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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relevance of the western capital structure theories 
- 
the 
static trade-off theory and the pecking order model 
- 
in providing plausible 
explanation of Malaysian corporate financing decisions from 1991 to 2000. To 
achieve this objective, the empirical analyses have been divided into three parts: 
(1) the first analysis examines the determinants of capital structure based on the 
Malaysian proposed factors and the theory-related attributes. (2) The second part 
tests the static trade-off theory (via target-adjustment model) and the pecking 
order model, separately and jointly, in seeking the applicability of the theory 
descriptions. (3) The final analysis evaluates the performance of the developed 
models when judged on explanatory power. The empirical analyses of the thesis 
adapt Shyam-Sunder and Myers' (1999) model specifications and the subsequent 
criticisms by Chirinko and Singha (2000), with several revisions and adjustments 
to fit our enquiry. 
Descriptive exploration on the data finds six distinct financing patterns, which 
range from 'no-leverage' financing to 'all-leverage' financing. When these 
patterns are descriptively linked to the theoretical predictions, it seems that both 
the static trade-off and the pecking order models do have some relevance in 
providing overall description of Malaysian firms' financing behaviour. 
These preliminary inferences are empirically tested using a panel data framework. 
The results suggest strong association between industry and firms' financing 
decisions, even if there are possibilities that some results may not show the 
significant relation. For other capital structure determinants, the findings support 
the general claim that most leverage-related factors identified in the developed 
economy also apply to other countries as well, despite institutional differences. 
The findings also indicate that the descriptions of both models are relevant in 
explaining firms' financing decisions. In addition, the findings embrace the semi- 
strong assumption of the pecking order model, and the negative relation between 
past profitability and changes in debt level. To test the power of the developed 
models, the model specifications are fitted to several hypothetical financing series. 
The fitted tests conclude that the stronger performance of the pecking order model 
than in the target-adjustment model, as claimed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), is a limited view. The results show that the pecking order model has 
generated a false fit (cc) when it incorrectly fits the target-adjustment series just as 
well as its own pecking order series. On the other hand, the tests have 
demonstrated the power of the target-adjustment model. The procedure in 
generating the series, the underlying assumption of the pecking order model, the 
subjective proxies for leverage predictors and the different background of the 
sample may be the plausible contributing factors to these findings. 
Based on descriptive exploration and panel data study, this thesis concludes that 
the descriptions of both the static trade-off theory and the pecking order model are 
consistent with Malaysian firms' financing decisions. However, the answer to 
which model can better describe firms' financing behaviour remains inconclusive. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER1 
AIMS OF THE THESIS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relevance of different capital structure 
theories in explaining the financing behaviour of firms from Malaysia. Essentially, 
firms' financing decision plays an integral part in sustaining a firm's value- 
maximisation objective. The value of firm is determined by discounting the stream 
of expected cash flows generated by the firm's acquired assets. Suppliers of 
finance in the acquisition of these assets have various types of claims on the firm's 
cash flow. The mix of the diverse funds obtained by the firm defines its capital 
structure. 
In identifying a firm's capital structure, Megginson (1997) describes it as applying 
strictly to permanent or long run capital that supports a firm's operation. Although 
any firm's capital structure can be measured by examining the balance sheet, the 
literature on firms' financing patterns has tended to focus on large corporations in 
developed economies. However, more recent capital structure literature has been 
shifting its direction to include evidence from other parts of the world. 
Megginson (1997) cites that there are two basic questions that arise when 
discussing the subject of capital structure. First, can changing the composition of 
the financing mix change the market value of firm? Second, if capital structure 
does matter, what are the determining factors? Quoting from Megginson on the 
importance of having answers to both questions: 
2 
"If capital structure does matter, and if we could determine precisely 
which factors were critical, the benefits to society would be immense. 
Corporate managers could always ensure that their companies were being 
financed at the lowest possible cost, investors could confidently entrust 
their savings to financial markets that guaranteed maximum return for 
minimum risk, and public policy-makers could design a regulatory and 
taxation regime that maximised aggregate output at minimum possible risk 
to the nation's economic stability" (pg. 305). 
Achieving a balance between maximum return and minimum risk in sustaining 
growth of a nation is a challenging task, especially in developing countries such as 
Malaysia with resource constraints and limited infrastructure. As an emerging 
market, Malaysia has undergone several phases of economic transformation in the 
last decade. Considerable capital inflows during the early and mid- I 990s have led 
to an overheating of the economy. Malaysia began to realise the importance of 
sustaining future growth and develoPment through resourceful financing. In the 
recent Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the Malaysian government has resorted to 
its own comprehensive yet controversial currency and capital control regime. 
They claimed that the measures undertaken have been able to halt the crisis from 
worsening. Given the dissimilar institutional variables and economic experiences, 
would the financing practices of firms in Malaysia differ from those in the 
developed economies? In other words, would Malaysian firms be subjected to 
similar motives, as in firms from western economy, in determining their capital 
structure if the country's economic orientations differ from the west? 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The literature on capital structure has focused around two main theories, the static 
trade-off and the pecking order theories. Prior to providing empirical evidence on 
their relevance, the descriptive analysis of this thesis attempts to document the 
3 
broad financing patterns of firms in Malaysia. This- process involves exploring the 
data for possible distinct financing trends, and relating the observed patterns to the 
movement in the economy for a period spanning 10 years from 1991 to 2000. 
Following the lead of many prior empirical studies (Myers, 1984; Friend & 
Hasbrouk, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999), this thesis reinvestigates the determinants of capital 
structure based on firm-specific factors, especially those variables found in 
Malaysian-based studies. For example, Annuar and Shamsher (1993), and 
Mohamad (1995) have documented evidence on the significant industry-effect on 
Malaysian corporate financing decision. The usual way of testing capital structure 
determinants has been mostly through cross-sectional analyses. However, this 
thesis uses panel data approach to test the significance of the attributes. As panel 
data takes into account both firm and time varying elements, we expect the 
pooling of time series and cross-sectional observation to be more informative. 
Further, this thesis seeks empirical evidence on whether the static trade-off and 
the pecking order models are able to explain firms' financing behaviour. The 
models developed for the analysis are adapted from the time-series capital 
structure models of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). However, Chirinko and 
Singha (2000) have questioned the practicality of the strict pecking order model 
introduced in Shyam-Sunder and Myers' paper. They claim that the simple test of 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers generates misleading inferences when evaluating 
plausible external financing patterns. Taking this criticism into consideration, we 
develop our version of the time-series target-adjustment and pecking order models 
4 
after making some changes to the assumptions in the original models. Finally, 
presenting the validity of the capital structure theories in the Malaysian context 
also calls for checking to see which of the two developed models provide a better 
description of the financing behaviour. This objective is achieved by performing 
statistical explanatory power tests on several simulated financing series. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis deals with three issues. The first issue looks into the determinants of 
capital structure at firm level. In essence, the analysis on this issue re-examines 
the possible importance of firm-specific factors such as industry, asset 
composition, operating risk, and profitability in explaining the variation in 
Malaysian finns' observed debt levels. Further, the analysis on this issue seeks 
consistency on the claims made by several Malaysian-based studies (Muhammad, 
1998; Mohamad, 1995; Annuar & Shamsher, 1993) about the effect of some 
factors on Malaysian corporate financing decisions. The second issue examines 
the possibility to discriminate among competing capital structure theories at 
aggregate level. It examines the extent to which the traditional capital structure 
theories 
- 
the static trade-off theory and pecking order model 
- 
work in Malaysia. 
Finally, the third issue seeks to find a better empirical-based model of corporate 
leverage that could provide plausible explanation of Malaysian firms' financing 
behaviour. With those initial ideas put forward, the study focuses on answering 
the following specific questions: 
1. Does economic cycle have any influence in describing firms' broad 
financing patterns? 
2. Is the observed financing pattern of Malaysian firms industry specific? 
5 
3. Are the proposed firm-specific factors in Malaysian capital structure 
similar to those cited in the literature? 
4. Can the static trade-off and the pecking order models explain Malaysian 
firms' financing behaviour? 
5. Which capital structure model provides better explanation of firms' 
financing behaviour? 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The past two decades have marked a major growth in the Malaysian equity 
market. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) has become the largest 
exchange in ASEAN, ranking third in the Asia Pacific region after Japan and 
Hong Kong in early 1997 (Thilainathan, 1998). However, for years, debt markets 
in Malaysia seemed to lack depth and breadth, especially with regard to price 
efficiency. The economic tL=oil that hit the Asian region in late 1997 has 
reinforced awareness of the need for a sizeable debt market, as an alternative way 
for Malaysian firms to raise funds. Firms can no longer rely on banks for funds as 
financial institutions became more preoccupied with NPLs in the latter part of 
1997 and into 1998 as the economy contracted. To accomplish the task, the 
government has made efforts to finiher develop the corporate bond market. In 
stimulating the supply of corporate bonds in the market, the govemment has 
addressed issues relating in governing corporate bonds and the issuance process. 
In additions, steps are taken to diversify sources of financing as a way to reduce 
the firms' over dependency on the banking system. 
The Malaysian economy has also seen the emergence of Islamic debt securities, 
which quickly, have become increasingly recognised by market participants. This 
market functions in parallel with the conventional market. Its presence adds 
6 
variety to the financing alternatives that firms could explore, in addition to 
conventional debt instruments, with the introduction of Islamic debt securities, 
Islamic unit trusts, warrants and several others. With various financing 
instruments available, this thesis seeks to examine whether Malaysian firms' 
financing behaviour would differ from those described in the capital structure 
literature. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis claims two contributions to the body of knowledge, descriptively and 
empirically. 
The thesis claims the contribution to the body of knowledge on the descriptive 
approach adopted to document firms' financing patterns. In identifying plausible 
external financing patterns, instead of employing any sophisticated statistical tests, 
a firm's Balance Sheet, and Profit and Loss Statement are utilised to construct a 
simplified fund flow statement. In the fund flow statement, deficits in the net fund 
flow are met by acquiring external funds, either through issuance of shares or 
loans. Whenever there are surpluses, firms will either repay loans or repurchase 
equity. In essence, this approach is able to link firms' financing strategies to 
economic cycle (a cycle from the pre-economic crisis period through the crisis and 
until post-crisis) and theoretical predictions. In carrying out a study of this kind, 
this approach may possibly serve as a preliminary step in describing firms' 
financing behaviour. In fact, this type of descriptive approach can provide some 
cursory insights about firms' financing background in developing hypotheses for 
an exploratory study of similar type. 
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Empirically, the thesis contributes to the body of knowledge by providing 
evidence of financing descriptions in Malaysia, a country that has different 
macroeconomic, political and social background from those in the developed 
economy. Thus far, most of the capital structure work has been focusing on 
financing practices in developed economies. Indeed, theoretical contributions that 
led to the discussion of corporate leverage theories were initially developed on 
western economic orientations. Of late, the discussion on corporate leverage has 
extended to include data from other economic backgrounds, particularly from 
developing countries. Nonetheless, the evidence from developing economies is 
still limited, especially on the applicability of the capital structure theory in firms' 
financing decisions. Specifically in Malaysia, the evidence on competing capital 
structure hypotheses is confined to a survey conducted by Kester and Mansor 
(1994) on CEOs' capital structure preferences. This thesis adds to the ongoing 
literature by offering evidence from an emerging market economy. The thesis 
examines the relevance of the capital structure theories in providing plausible 
explanations of firms' financing behaviour. In essence, this thesis attempts to 
reconcile the description of western capital structure theory with actual financing 
practices of firms from other economic backgrounds, i. e. bridging the gap between 
theory and practices. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The remaining chapters of the thesis are organised as follows: Chapter 2 is an 
overview of Malaysian capital market, specifically of the development of the 
equity and debt markets. The chapter begins with the early establishment and 
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development of the stock exchange. The discussion traces Malaysian economic 
events throughout the last decade, focusing on the Asian economic crisis of 1997- 
98. This part of the discussion briefly explains the measures taken by the 
government in supporting the economic progress through active development of 
the private debt market. The chapter also looks into the Islamic capital market, 
and then at the differential tax treatment of dividends and interest in the Malaysian 
corporation taxation system. 
Chapter 3 reviews the available literature on capital structure. The discussion 
begins with the early development of the various theories. The survey then 
becomes more specific, discussing the two main capital structure theories 
- 
the 
static trade-off and the pecking order model 
- 
along with the evidence for and 
against the respective theories. In addition to citing evidence from the developed 
economies, the literary work also includes evidence from other parts of the world. 
Subsequently, the discussion concentrates on the Malaysian evidence. 
Chapter 4 explains the data collection procedures beginning from the gathering of 
the raw data to the transformation of the data into a workable data set. In addition, 
the chapter lists the testable hypotheses for the proposed analyses. 
Chapter 5 presents a preliminary examination on the firms' financing profiles. The 
discussion of the chapter begins with narrative descriptions of the identified 
financing patterns, and then links these patterns to industry membership and 
economic events. Further, the discussion in the chapter reports the performance of 
the key financial indicators during the period of the study. The final part of the 
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chapter provides descriptive statistics of the main variables for the research and 
offers preliminary empirical findings on several proposed relationships based on 
the sample. 
Chapter 6 ventures into the determinants of capital structure based on (1) the 
Malaysian-based proposed factors, and (2) the theory- supported factors. The 
chapter also submits the rationale for using panel data. Chapter 7 tests both the 
static trade-off (via target-adjustment model) and the pecking order models 
separately and jointly to examine whether both, either, or neither models are able 
to provide explanations of finns' financing behaviour. Chapter 8 evaluates the 
performance of the statistical explanatory power of both the target-adjustment and 
the pecking order models developed for this thesis. The experiment begins by 
generating two types of hypothetical financing time-series, one to reflect the target 
adjustment financing and the other to reflect the pecking order financing rules. In 
assessing the statistical explanatory power of the models, the chapter reports the 
findings from fitting both models' specifications into each hypothetical series, 
independently and jointly. 
Finally, Chapter 9 presents a synthesis of the research findings and conclusions. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the limitations of the research, the practical 
implications of this research, and ends with suggested recommendations for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MALAYSIAN CAPITAL MARKET: 
AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces the background of Malaysian economy and the development of 
the country's capital market. Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has 
undergone four major economic crises: the first two crises were the oil crises of 
1973-74 and 1980-81, the third crisis was the commodity crisis of 1985-86, and 
the most recent was the financial and currency crisis of 1997-98. The discussion in 
this chapter covers the development of the Malaysian capital market, specifically 
the equity and bond markets. A major part of the discussion concentrates on 
Malaysian economic cycle throughout the 90s, especially during the wake of the 
Asian economic crisis of 1997-98. The dates identified in the discussion are only 
to describe the economic events in chronological order and will not be utilised in 
the analyses of this thesis. 
The chapter begins with the development of the stock market and the exchange 
during the economic transformation. Subsequent discussion covers the measures 
taken by the government to fixther enhance the competitiveness of the market as a 
precaution against further economic turmoil. This part describes the government's 
effort to accelerate the development of private debt market as an alternative source 
of financing. In line with the effort, the country's bond market has gradually 
gained significant market share and offered a wide range of financial products. 
II 
An alternative to the aforementioned market is the Islamic capital market. A look 
on the recent emergence of the Islamic capital market is essential as this market 
works in parallel with the conventional market. Finally, the chapter ends with the 
discussion on the corporate tax treatment of dividend and interest as they allegedly 
play some part in influencing firms' financing preferences. 
2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF MALAYSIAN CAPITAL MARKET 
Malaysia, a middle-income country, transformed itself from 1971 through late 
1990s from a producer of raw materials into an emerging multi-sector economy. 
Growth is almost exclusively driven by exports, particularly electronic goods. In 
ensuring social stability and growth, Malaysia has adopted the Japanese economic 
model, especially in maintaining strong links between government and businesses, 
export-led growth and productivity through technological innovation. Social and 
political factors also have a powerful influence on the country's economic matters, 
particularly through policies to preserve economic prosperity in this multi-racial 
setting. 
Malaysia's capital markets comprise both the conventional as well as Islamic 
markets for medium and long-term financial assets. In implementing the function 
as financial intermediaries, the roles of these markets have become increasingly 
important especially in recent years. Among the various markets, the equity 
market is the most mature. Briefly, the equity market in Malaysia can be traced 
back to the early establishment of Malayan Stock Exchange in March 1960. 
However, the trading of securities only began in May 1960 in the clearinghouse of 
the central bank, namely the Bank Negara Malaysia (or BNM hereafter). The 
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BNM subsequently established the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) in 1968 to 
R 
supervise the issue of shares and other securities by companies applying for listing 
in the stock exchange. Subsequently, the government split The Malayan Stock 
Exchange into Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES) in 1973 following the termination of the interchangeability of 
currency with Singapore and the floating of Malaysian currency. Formal rules and 
regulations were drawn up following the split. The discussion in this section 
however, concentrates on the economic transformations experienced by the 
country over the last decade. 
In retrospect, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) has divided the economic 
transformation of Malaysian capital market into three phases: (1) Phase 1: Post 
Mid-1980s Recession. (2) Phase 2: The Superbull Run of 1993 and (3) Phase 3: 
The Asian Crisis of 1997-1998. 
2.2.1 PHASE 1: POST MID-1980s RECESSION: 1988-90 
In the commodity crisis of 1985-86, the Malaysian equity market faced a 
challenge following the collapse of a Singaporean incorporated publicly listed 
company, Pan-Electric Industries (Pan-El), which caused instability in the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore (SES). This experience led the goverment to announce 
the de-listing of Malaysian registered firms from the SES. The announcement 
called for significant improvements to the stockbroking industry, corporate 
disclosure enhancement, and protection of shareholders' interest. These upgrades 
emphasised the goverriment's effort to develop the domestic capital market by 
establishing the KLSE as an independent exchange, and to confine dealings of 
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Malaysian securities only to the local exchange. The purpose was to attract 
international investors as well as reduce the market's vulnerability to unfavourable 
development in the neighbouring exchange. By this split, Malaysia had been able 
to attract considerable capital inflows into the KLSE. 
This split however, resulted in the establishment of a new over-the-counter market 
known as CLOB (Central Limit Order Book International) on the same day in 
Singapore. CLOB listed 133 actively traded Malaysian stocks and 6 other foreign 
stocks. Nonetheless, CLOB was declared unofficial by the KLSE, as this market 
was not bound by any corporate disclosure rules and listing requirements. Many 
challenges related to the efficiency of the KLSE and the capacities of the local 
stockbrokers have become apparent resulting from the split and the emergence of 
CLOB. Another part of the effort to transfonn the KLSE into a world-class stock 
exchange was the modernisation of the KLSE by implementing the automated 
trading system, known as SCORE, and central depository system (CDS). 
2.2.2 PHASE 2: THE SUPERBULL RUN OF 1993 
In 1993, strong economic performance in Malaysia prompted substantial inflows 
k 
of short-term capital funds into the market. With a moderate level of inflation, the 
country achieved its sixth successive year of sustained growth above 8 percent. By 
September of that year, share prices and market tumover reached their 
phenomenal record highs. On 5 January of 1994, the Kuala Lumpur Composite 
Index (KLCI) reached a peak of 1,314 points before undergoing a sharp 
correction. 
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Compared to neighbouring countries, Malaysia had positioned itself comfortably 
Ný 
with lower debt ratio and high savings, thus having relatively strong economic 
fundamentals (Cheng & Hossain, 2000). The BNM, in one of its reports, showed 
the results of a survey conducted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
in 1991 on emerging stock markets. The survey identified Malaysia as one of the 
markets with the most liberal exchange control systems. In addition, the report 
indicated that there were tax advantages in the Malaysian stock market arising 
from the exemption of both dividends and capital gains from taxes. 
However, during the course of the rise in KLCI, stock market speculation and 
asset price inflation began to emerge and led to further price inflation. The central 
bank (BNM) faced a dilemma of conflict in policy objectives. On one hand, the 
government felt that the imposed high interest rates would ensure a strong 
economic growth of the country. On the other hand, these high rates would 
promote inflows of speculative fimds. These concerns were said to be among the 
factors that triggered the subsequent correction in the KLCI after its all time high. 
To lessen the anxiety, the government established the Securities Commission (SC) 
in March 1993. This agency assumed the responsibility for regulating and 
supervising the securities industry. 
2.2.3 PHASE 3: THE ASIAN CRISIS OF 1997-98 
Although the positive sentiment in 1996 extended into early 1997, there remained 
some weaknesses in the economy, especially with regard to the strong dependency 
of financial institutions on lending to the property sector and stock market. The 
triggering event at the onset of the crisis was the floating of the Thai bhat in July 
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1997. With the devaluation of the Thai bhat, strong pressures began building up 
against the Malaysian ringgit. The authorities initially attempted to defend the 
ringgit by increasing interest rates. However, the persistence of the exchange rate 
pressures indicated that the volatility of the currency would be longer term. The 
instability in the currency markets then fed into the stock market. Despite 
allegedly strong economic fundamentals, the crisis that hit the neighbouring 
countries spread into Malaysia as panic-stricken investors began withdrawing 
short-term capital flows from the country. The liquidation of portfolio positions in 
the stock market forced the KLSE to crash. The situation was worst in the banking 
sector as NPLs continued to mount. The volume of lending began to slow and 
credit worthiness of some borrowers was impaired by the higher interest rates. 
The crisis, which initially started as a currency crisis, became a full fledged 
financial crisis (Bhattacharya, 2001), hitting predominantly the exchange rate, the 
banking sectors, and the stock and property markets. The impact took a heavy toll 
on the economy with GDP falling by 7.5 percent in 1998. 
To combat the crisis, the govenu-nent implemented selective exchange controls on 
I September 1998. In essence, the government adopted a temporary currency and 
capital control regime in its new policy that includes the fixed pegging of the 
Malaysian ringgit to the US dollar (3.8 ringgit/US$). The main objectives of the 
control policies were to halt the speculative pressure on the ringgit by eliminating 
all international financial transactions other than those related to trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and to provide stability through a pegged exchange rate. 
The immediate achievement of these controls was the closing offshore market, 
which created the scope for lowering domestic interest rate (Hood, 2001). The 
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government recognised some structural weaknesses in the Malaysian financial 
system that would have to be addressed. For this part, Hood (2001) sees these 
controls as providing a breathing space during which the goverment could 
strategise programmes to deal with the weaknesses. The Malaysian government 
used economic stimulus measures very cautiously as they refused to seek 
assistance from any international finance organisation (Chotigeat & Lin, 2001). 
Further, Chotigeat and Lin (2001) state that the corrective measures adopted thus 
far seem to be succeeding. The controls have provided insurance against the 
consequence of further disturbances in interest rates and volatility of exchange 
rates. 
2.3 THE KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE 
Under the Malaysian Securities Industry Act 1973 (currently known as the 
Securities Industry Act 1983), the government incorporated the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) as a limited liability company in July 1973. The main 
objective of the establishment of the exchange was to provide a marketplace for 
raising new funds and for transacting shares, bonds, and various other securities of 
Malaysian listed firms. 
0 
The KLSE is a self-regulatory organisation whose tasks are threefold. First, the 
organisation is in charge of governing the conduct of its members and of the 
member stock broking companies in securities dealings. Second, it is accountable 
for stiPulating the listing requirements and maintaining disclosure standards by 
public listed companies. Third, it is also responsible for the surveillance of the 
market place. The regulatory framework that governs the exchange is designed to 
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maintain investors' confidence in promoting fair and open price formation, 
p 
providing protection for investors, and ensuring prompt and reliable information 
sharing. 
To cope with the increasingly competitive capital market, the exchange has also 
been converted from a non-profit mutual company limited by the guarantee of its 
members to a public company limited by shares in January 2004. Shortly, on 20 
April 2004, the exchange has announced the changing of its name to Bursa 
Malaysia (Malaysia Exchange). This newly acquired name reflects its role as the 
6one centre' for the trading of all types of financial securities in Malaysia. 
However, in this chapter and throughout the thesis, we still refer this exchange as 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) for consistency with earlier writers. 
2.3.1 THE LISTING REQUIREMENTS 
Companies that meet certain requirements can apply for listing on the exchange, 
and the sectors in which they are classified reflect their core businesses. These 
requirements ensure an orderly development of the capital market. Based on the 
fulfilment of the requirements set forth by the exchange and the Securities 
Commission, however, not all companies qualify to be listed on the main board. In 
November 1988, KLSE established the Second Board, which complement the 
Main Board, to enable small and medium size companies with strong potential 
growth to seek a listing on the exchange. 
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Table 2.1 below summarises the requirement for the companies to qualify listing 
9 
into the Main Board and Second Board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE). 
TABLE 2.1 SUMMARY OF THE LISTING REQUIREMENTS' 
NIAIN BOARD SECOND BOARD 
1. Issued and Paid-up Capital: 1. Issued and Paid-up Capital: 
A public company seeking listing and A public company seeking listing and 
quotation for its securities on the Main Board quotation for its securities on the Second Board 
should have a minimum paid-up capital of should have a minimum paid-up capital of 
RM60 million, comprising ordinary shares of RM40 million, comprising ordinary shares of 
not less than 10 sen each. not less than 10 sen each. 
At least 25% of the company's issued and paid At least 25% of the company's issued and paid 
up capital at the time of listing shall be in the up capital at the time of listing shall be in the 
hands of public shareholders. The company hands of public shareholders. The company 
should ensure that at least 750 shareholders are must ensure that at least 500 shareholders are 
public shareholders who are not employees. public shareholders who are not employees. 
2. Historical Profit Performance: 2. Historical Profit Performance: 
The company should have an uninterrupted The company should have an uninterrupted 
after-tax profit record for the past three (3) to after-tax profit record for the past three (3) to 
five (5) full financial years, an aggregate after- five (5) full financial years, an aggregate after- 
tax profit of at least RM30 million over the tax profit of at least RM12 million over the 
aforesaid period of uninterrupted after-tax aforesaid period of uninterrupted after-tax 
profit and a minimum after-tax profit of RM8 profit and a minimum after-tax profit of R. N14 
million for the most recent financial year. million for the most recent financial year. 
3. Others 3. Others 
Some other factors which could show financial Some other factors which could show financial 
stability, and corporate disclosure requirement. stability, and corporate disclosure requirement. 
Source: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
The Main and Second Board were later complemented by MESDAQ. This over- 
the-counter establishment, which commenced trading in April 1999, has the 
objective to provide a market for young, high-growth and high technology 
companies to raise capital as well as to promote the development of technology- 
intensive industry. This market, which attempts to position itself as the emerging 
regional equivalent of NASDAQ in the US, was later merged with KLSE in 2001 
' The recent updated requirements can be retrieved from the official website of Bursa Malaysia; 
hIU2: //www. bursaTnalgysia. com/website/listin! ý/listin2reqs mbsb. htm, 
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to form a single Malaysia exchange for the capital market. After a thin listing 
during its early trading (i. e. 3 firms listed in 2001), the number of listed firms had 
grown to 107 by December 2005. 
2.3.2 THE LISTING STATISTICS 
As of the end of 2000, there were 795 firms listed on the KLSE as compared to 
only 250 companies listed in the early 80s, an increase of more than 200 percent 
over the 20-year period. Out of the 795 firms, the Main Board has 498 listed 
% firms, while the remaining 297 firms were on the Second Board. Market 
capitalisation grew from RM43.1 billion in 1980 to over RM400 billion in 2000. 
The statistics on the finns' distribution since 1980 are as in the following table. 
TABLE 2.2 TOTAL NUMBERS OF LISTED COMPANIES IN THE MAIN 
BOARD, SECOND BOARD AND MESDAQ MARKET 
(AS AT 30 DEC 2005) 
YEAR NIALN BOARD SECOND BOARD -NIESDAQ 
-NIARKET 
TOTAL 
2005 647 268 107 1022 
2004 622 278 63 963 
2003 598 276 32 906 
2002 562 294 12 868 
2001 520 292 3 812 
2000* 498 297 
- 
795 
1999 474 283 
- 
757 
1998 454 282 
- 
736 
1997 444 264 
- 
708 
1996 413 208 
- 
621 
1995 369 160 
- 
529 
1994 347 131 
- 
478 
1993 329 84 
- 
413 
1992 317 52 
- 
369 
1991 292 32 
- 
324 
1990 271 14 
- 
285 
1989 305 2 
- 
307 
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1988 295 295 
1987 291 
- - 
291 
1986 288 
- - 
288 
1985 284 
- 
- 
284 
1984 282 
- 
- 
282 
1983 271 
- - 
271 
1982 261 
- 
261 
1981 253 
- 
253 
1980 250 
- 
250 
Source: http: //ýww. bursamalavsia. coi? ilAýebsitellistinzllistinjzstats. htm 
2.4 THE BOND MARKET 
In Malaysia, the Ringgit bond market has been a significant source of financing 
for various development projects. The market comprises the government securities 
market and the private debt securities market. In the 80s and early 90s, Malaysian 
Government Securities (MGS) had essentially dominated the bond market, as the 
private debt securities market was practically nonexistent. MGS were issued in 
the early years to meet the investment needs of the Employees' Provident Fund, 
banks and insurance companies. MGS also served to fund public sector 
development expenditure. Due to the reduction in the government's borrowing 
programme, the new MGS issues had slowed in the period from 1988 to 1997, and 
only picked up from late 1999 onwards. 
Sharma (2001) states that the underdeveloped bond or PDS market in the region 
was due to the strong links between banks, companies, and government that 
encouraged the increase in firms' borrowing through domestic and foreign banks. 
Apparently, as Malaysian economy has modelled after the Japanese, Sharma's 
mentioned links are observable in the country. Sharma illustrates the situation of 
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the corporate bond market in Southeast Asia during the period in Figure 2.1 
k 
r. 
below. 
FIGURE 2.1 INSTITUTIONAL FORCES BEHIND LIMITED BOND ISSUANCE IN 
THE LATE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s (SHARMA, 2001)2 
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Source: Sharma, K (2001) The Underlying Constraints on Corporate Bond Market Development in Southeast 
Asia, World Development, V29, N8, pg 1405-1419. 
In addition to the strong relation that bank lending created between govenunent, 
banks and corporate borrowers as illustrated above, Harwood (1993) states that 
among other factors that contribute to the underdeveloped Malaysia's PDS market 
during that period was the difficulty to encourage corporations to borrow outside 
the banking system and the cumbersome approval process for issuing bond. 
Unless the regulators come up with more attractive features to warrant a shift 
away from bank loans, banking system will continue to satisfy the need of 
borrowers. In addition, the long approval process makes corporate bond become 
less attractive if market conditions change within the time frame. Consequently, 
corporate issuers tend to shy away from the market. 
2 Sharma's original chart attempts to illustrate the situation of the corporate bond market in 
Southeast Asia in general. Due to the similarity in the market orientations of the countries in the 
region, we could also apply these institutional forces to Malaysia as well. 
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In line with the government's aspiration to promote the private sector as the 
engine for growth, the private debt securities (PDS) market has undergone rapid 
development. It- aimed to provide alternative to bank borrowings and complement 
the more mature market in MGS and equities, particularly aimed to meet the 
financing needs of privatised infrastructure projects. Although the MGS 
dominated the bond market, its secondary market was relatively inactive. 
Meanwhile, the PDS has improved significantly, as funds generated through PDS 
have dominated the funds provided by the private sector. This reflects the 
p increased recourse to PDS as an alternative source of financing. 
p 
With the shift in policy, the government began downsizing its operations, 
reducing its involvement in the economy and allowing domestic financial 
resources to support private sector activities. Privatisation has become the main 
route. This privatisation policy was set out to encourage private sector activities 
through tax incentives and financial liberalisation, as to foster foreign investment 
in local private industry. The Ministry of Finance has also set up Khazanah 
Nasional Berhad in September 1993 to manage all commercial assets held by the 
government and undertake strategic investments. Holding the role as the 
government investment house, Khazanah has the primary objectives to manage 
investment entrusted to it by the government and to undertake new investments in 
strategic, high technology sectors and projects in the national interest. To date, 
Khazanah holds substantial controlling stakes in 24 government-linked companies 
(GLCs). Amongst the GLCs are the national automobiles company (Proton 
Holdings), the national telecommunication company (Telekorn Malaysia), the 
national utility company (Tenaga Nasional) and Malaysian Airline System 
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(MAS). To date, GLCs have accounted for approximately 40 percent of the 
Composite Index (KLCI). 
Moreover, to diversify the financing resources away from the banking sector, the 
government has enhanced the role of the corporate bond market as a financier of 
domestic economic activities. To support the rapid development of the market, the 
government took into account several considerations. First, following the 
privatisation policy, there is a need to meet the financing needs of the expanding 
P Malaysian economy. Second, to provide alternative avenues for savings in a wide 
range of financial assets. Third, the need to provide cost-effective financing 
sources to cater the increased sophistication of corporate borrowers. In an effort to 
further strengthen the stability of the financial system, the government has 
introduced several measures to bring discipline to the banking sectors. In March 
1998, in restructuring and revitalising the banking system, the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM) announced a restructuring of the country's financial institutions: 
some are to be restructured into several anchor groups while the remainder are to 
be absorbed by their parent banks. 
A In coordinating the development of the bond market, the government has 
established the National Bond Market Committee (NBMC) in 1999. The NBMC 
provides overall policy direction for the systematic development of the bond 
market and recommends appropriate implementation strategies. The government 
has also made the Securities Commission (SC) the single regulatory authority over 
the corporate bond market as from I July 2000. To promote a more active and 
vibrant PDS market, the SC has introduced guidelines for the issuance of PDS to 
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provide a smooth and efficient approval process for all debt proposals. The KLSE 
and the Securities Commission (SC), in a concerted effort, have also implemented 
a series of measures in the PDS market to ensure that-the regulatory framework is 
facilitative, transparent, cost efficient and effective. 
To complement the role of traditional lenders, the range of debt securities has also 
widened in tandem with the growth in the market. The PDS market comprises 
various types of instruments with the range covering fixed rate, floating rate, zero- 
coupon, convertible/non-convertible and secured/unsecured. The maturity ranges 
from three to 20 years. The PDS instruments also include issues that are based on 
Islamic principles. Table 2.3 summarises the types of instrument offered by the 
bond market. 
TABLE 2.3 TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS IN THE 'RINGGIT' BOND MARKET 
Malaysian Government MGS are long-term government securities with interest payable semi annually. 
Securities (MGS) The maturity period of MGS is normally above one year and the coupon rate is 
determined by the weighted average of the yield. 
Malaysian treasury Bills MTB are short-term government securities and are bid for on a yield basis. The 
(MTB) yield is specified as a rate of discount and the life of MTB; is expressed in actual 
number of days (normally 91 days) 
Government Investment GII are government securities issued based on Islamic principles and are placed 
Issues (GII) on non-competitive tender. 
Bank Negara Malaysia BNB are short-term securities issued by Bank Negara Malaysia and are bid for 
Bills (BNB) on a yield basis. The yield specifies the rate of discount and the maturity period 
of BNB is expressed in actual number of days. 
Cagamas' Instruments: 
" Floating Rate Bonds These bond are of medium/long-term tenor with an adjustable coupon rate. The 
interest is payable either semi annually or quarterly basis. 
" Fixed Rate Bonds These bonds are fixed-coupon medium/long-term bonds where interest is 
payable semi annually. 
" Cagamas Notes These notes are short-term securities with a maturity period of 12 months or 
less. The notes are similar to MTB and normally issued at discount. 
3 Cagamas Berhad, the national mortgage corporation, primarily issues Cagamas debt securities to 
fund its purchases of loans and debts. Established in 1986 to promote secondary mortgage market 
in Malaysia, Cagamas Berhad has a corporate mission to provide financial products that would 
make housing loans more accessible and affordable to Malaysians, particularly the lower income 
group. 
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Islamic Notes- Al These debt securities are of medium-term issued under the Islamic Principle of 
Mudharabah A] Mudharabah with a pre-determined profit sharing ratio. 
Commercial Paper CP is a revolving short-term paper with period of not less than one month but 
(CP) not more than 12 months. These securities are similar to MTB and are normally 
issued at discount. 
Medium-Term Notes MTNs are instruments with life of more than one year but up to 5 years, and may 
(MTNs) be issued based on conventional or Islamic principle. The mode of issue of 
MTNs can either be on direct placement and/or by way of tender. 
Corporate bonds The issuer may issue these long-term bonds based on Islamic or conventional 
principle, and with fixed/floating rate bonds or without interest (zero coupon 
bonds) attached. The interest maybe payable on a quarterly, semi annually or 
annually depending on the cash flows of the issuer. 
4 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia at http: //ýmbondbnm. gov. my 
Furthermore, all tradable PDS must be rated to ensure confidence, and to assist in 
the investment decision-making process. Malaysia's first credit rating agency, 
Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad (RAM), was incorporated in November 1990 to 
serve this need. Amongst its functions are to rate all PDS and disseminate timely 
information to potential investors in both the primary and the secondary markets. 
As demand increases, a second credit rating agency, Malaysian Rating Agency 
Corporation Berhad (MARC), was established in September 1996 to complement 
To cope with the 1997-98 financial crisis, the govenunent has also set up three 
distinct agencies: Danaharta, Danamodal, and the Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Committee (CDRC). The establishment of Danaharta, an asset-management 
company, and Danamodal, a special purpose recapitalisation agency, was aimed 
to restore confidence in banking institutions. The primary assignment of 
Danaharta was to acquire and manage the NPLs of fmancial institutions. 
Established at the same time, the government has given a mandate to Danamodal 
to authorise the recapitalisation of the financially weak banking institutions by 
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holding representation on the board of directors after the shareholders absorbed 
the loss and diluted their ownership. Meanwhile, the third agency, the CDRC has 
the task of assisting both debtors and creditors to find out-of-court solutions to 
their debt problems. By end of 1999, Cheng and Hossain (2000) claimed that 
these agencies have made significant progresses in facilitating and accelerating 
corporate debt restructuring and participating in the bond market. In line with this 
claim, Danaharta has recently announced that it has achieved its objectives and 
will cease operation by the end of 2005, only after seven and a half years in 
I operation, when initially the government estimated that the agency would take 10 
years to stabilise the economy following the Asian financial crisis. 
With increased participation in the market, the PDS market has gained significant 
market share. The following Figure 2.2 illustrates the development and growth of 
debt instruments in Malaysia from 1987 to 1999. 
FIGURE 2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PDS MARKET (RM BILLION) 
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As shown, the PDS market rose from RMOA billion as at end of 1987 to RM80 
billion at the end of August 1999. By the end of September 2001, total outstanding 
PDS has amounted to RM 152 billion (Economic Report 2000/200 1). Based on the 
mentioned figures, PDS outstanding have grown by nearly 380 times in the 
fifteen-year period from 1987 to 2001. The market of PDS currently contributes to 
more than 30 percent of Malaysia's GDP. 
2.5 ISLAMIC CAPITAIL MARKET 
0 In Malaysia, Islamic equity investment has started as early as the mid- I 960s when 
Lembaga Tabung Haji (Pilgrims Fund Board) was established. However, the first 
Islamic paper was successfully issued by Shell Malaysia in 1990. The 
I 
establishment of Bank Islam (Islamic Bank), takaful companies (i. e. Islamic 
insurance companies) and Islamic banking divisions has proactively led to the 
development of the Islamic capital market (ICM). Islamic capital market refers to 
the market where activities are carried out in ways that do not conflict with the 
principles of Islam, especially with respect to the strict enforcement of the 
prohibition on paying and receiving interest ('riba ). Other prohibited activities in 
Islam include those activities that involve 'gharar' or elements of ambiguity and 
gambling. Islam defines ambiguity as having an element of deception through 
ignorance of the price or through faulty description of the goods, in which both 
seller and buyer stand to be deceived by their unawareness of the essential 
element of exchange. Meanwhile, gambling as defined in Islam is an activity that 
involves betting whereby winner takes all and loser looses all. 
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In accordance with these principles, ICM comprises two distinct markets: the 
primary market and the secondary market. The former is a market that offers new 
issues of Islamic securities to the public and institutions, whereas the latter trades 
existing Islamic paper and securities. The market has functioned as a parallel 
market to the conventional market for financial seekers and providers. The 
Govenunent Investment Act 1983 allows the government to issue non-interest- 
bearing government paper to the public based on Islamic principles. The current 
Islamic instruments available in the government securities market are the 
0 Government Investment Issues (GII) and the Malaysian Islamic Savings Bond. 
There are two major components of the Islamic corporate securities market: the 
Islamic debt securities market and the Islamic equity market. Islamic debt 
securities (IDS) have become increasingly accepted, with various types of Islamic 
debt instruments. These Islamic debt securities comprise the medium-term Islamic 
bonds and short-term Islamic commercial paper. As of June 1999, the outstanding 
IDS amounted to RM17.1 billion, comprising RM14.3 billion of Islamic bonds 
and RM2.8 billion of Islamic commercial paper (Bank Negara Malaysia Annual 
Report). The issuance of Islamic PDS can be attributed to the higher demand for 
q the instruments by Islamic banking units and Islamic unit trust funds. To date, the 
market share of IDS has accounted for about 25 percent of the total outstanding 
PDS. The following Figure 2.3 shows the Islamic securities outstanding in the 
market as at end of 2003 and 2004, with Islamic PDS leading in volume. 
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FIGURE 2.3 OUTSTANDING ISLAMIC SECURITIES 
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Meanwhile, Islamic stock-broking operations, Islamic indices, Islamic Unit 
Trusts, and a list of permissible securities in the KLSE endorsed by the Securities 
Commission (SC), mark the presence of the Islamic equity market. Islamic equity 
market is essentially a subset of the conventional equity market. Only those 
securities whose activities fulfil certain guidelines are considered as Islamic 
equity. Currently, there are two Islamic indices: the RHB Islamic Index 
introduced in 1994 followed by the Syariah Index launched in April 1999. The 
Syariah Index tracks these 'Syariah-compliant' stocks in the KLSE, constructed 
0 from the list of 'Syariah-approved' securities issued by the SC based on the 
deliberation of the Syariah Advisory Council of the SC. The Syariah Advisory 
Council (SAC) was formed in May 1996 to assist the development of the ICM. 
This council holds the task to assess and evaluate existing instruments and 
ensuring the operations of ICM are in accordance with all Syariah principles. As 
at the end of April 2004, the Syariah Advisory Council has approved 741 
securities out of the 924 total securities, which accounted for 80 percent of the 
I 
total listed securities. The SAC updates the list progressively over time by 
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including newly approved securities and excluding existing securities that no 
longer meet the criteria set forth. 4 
Malaysia's Islamic capital market (ICM) has experienced significant growth over 
the years. As of the first quarter of 2005, Islamic financial instruments constituted 
over 26 percent (RMIOO. 9 billion) of the total financial instruments issued 
(RM382.8 billion), as compared to only 14 percent (RM38.9 billion) out of the 
total outstanding financial instrument (RM269.4 billion) in the year before (see 
6 Figure 2.4 below). 
FIGURE 2.4 GROWTH IN ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKET 
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High demand for Islamic securities, relatively more cost effective for corporate 
issuers, and the increased depth and breath of Islamic money market are said to be 
among the contributing factors that trigger growth of Malaysia's Islamic capital 
market (ICM). 
4 The most recent syariah approved list can be accessed through the Securities Commission official 
website at http: //w%Aw. sc. com. my/html/icm/fr icm. html 
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2.6 CORPORATE TAX TREATMENT OF INCOME ARISING FROM 
EQUITY AND DEBT 
0 
Malaysia's tax structure is based on the UK and Australian models, and is 
generally considered to be investment-friendly. The law governing income tax 
treatment in Malaysia is the Income Tax Act 1967. According to the Act, income 
of any Malaysian resident accrued and derivedfirom Malaysia or remittedjrom 
outside Malaysia into Malaysia will be taxed. However, for non-residents, only 
income derived from Malaysia will be taxed, while income arising from sources 
outside Malaysia is exempted from tax. In essence, Malaysia operates on 
imputation system of company taxation. Section 3.14, Paragraph 2 Part 1 of 
Schedule 1, and Section 108 of the Income Tax Act 1967, govern this imputation 
system in Malaysia (Kamil & Mohd-Yusoff, 1998). With regard to the company's 
taxable income, the Inland Revenue Board charges corporation tax at a single tax 
rate of the year of assessment. The current corporate income tax rate is set at 28 
percent. Meanwhile, the tax treatment on income arising from equity and debt are 
as follows: 
A. Tax Treatment of Corporate Dividends and Capital Gains 
6 
Under Section 108 (1) of the Income Tax Act 1967, when a company makes 
dividends distribution to shareholders, this imputation system allows the company 
to deduct tax imposed on dividend income to shareholders at the ongoing rate of 
the year of assessment. If the tax paid is in excess of the amount prescribed, then 
the company can carry forward the excess to the following year of assessment 
(Section 108(6)). However, if the amount of tax paid is less, then the company is 
in debt to the government and will have to pay on demand (Section 108(5)). 
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The amount deducted by the company reflects an amount of dividend tax credit 
0 
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and the shareholders can claim this amount to offset the tax chargeable on their 
taxable income. This is necessary due to the fact that the assessment of taxable 
income of the shareholders is at a gross amount but they receive only the net 
amount from the company. In essence, shareholders do not pay additional taxes on 
dividend income. Capital gains on sales of shares are also generally not subject to 
taxation. A tax is imposed only on gains derived from disposal of real property or 
shares in real property company. 
B. Tax Treatment of Interest 
In determining the taxable income, Section 33 of the Income Tax Act specifies the 
general rule for deductions. The interest paid must be from the income producing 
expenditure in the accounting year. The Act disallows deduction of interest 
expenses from non-business investments against business income. The effect of 
this restriction is that only the portion of interest attributable to the production of 
business income is allowable against business source and is fully deductible. 
Meanwhile, interest attributable to non-business investments, such as loan to 
subsidiary, investment in shares and fixed deposit, will only qualify for deduction 
against income generated from those investments or loans. 
However, the government normally would not impose interest restriction if the 
interest on borrowed funds charged to the business account does not exceed 
RM6,000 per annum for individual or RM10,000 for company (Choong, 1994). 
As for interest income received from borrower, this income is treated as ordinary 
income and taxed at the ongoing tax rate in the year of assessment. 
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In general, the advantage of using debt is that interest payments are deductible as 
an expense. They avoid taxation at the corporate level, whereas dividends 
associated with stocks are not deductible by the corporation for tax purposes. In 
fact, dividends are subjected to double taxation in the classical system of taxation, 
i. e. at corporation level and at personal level. Theoretical argument would favour 
employing debt as the total amount of payments available to both debt holders and 
equity holders is greater compared to equity. In Malaysia, the tax treatment of 
interest is similar to the west. However, the situation does not apply to the 
0 treatment of dividends and capital gains. Although dividends do not possess this 
tax-deductible feature, the Malaysian tax system exempts shareholders from 
paying additional tax on dividends received. Capital gains are also generally not 
subject to tax in Malaysia. On the demand side of the equation, this implies that 
equity purchases should be more attractive to existing and potential shareholders. 
P 
2.7 SUMMARY 
The chapter provides a general overview of Malaysian economic background and 
capital market. In addition to describing the development of the capital market, the 
chapter briefly outlines the various roles assurned by the local exchange (the 
KLSE). The chapter extends its discussion into the progression of the private debt 
securities (corporate bond) market especially after the recent financial crisis of 
1997-98. In obtaining some background of the country's market orientations, the 
chapter discusses the recent emergence of the Islamic capital market, which has 
gained significant growth of issuance over the years. This part also discusses the 
features of Islamic securities that separate them from conventional financial 
instruments. The chapter ends by looking briefly into Malaysian corporate 
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taxation treatment of dividend and interest. The differential tax treatment of 
interest and dividends play a part in firms' decision of whether to seek debt or 
equity to fund their investments. If the tax-deductibility feature of interest 
payment favours firms to issue debt, the tax-exempted feature of dividend income 
in Malaysia would make equity purchases more desirable to potential 
shareholders. 
Perusing through the overall discussion in this chapter, we have identified three 
key areas in which the Malaysian financial system differs from the western 
market: 
(1) First, the Malaysian capital market falls under the emerging market category 
and has undergone several phases of economic transformations from a 
middle-income country into an export-led economy. Despite rigorous 
attempts to strengthen the securities market and the country's economic 
prospects, the market is still considered less well developed if compared to 
the western market. Further improvements are still underway as part of the 
government's effort to transform the market into a more developed market. 
(2) Second, the Islamic capital market has functioned in parallel with the 
conventional market. Albeit having strict requirements for their issuance, the 
Islamic instruments have added variety to the firms' financing alternatives. 
The diverse choice of financial instruments being traded in the market is one 
advantage that the Malaysian capital market has to offer. 
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(3) Third, the tax treatment with regard to dividends and capital gains received 
by shareholders. Unlike the classical system in which dividend is subject to 
double taxation, the Malaysian imputation tax system exempts shareholders 
from paying additional tax on dividend and capital gains. Ideally, assuming 
other things remain constant, this tax-exempted feature of dividend and 
capital gain would make Malaysian investors prefer equity to debt. 
With the aforementioned differences in the country's financial system, this thesis 
I is structured to seek the possibilities that the capital structure theories originated 
and tested in the developed western market can be disproved if tested in Malaysia. 
4 
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PART 2 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
BACKGROUND 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE RIEVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the literature survey on the development of the capital 
structure theory and competing arguments with regards to the views on optimal 
capital structure and financing hierarchy. Before examining the capital structure 
theory in detail, some insights on the general capital structure patterns would help 
to better understand the theory. Megginson (1997) elaborate these capital structure 
patterns by citing that a strong theory should be able to explain the empirical 
patterns as outlined below (pg. 306-314): 
(1) Observed capital structures show a distinct pattern. 
(2) Capital structures have pronounced industry patterns, and these 
patterns are the same around the world 
(3) Within industries, leverage is inversely related to profitability. 
(4) Taxes clearly influence capital structures, but not alone decisive. 
(5) Leverage ratios appear to be inversely related to the perceived costs 
offinancial distress. 
(6) Existing shareholders consider leverage- increasing events to be 
'good news'and leverage-decreasing events to be 'bad news'. 
(7) Changes in the transactions costs of issuing new securities have 
little apparent impact on observed capital structures. 
(8) Ownership structure clearly seems to influence capital structures, 
though the true relationship is ambiguous. 
(9) Corporations that are forced away ftom a preferred capital 
structure tend to return to that structure over time. 
Perusing through more than forty years since the legacy of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), many financial economists have taken great interest in investigating the 
capital structure issues in depth, both empirically and theoretically. These capital 
structure issues have concentrated on evidence at the individual firm level as well 
as the aggregate economy level. At the individual finn level, evidence has evolved 
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into finding firm specific determinants that influence its financing pattern (e. g. 
Frank & Goyal, 2003; Claggett Jr., 1991; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Meanwhile, 
the empirical work at the macro level compares capital structure practices of firms 
between economies and regions (e. g. Booth et. al, 2001; Krishnan & Moyer, 1997; 
Bartholdy et. al, 1997; Rajan & Zingales, 1995) 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 begins with the archetypal model 
inspired by Modigliani and Miller (195 8) and the subsequent corporate income tax 
f model (Modigliani & Miller, 1963) and personal income tax model (Miller, 1977). 
Section 3.3 describes the more recent models after incorporating 'real world' 
elements into the original assumptions. The later discussion in this section 
concentrates on the two competing capital structure of the static trade-off theory 
and the pecking order model. Section 3.4 looks into the evidence supporting or 
negating the theory domination, and other arguments related to the issues. Section 
3.5 examines a number of firm-specific attributes claimed to be the motivating 
factors behind firms' financing choices. Section 3.6 looks into evidence of capital 
structure from other developing countries that contributes to the current literature 
work. Section 3.7 presents the general findings from the existing Malaysian-based 
q 
capital structure studies. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes by unfolding the relevant 
issues from this literature survey. 
3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY CAPITAII, STRUCTURE THEORIES 
The documented capital structure theories in the literature have the underlying aim 
towards maximising the value of firm. In presenting the complete picture of the 
theory development, the following Figure 3.1 illustrates the overall progression of 
I 
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the capital structure theory from the early models to the emergence of the more 
4 
recent capital structure models. 
FIGURE 3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES5 
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5 The diagram was adapted from the flowchart in the article by Quan (2002) on the relationship 
between the Modigliani-Miller Proposition I and the Pecking Order Hypothesis. In Quan (2002), 
he proposed the pecking order model as an extension of the static trade-off theory. However, 
Quan's flowchart was modified to fit our discussion on the development of the capital structure 
theory. In this modified version, the pecking order and the static trade-off theories were seen as 
two separate strands of capital structure theory. 
40 
The flowchart above shows that all capital structure models originate from the 
t 
solid based principle of firm's market value maximisation embodied in the 
original proposition of Modigliani and Miller (195 8). The proposition relies upon 
the restrictive assumptions of perfect market arguments. Although it seems 
unrealistic, Modigliani and Miller's (MM henceforth) initial proposition asserts 
that the market value of any firm is irrelevant of its capital structure; hence, the 
use of debt has no influence on the firm's market value. 
Five years after instituting this irrelevance proposition, MM (1963) corrected their 
previous version of corporate income taxes model. The result overwhelmingly 
reverses the claim of the earlier prediction. On this account, they recognise that 
with the corporate tax advantages of debt, the use of debt in firm's capital 
structure has the affect of increasing the value of firm. This corporate tax model 
asserts that the value of firm will be at its maximum level with 100 percent use of 
leverage financing. At this point, the discussion on the theoretical predictions of 
capital structure is either irrelevant when the market is perfect (MM, 1958), or set 
at its maximum prediction with the inclusion of corporate income tax in the 
q otherwise perfect market 
(MM, 1963). However, neither prediction reflects the 
objective reality of the world. 
Fourteen years later, Miller (1977) presents another model that incorporates 
personal income taxes to the existing corporate-tax model. In his model, Miller 
hypothesises that if personal tax rates on interest income are relatively higher than 
the personal tax rates on equity, then the gains to corporate leverage can largely be 
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discounted or even eliminated entirely, thus reverting to the irrelevant results of 
capital structure. 
Whilst all models only work in an idealised world, these controversial 
propositions have prompted researchers to keep adding elements of the 'real 
world' in seeking how the theory predictions change. Among these 'real world' 
elements are financial distress costs (Stiglitz, 1969; Chen & Kim, 1979), agency 
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), managerial operating decision 
0 (Harris & Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990), transaction costs (Myers, 1984), and 
information asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Ross, 1977; Leland & Pyle, 
1977; Narayanan, 1988; Heinkel & Zechner, 1990). The development of these 
more recent models is discussed in the subsequent section. 
0 
3.3 THE MORE RECENT CAPITAIL STRUCTURE MODELS 
Following the work of MM (1963) and Miller (1977), economists began 
developing further extensions to the original MM hypothesis. These modifications 
to the basic capital structure model now become the focus of the corporate 
leverage issues. The possibilities for the 'debt-inducement' models have extended 
to include organisational efficiencies (Jensen, 1986), the managerial operating 
decision (Harris & Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990), financial planning principles 
(Myers, 1984; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977), and investment incentives 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984; Heinkel & Zechner, 1990). Meanwhile, the 'debt- 
deterrent' models arise when the elements incorporate financial distress (Stiglitz, 
1969; Chen & Kim, 1979) and wealth transfer issues (Jensen & Meckling, 1986). 
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A. Financial distress costs model 
In re-examining the original MM theorem, Stiglitz (1969) suggests the possibility 
of bankruptcy in a perfectly competitive market. By adding more debt into a firm, 
the financial distress costs exacerbate as debt imposes element of risk in the firm's 
financial structure. Only higher interest payment could compensate for this risky 
debt (Stiglitz, 1969). In support, Chen and Kim (1979) claim that risky debt gives 
rise to various market imperfections. With the existence of risky debt, economists 
recognised that to go on borrowing beyond a certain point may lead to bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy costs have great impact on firm's value especially with the presence 
of 'me-first' rules (Chen & Kim, 1979). To achieve the value maximisation 
objective, a firm that utilises debt in its financing stream should be able to create a 
balance between tax advantage of debt and these bankruptcy costs. 
I 
B. Agency costs model 
Aware of the bankruptcy cost of debt, Jensen and Meckling (1976) observe that 
when there is no separation between corporate ownership and control in a business 
entity, the owner bears all the cost and collects all the benefits. However, once the 
owner sells a small part of the firm's stake to outsiders, and/or hires a third party 
to take control and make decisions on the owner's behalf, problems start to 
emerge. Fama and Miller (1972) initiate the work by examining the possibility of 
different utility function between management and shareholders. Building on the 
work of Fama and Miller, Jensen and Meckling suggest two particular conflicts of 
interest: (1) conflicts between shareholders and managers, and (2) conflicts 
between debt holders and shareholders. 
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According to Jensen and Meckling, conflicts between shareholders and managers 
arise from the managers not having a 100 percent share in the firm's claim. The 
managers do not capture the entire gain from their profit enhancement effort, but 
are responsible for the cost of refraining from this effort. As a result, these 
managers might engage in those behaviours that will maximise their wealth at the 
expense of the firm's wealth. To ameliorate this conflict, debt plays a role as a 
monitoring device in Jensen's (1986) control hypothesis effects. By issuing 
additional debt, the amount of 'free' cash flow available to the managers reduces, 
I as firm is now committed to service the debt rendered. For this reason, debt 
financing is said to mitigate the conflict between managers and equity holders. 
Debt however, does not call for scrutinising the total returns of the firm, but only 
those matters that affect bankruptcy (Stiglitz, 1988). 
Meanwhile, the conflicts between debt holders and equity holders arise because 
the funds obtained through debt could trigger equity holders to invest sub- 
optimally. Leverage increases the incentive of equity holders to shift wealth from 
bondholders to equity holders (Fama & Miller, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
By engaging in this act, the equity holders anticipate capturing most of the gain if 
A 
the investment works to the favour of the firm, while the debt holders only collect 
the fixed payment from the interest and principle. If the investment fails, then the 
debt holders will have to bear all the costs. However, having too much leverage 
financing increases the likelihood of financial distress (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The loss can be more damaging if the debt holders could correctly predict the 
equity holders' intention. The outcome of the agency cost of debt that causes loss 
of value to the equity holders because of poor investment decision is called the 
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'asset substitution effect'. For that reason, a firm that utilises debt should be able 
generate a balance between the benefit and the agency cost of debt (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In related work, Kim and Sorensen (1986) conduct a study on 
the presence of agency cost and its association to the corporate debt policy. They 
find that firms with higher degree of inside ownership have greater debt ratios 
than firms with lower insider ownership. 
Inevitably, these early works of MM (1958), MM (1963), Stiglitz (1969), Miller 
4 (1977), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) have collaboratively contributed to the 
theoretical arguments in favour of the existence of an optimal value. Having 
introduced the bankruptcy costs and agency costs in tandem, the arguments lead to 
the formation of the initial trade-off model of capital structure. Equation (3.1) 
below expresses this trade-off model of capital structure. 
VL = Vu + PVTS 
- 
PVBAC 
I 
(3.1) 
The tenn PVTS represents the present value of tax shield, while PVBAC is the 
present value of bankruptcy and agency costs. The equation states that the value of 
a levered finn (VL) is actually the value of unlevered firm (Vu) after taking into 
account the present value of tax shields (PPIS), bankruptcy costs, and agency 
costs (PVBAC). When debt usage is low, the present value of tax shields (PV7S) 
is greater than present value of bankruptcy and agency costs (PVBAC); hence, the 
market value of firm increases (VL). A firm opting to use debt reaches an optimal 
level by adjusting its capital structure towards a point, which the debt ratio 
produces the maximum tax shield value adjusted for increased probability of 
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bankruptcy and agency costs. However, when debt usage becomes extremely 
high, bankruptcy and agency costs become apparent, and the increase in the 
PVBAC dominates the increase in PVTS. As a result, VL drops. 
Under a graphical scenario, a value-maximising firm attempts to balance the 
marginal present value of tax shield against the marginal present value of 
bankruptcy and agency cost as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
4 FIGURE 3.2 THE TRADE-OFF THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
I 
C. Managerial operating decision model 
A more recent argument that contributes to the optimality notion has emerged 
from the study of Harris and Raviv (1990), and Stulz (1990) on the disagreement 
between managers and investors over an operating decision. Harris and Raviv 
6 This trade-off graph is a commonly discussed graph when describing the development of the 
early capital structure theory in modem corporate finance. 
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The static-trade off theory assumes that firms would balance the cost and benefit at the margin and seekjor 
the optimal level at the top of the curve 
(1990) indicate that the use of debt could lessen the probability of giving investors 
the option to force liquidation if cash flows are poor. They finiher explain that 
firms with higher liquidation value and lower investigation costs will tend to 
obtain more debt and will be more likely to default. Therefore, higher leverage is 
always associated with larger firm value, higher debt level relative to expected 
income and lower probability of reorganisation following default. In their model, 
Harris and Raviv define optimality in capital structure as a trade-off between 
improved liquidation decision and higher investigation cost. Stulz (1990), on the 
other hand, assumes that managers always want to invest all funds available even 
if paying out cash to investors is a better choice. However, only when the firm is a 
target for takeovers, the financing structure would include more debt. Stulz views 
optimality as trading off the benefit of debt in preventing investment in value 
decreasing projects. 
9 
Transaction costs model 
The traditional view proposed by Myers (1984) describes the differences in the 
transaction costs of financing instruments as the cause for firms to set preferences 
in the financing sources. Acquiring funds internally is free from any transaction 
costs, and causes minimal impact on firms' stock price. On the other hand, firms 
will have to pay high transaction costs for funds generated externally. These 
transaction costs may vary with the financing instruments issued. The transaction 
costs of issuing debt are normally lower than the costs of issuing equity. In an 
effort to minimise these costs, finns will take on the cheaper financing before 
resorting to the more expensive sources, hence choosing internal over external 
ftmds, and preferring debt to equity. Therefore, firms tend to seek financing 
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sources based on some hierarchy, which normally begin with internal funds, debt, 
and equity issue is the last resort. 
E. Information asymmetry model 
By adding more elements of the real world to the underlying assumptions of the 
MM original prediction, the evidence on the information asymmetry between 
insiders of the firm and less-informed outsiders become increasingly apparent 
(Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Infonnation asymmetry is a situation in 
V which managers of a firm have more information about operations and future 
prospects of the firm than do investors. Assuming that managers make decisions 
with the goal of maximising the wealth of existing shareholders, then information 
asymmetry can affect the capital structure decisions that managers make. In 
anticipation, investors rely on the actions of these managers in assessing the firms' 
prospects. These investors will react based on their own interpretation of the 
managers' actions. Information asymmetry can be subdivided into two arguments, 
the signalling arguments (Ross, 1977; Leland & Pyle, 1977), and the under- 
investment arguments (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
9 The signalling arguments suggest that a firm's financing choice is an insider's tool 
to convey information to the market concerning investment opportunities and 
future prospects of the firm. Ross (1977) indicates that managers use leverage to 
convey signal to the market regarding their firm type. The true quality of a firm is 
the signal communicated by the relative amounts of debt and equity employed by 
the firm (Ross, 1977; Leland & Pyle, 1977). Ross further claims that the higher 
the level of financial leverage, the higher is the quality of the firm. Using debt to 
lk 
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raise funds is frequently viewed as a signal that reflects management, 's view of the 
firm's stock value. Under normal circumstances, debt financing conveys a positive 
signal, suggesting that management believes that the stock is currently 
undervalued and therefore a bargain. When the market recognises this positive 
outlook, the increased value will be fully captured by existing shareholders, rather 
than having to share with new investors. However, if the outlook of the firin is 
unfavourable and management believes that the firm's stock is currently 
overvalued, then it would be in the best interest of existing stockholders for the 
V firm to issue equity. Therefore, outside investors often interpret the announcement 
of stock issues as a negative signal. The problems of asymmetric information also 
relate to the effort of the owners attempting to convince potential borrowers 
(Stiglitz, 1988), the managers impinging on the returns of capital provider 
(Stiglitz, 1988), and the quality firms blocking the financially weaker firms from 
entering the market (Narayanan, 1988). 
On the other hand, the under-investment arguments (Myers & Majluf, 1984) stress 
how asymmetric information could affect the firms' issue-invest decisions. When 
a finn needs to finance a project externally, there is a possibility that the less- 
ýv infonned outsiders may underprice the firm. In light of the matter, the existing 
shareholders sometimes may have to forego a promising project. The under- 
investment argument is described as a firm's inability to invest in a positive-NPV 
investment despite having high returns. It postulates the rationale for seeking 
internal funds ahead of other choices since these funds are free from the pricing 
effect. Myers and Majluf introduce the term 'financial slack' to represent the sum 
of internal financing and the default-risk free debt. Firms with sufficient financial 
0 
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slack will never have to issue risky debt or equity in order to fund their investment 
projects. Firms that seek funds for investment through this 'financial slack' have 
lesser risk exposures and would avoid price valuation by investors, thus able to 
finesse asymmetric information problems between managers and investors 
(Megginson, 1997). 
Another related view brought forward by Heinkel & Zechner (1990) claims that 
debt issuance could also lessen the over-investment opportunity problem. Too 
I much equity financing can result in a firm investing even in negative NPV 
4 
projects if the equity holders believe that the stock price is overvalued. Further, 
Heinkel and Zechner suggest that firms could seek funding by issuing preferred 
stock to moderate both the under-investment and over-investment problems. 
Preferred stock is often considered as 'quasi-debt' or hybrid financing instrument. 
Among the features of preferred stock is that the payment of preferred dividends 
is much like dividends to common stockholders, but this claim is fixed and takes 
precedence over the claim of the common stockholders, and this feature is much 
like interest on debt. Use of preferred stock to complement debt financing could 
lessen the problems caused by the pricing effect of equity financing. However, the 
capital structure literature has given little attention to the issues related to the 
preferred stock financing (Heinkel & Zechner, 1990). Albeit the positive aspects 
associated with debt issues, the effect of having too much debt can also have 
negative sides (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Heinkel, 1982). 
Most capital structure studies have offered useful interpretation behind their 
proposed ideas, however, none has been completely successful in describing the 
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choice of financial structure (Hart & Moore, 1990). For example, the question of 
how much debt is enough has remained unanswered (Megginson, 1997; Ross, 1988; 
Miller, 1991). Furthermore, the central question in corporate financial decision has 
revolved around trying to find the optimal balance between the two sources: debt 
and equity. In understanding these forces, one must consider the nature of corporate 
financing decisions. When a firm finances its investment, it offers investors a set of 
financial services with the different return streams, which include some combination 
of risk, return and liquidity (Taggart; 1986). 
0 
Theoretical contributions on capital structure issues have led to two main financing 
descriptions, the optimality view in the static trade-off theory, and the financing 
hierarchy view specified in the pecking order model. These two separate strands of 
capital structure theories have been the subjects of most recent extensive debates in 
capital structure (see Frank & Goyal, 2003; Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Shyam- 
Sunder & Myers, 1999; Ghosh and Cai, 1999). One similarity between the two 
theories is that both assume shareholders' wealth maximisation as the corporate 
objective. 
It 3.3.1 THE STATIC TRADE-OFF THEORY 
In its broadest term, the static trade-off theory derives from the prediction that 
firms maximise their value by maintaining a target debt ratio through minimising 
the cost of market imperfections. It predicts a cross-sectional relation between 
debt ratios and asset risk, asset type, profitability and tax status. The static trade- 
off theory has managers seeking for optimal capital structure, with any deviations 
from it will result in a mean-reverting behaviour. As described earlier, this theory 
w 
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stems from the modifications of the original irrelevance hypothesis (MM, 1958) 
and the documentations from the tax-related proposition (MM, 1963; Miller, 
1977; Modigliani, 1982; Miller, 1988). This trade-off theory proposes a corporate 
debt policy that requires an optimal balance between present value of tax savings 
from the tax-deductibility feature of interest and the present value of personal tax 
(Miller, 1977), agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and potential bankruptcy 
costs (Stiglitz, 1969; Chen & Kim, 1979). Titman and Wessels (1988) who extend 
this optimal theory by using a factor-analytic technique rather than the 
0 conventional regression approach also report consistency with the static trade-off 
theory 
4 
6 
In addition, there are several opinions put forward on the relation between optimal 
capital structure and the tax-based presumptions. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
present a theory of optimal capital structure that is motivated by corporate tax 
shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances 
and investment tax credits. DeAngelo and Masulis suggest that regardless of the 
leverage-related costs, firms can have a unique interior optimal level in the 
presence of these corporate tax shield substitutes. Lewis (1990) on the other hand, 
implies that in a world of market perfection except for taxation, a firm may have a 
set of debt ratios, which are consistent with the value maximisation objectives. He 
claims that any debt structure that produces a consistent series of promised interest 
payments would result in the same market value. In the effort to explain the tax 
advantage of debt, Berens and Cuny (1995) offer a different view of optimal 
capital structure. They argue that there are many optimal capital structure levels 
when referring to the choice of debt levels over time. However, until today, no 
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consensus has emerged about the tax-based predictions, and the opinions thus far 
are not unanimous (Fama & French, 1998; Graham, 2000). 
Further, the optimality view also describes financing decisions as adjusting 
existing debt and equity levels toward some value-maximising target. In selecting 
between debt and equity, firms will behave as though they have some target levels 
in mind (Marsh, 1982), and eventually converge towards their industry mean 
(Claggett Jr., 1991). Using logit model, Marsh (1982) concludes that market 
t conditions and past security prices heavily influence firms' financing behaviour. 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) propose the partial adjustment model in an attempt to 
measure the speed of financing adjustment between firms. They introduce an 
empirical framework that focuses on the market imperfection issues such as 
adjustment costs and interdependencies among corporate decisions. Their results 
still suggest that the firrns' targets are the driving forces in their financing 
behaviour. Nonetheless, the adjustments are considerably smaller for firms with 
low long-run dividend payout ratio (Vogt, 1994). 
0 
4. 
Fischer et. al (1989) develop a more dynamic model by refining the meaning of 
optimal debt level. Rather than a static ratio, their model uses a range of debt 
ratios. As an empirical measure of leverage, they allow the debt ratio to swing 
between the specified critical upper and lower limit. Their findings indicate that 
smaller, riskier, lower-bankruptcy cost firm's exhibit wider swings in debt ratios 
over time. In defining the optimal level, Ariff and Lau (1996) present a more 
indirect demonstration of optimality on the fact that firm's debt ratio is always 
below unity. However, since the definitive optimal level is difficult to measure, 
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Ariff and Lau submit to the idea of prescribing industry average as a benchmark in 
capital structure decision. This idea is very much in agreement with the earlier 
empirical work by Claggett Jr. (199 1). 
In a survey to 392 CFOs of Fortune 500 firms, Graham and Harvey (2001) find 
that actual debt ratios vary across firms and through time. In addition, they 
discover that firms do not rebalance these ratios when market value changes. 
Consistent with the attempt to seek the tendency of capital structure readjustment, 
fa study by Hovakimian et. al (2001) suggests that high past profits' finns tend to 
issue debt rather than equity and repurchase equity rather than debt. They observe 
this type of behaviour in firms that are trying to offset accumulated earnings. 
However, they discover a few complications that would prevent a firm from 
moving towards its target ratio. One of the hindrances is the debt overhang 
problem. This problem prevents a wealth transfer to debt holders if the firms were 
to reduce debt especially those financial distress firms, and the low stock price 
that would translate into a lower market-to-book ratio. 
In sum, apart from striking a balance between present value of interest-tax 
savings, agency costs and potential bankruptcy costs, the static trade-off theory 
must also consider other market imperfections, such as the corporate tax shield 
substitutes, industry averages, changes in stock price, and market conditions. The 
static trade-off financing suggests that firms will adjust their capital structure 
towards their target level if the adjustment costs (i. e. costs of market 
imperfections) can be tolerated. 
4 
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3.3.2 THE PECKING ORDER MODEL 
Firms have no clear-cut target debt ratios in the alternative pecking order model 
(Myers, 1984). Albeit having value maximisation objective, this theory does not 
view seeking optimal capital structure as the way to achieve this objective. Instead 
of aiming for some targeted debt level, firms implementing this pecking order 
financing rule follow some sort of hierarchy in sourcing their funding. 
This idea of financing hierarchy originates Erom the pioneering work of 
0 Donaldson (1961). This view has been circulating for many years before Myers 
b 
(1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984) present a clear theoretical rationale on the 
issue. They later label this type of financing behaviour as the pecking order 
model. There are four underlying predictions about corporate financing behaviour 
of this pecking order model. First, the model assumes that dividend is 'sticky' and 
managers will try to maintain a stable nominal dividend despite earnings 
fluctuation. Second, finns prefer internal financing to external financing. Third, if 
a firm must obtain external financing, it will choose the safest financing first. 
Finally, as more external financing needed, it will work down the pecking order 
beginning with safe debt and eventually progressing through risky debt. Issuing 
extemal equity will be the last resort. This hierarchical behaviour is the result of 
information frictions associated with each financing source. Aware of 
management's ability and incentives to issue overvalued securities, the mere act of 
announcing new issue will lead investors to revise downward their estimates of 
the firm's value. In view of investors' reaction, retained earnings nonnally pose 
no information frictions. However, debt has minor frictions, and equity is subject 
to serious infonnation frictions. 
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In essence, there are three documented views on the main underlying motives for 
opting this financing hierarchy. The first view, which was initiated by Donaldson 
(196 1), claims that financing hierarchy is the management's device to avoid market 
monitoring. The second view by Myers (1984) suggests financing hierarchy as a 
way to minimise transaction costs of financing instrument. The third view as 
proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) is to reduce the 
repercussion of the asymmetric information between firms and outside investors. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that outsiders tend to constantly assess firms that 
have high asymmetric information. This information asymmetry notion is consistent 
with the previously discussed signalling arguments of Ross (1977) and Leland and 
Pyle (1977), and the under-investment arguments of Myers and Majluf (1984). The 
asymmetric information's prediction of the pecking order theory by implication 
rejects the notion of a target capital structure. In addition, asymmetric information is 
argued by Dierkens (1991) to be related to two primary factors: 1) uncertainty about 
the firm (i. e. variance of return), and 2) information environment concerning the 
firm (i. e. public announcement). 
0 In a survey to chief financial officers of Fortune 500 firms on opinions regarding 
capital structure theory, Pinegar and Wilbritch (1989) find that managers are more 
likely to follow a financing hierarchy than to maintain a target debt ratio. In their 
results, Pinegar and Wilbritch stress the importance of the pecking order model in 
firms' financing, but their survey does not link asymmetric information to firms' 
financing decisions. Building on this idea, Hittle and Haddad (1992) conduct a 
survey on over-the-counter firms and note a strong support for the pecking order 
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financing preference. They claim that these firms seem more likely to experience 
asymmetric information than the Fortune 500 firms, as the managers believe that 
their stock is mispriced compared to those of Fortune 500. To add, Hittle and 
Haddad claim that asymmetric information is not an observable event. On related 
note, Baskin (1989) states that pecking order hierarchy arises as a portrayal of 
corporate practice. He argues that such financial planning is important in governing 
firms' financial behaviour. 
IA recent study by Frank and Goyal (2003) tests the pecking order theory of 
corporate leverage on American publicly traded firms from 1971 to 1998. They 
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find finns used external financing heavily if internal funds are insufficient to 
cover capital expenditure. However, their results indicate that net equity issues 
follow financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. The use of equity 
issues to meet financing deficit reinforces Atkin and Glen's (1992) claim on the 
market-based orientations of the United States. Frank and Goyal also conclude 
that the support for the pecking order theory has declined over time. Their study 
finds the greatest support on this theory only among firms in the early years. 
Overall, the pecking order theory lies on the fundamental concept of financing 
hierarchy, after taking into account varying transaction costs and information 
asymmetry. In minimising these imbalances, finns should seek the most 
convenient and cheapest financing before working down the hierarchy. Inevitably, 
internal funds meet these financing criteria. However, between internal and 
external financing, seeking funds externally is an observable event. To facilitate 
firms' financing observation, firms following the pecking order behaviour should 
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seek financing through debt before resorting to issuing equity whenever they 
experienced deficit. 
3.4 THE TWO THEORIES TOGETHER 
The assumption of optimal debt ratio has implicitly guided most empirical 
literature on capital structure. Although firms' debt ratios seem to converge to 
their industry means, which represent the targeted ratios (Gosh & Cai, 1999; 
Claggett Jr., 1991), there may be financing constraints that induce pecking order 
11 behaviour (Vogt, 1994). Earlier, Baskin (1989) has already stated that the 
alternative static trade-off theory appears to have little power over the pecking 
order model in explaining corporate behaviour. Consistent with this idea, a study 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also indicates that the pecking order model 
has provided greater confidence and has much better explanatory power than the 
target-adjustments model. They claim that the pecking order model is a better 
empirical description of capital structure than the alternative static trade-off 
theory. 
0 
Perusing through some of the body of literatures in this area, there are a range of 
studies that examine the empirical performance of existing theories of capital 
structure. Table 3.1 below summarises some of the earlier tests performed in 
finding consistency with the claimed theories. 
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TABLE 3.1 EMPHUCAL TESTS ON THE ESTABLISHED THEORIES 
STUDIES TESTS RESULTS 
Marsh (1982) Logit Analysis Firms' financing behaviour as though they 
have target levels in mind 
2. Jalilvand & Pooled Cross-sectional time Firms' target levels are the driving force in 
Harris (1984) series. the firms' financial behaviour 
Generalised Least Squares 
3. Kim & Sorenson ANOVA & Multiple Regression Firms with higher inside ownership tend to (1986) finance with greater LT debt. 
4. Titman & LISREL: Measurement & Document empirical regularities that are 
Wessels (1988) Structural Model consistent with existing capital structure 
theories. 
5. Fischer, Heinkel OLS Regressions Smaller, riskier, low tax, low bankruptcy 
& Zechner (1989) cost firms exhibit wider swings in their debt 
ratios over time. 
6. Claggett Jr. Non-parametric Fisher Exact Suggest that convergence and pecking order 
(1991) Probability Test (FEP). coexisted; however pecking order explains 
Goodman-Kruskal Measure capital structure decisions better. 
7. Chiarella et. al. LISREL: Measurement & The direction of effect for each indicator 
(1992) Structural Model variable is in accord with theoretical 
predictions 
8. Hittle & Haddad Chi-Squares Over-the-counter firms indicate a stronger 
(1992) preference for pecking order than Fortune 
500 firms. 
9. Vogt (1994) Three-stage Least Squares In favour of both partial adjustment model 
and pecking order behaviour. 
10. Ghosh & Cai Non-parametric Fisher Exact Majority of firms converged toward their 
(1999) Probability Test (FEP). industry means esp. from firms above the 
Goodman-Kruskal Measure industry means. Results also support the 
pecking order hypothesis. 
Shyam-Sunder & Ordinary Least Square Results suggest greater confidence in the 
Myers (1999) Regressions pecking order than in the target adjustment 
model. 
12. Frank & Goyal Panel Regressions Financing deficit only adds a small amount 
(2003) of extra explanatory power over the 
conventional leverage factors. 
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Most capital structure literature has proposed separate motives that induce the 
pecking order and the static trade-off financing behaviour. An article by Quan 
(2002) however, takes an opposite perspective. In his article, he refutes the notion 
that the pecking order and the optimal capital structure views are two separate 
strands of the capital structure theory. In fact, he suggests that the pecking order 
hypothesis is a general extension of the static trade-off theory. To comment on 
this claim, it is noted that the theoretical and empirical literatures on capital 
structure have generally agreed that both theories stem from the irrelevance 
9 proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958) after applying several different 
arguments to the original proposition. However, to suggest that both theories are 
directly related, some supporting empirical evidence is in order. 
In another work, Graham (2000) points out that conservative firm should incur 
low cost of debt financing and as a result, use debt aggressively. Further, Graham 
states that due to the more severe adverse selection impact of equity, firms should 
use equity more conservatively. However, his results indicate otherwise. He finds 
that rather than utilising high levels of debt, these conservative finns use less debt, 
suggesting that the pecking order model does not work. He concludes that neither 
4 
the pecking order, nor the static trade-off theory explains why firms use debt 
conservatively. Therefore, there must be other factors that initiate a firm to choose 
a specific financing over the other. The following section discusses some of the 
contributing factors that influence firms' financing decisions. 
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3.5 FIRM-SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Cross-sectional studies on capital structure deten-ninants have verified the 
correlation between the corporate financing decisions and certain factors. The 
discussions in this section examine the importance of firm-specific attributes as 
they are alleged to be amongst the heavily discussed factors in firm' borrowing 
debate. Among the cited firm-specific determinants of capital structure are firms' 
asset composition, size, profitability, taxation, growth opportunities, business risk, 
and industry. Of the factors, four are the key detenninants of the static trade-off 
I explanations (i. e. asset, profitability, tax and risk), while past profitability is 
alleged to have a strong link with the pecking order behaviour. In addition, growth 
opportunities can also be incorporated in firms' profitability (i. e. future 
profitability). Finally, firms in different industries and of different sizes are also 
alleged to have dissimilar capital structure composition. Brief discussions on the 
mentioned variables are as follows. 
(i) Asset Composition 
High levels of debt financing are only feasible if a firm can offer tangible 
collateral as financial security. Inevitably, with valuable asset as collateral, a finn 
can borrow on relatively favourable terms, hence incurring a low borrowing cost. 
Thus, we expect finns with higher tangible assets to have high level of debt, and 
retain more value in liquidation. The greater the proportions of tangible assets in a 
firm's balance sheet, the more loans the lenders should be willing to supply (Rajan 
& Zingales, 1995). With regards to the empirical evidence, earlier studies have 
reported a significant positive effect between leverage and asset tangibility 
(Marsh, 1982; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
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Wiwattanakantang 
, 
1999). However, Chiarella et. al. (1992) finds no support for 
collateral value attributes. 
(ii) Size 
Large firms use more debt financing than do their smaller counterparts as these 
large firms have better access to credit markets. In addition, these large firms 
often incur lower informational costs in borrowing and more hold diversified 
investment portfolio, thus able to support more debt. A number of studies find a 
0 significant positive relation between size and leverage (Myers, 1982; Jalilvand & 
Harris, 1984; Fischer et. al., 1989, Chiarella et. al., 1992; Lasfer, 1995). Consistent 
with this finding, Rajan and Zingales (1995) expand the geographical scope by 
showing that leverage increases with size in most G-7 countries. Several other 
cross-country studies on capital structure determinants also suggest size to have a 
significant positive relation to debt (Booth et. al. 2001; Chui et. al, 2002). 
However, if debt is split into short-term and long-term measures, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) find that firm size relates negatively to short-term debt. They 
argue that smaller firms would have more short-term debt and less long-term debt 
because of the elevated agency conflict between shareholders and debt holders in 
small firms. 
(iii) Profitability 
There are some conflicting theoretical predictions on the profitability effects on 
leverage. In view of the pecking order hypothesis discerned from Myers (1984) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984), leverage should relate negatively to firms' past 
profitability. Earlier empirical works have provided evidence on this negative 
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relation (see Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chiarella et. al., 1992; Rajan & Zingales, 
1995; Wiwattanakantang, 1999). This pecking order hypothesis postulates that 
firms with high past profit will employ more internal funds and use less debt. 
Consistent with this claim, Graham (2000) finds that large profitable firms use 
debt sparingly. This finding indeed explains the sufficient internally generated 
cash flow to support the financing needs. However, Jensen's (1986) control 
hypothesis claims that leverage relates positively to profitability. This positive 
relation is also consistent with Ross' (1977) signalling theory, as a firm's 
financing behaviour should vary accordingly to indicate future prospects of the 
firm. Shenoy and Koch (1996) point out that the theoretical predictions of 
leverage and profitability differ because the pecking order behaviour describes the 
simultaneous relation between the two variables, while the signalling implication 
captures the dynamic aspect of the variables. Several studies have established this 
positive relation between leverage and current profitability (Chui et. al, 2002; 
Chiarella et. al., 1992) as well as future profitability (Mohamad, 1995). 
0 
(iv) Taxation 
"... One cannot easily dismiss the possibility that taxes influence the aggregate 
corporate leverage in a country" (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). The tax-based model 
claims the major benefit for issuing debt is the tax deductibility feature of interest. 
By resorting to debt financing, this tax-deductible feature of interest would 
increase the firm's after-tax cash flow. Although the tax-based opinion is 
inconclusive and often contradictory (e. g. Myers, 1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988; 
Stulz, 1990), evidence has indicated that tax benefits are among the factors 
affecting firm's financing choice (Graharn, 1996, Wiwattanakantang, 1999). 
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DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) point out that other non-cash expenses reported in 
firms' profit and loss statement are also tax-deductible. The tax-deductibility 
feature of these non-cash items could also substitute for the debt tax benefit, hence 
lessening the need to use additional debt financing as heavy debt use may 
exacerbate agency problems and other countervailing issues. 
(V) Growth Opportunities 
Growing firms shun lenders from interfering with their investment decision. With 
greater funds needed to finance future investment, these firms have the inclination 
to retain more earnings, as debt can be costly to firms with good investment 
prospects (Pandey, 2001). Myers (1977) states that future investment 
opportunities signify an increase in firm's value although they neither can be 
collateralised nor generate current income. He adds that highly leveraged firms 
normally fail to take profitable investment opportunities due to the existence of 
agency problem. Myers argues that firms with many growth opportunities should 
not use debt as a financing instrument if these firms want to reduce the under- 
investment problem. Building on this idea, earlier studies have found that growth 
is negatively related to long-term debt (Ozkan, 2001; Graham, 2000; Titman & 
Wessels, 1988), however, positively related to short-term debt (Baskin, 1989; 
Titman & Wessels, 1988). Ozkan (2001), Graham (2000), and Titman and 
Wessels (1989) claim that firms with growth options are conservative in their debt 
usage. If the need calls for acquiring fund through debt, these firms are inclined to 
use more short-term debt rather than long-term debt (Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
Even though Baskin (1989) reports a significant positive relation between growth 
and leverage, this leverage comprises more of the short-term component. In 
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support, Lasfer (1995) observe fewer-growth opportunities firms tend to have 
more long-term debt in their capital structure. 
(vi) Business Risk 
Based on the trade-off theory, the higher the risk, the higher is the probability of 
financial distress. This theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage 
and risk. Consistent with this prediction, previous empirical results have indicated 
a negative relationship between leverage and the proxy for risk (Marsh, 1982; 
Bradley et. al, 1984; Friends & Hasbrouk, 1988, Fischer et. al., 1989). For the 
evidence to show negative relation between risk and leverage, bankruptcy costs 
must also be quite large (Bradley et. al., 1984). 
vii) Industry 
Schwartz and Aronson (1967), and Scott Jr. and Martin (1975) have provided 
early evidence on the relation between industry and financial structures. Together, 
both studies observe direct evidence of different leverage levels across industries. 
However, they find that within the same industry, firms' leverage ratios are 
relatively stable over time. The later piece on capital structure determinants also 
indicates the same relation between industry and financing mix (see Varela & 
Limmack, 1998; Boquist & Moore, 1984, Bradley et. al, 1984; Bowen et. al, 
1982). Bowen et. al. (1982) address several views with regards to the relationship 
between leverage and industry class. First, there is a statistically significant 
difference between mean industry financial structures. Second, the rankings of 
these mean industry financial structures demonstrate significant stability over 
time. Third, firms exhibit a tendency to move towards their industry mean over a 
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period. Their views are shared by many who set industry mean as the targeted 
capital structure (see Gosh & Cai; 1999, Ariff & Lau, 1996; Claggett Jr., 1991; 
Marsh, 1982). 
3.6 CAPITAIL STRUCTURES IN INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
Research on capital structure has become increasingly internationalised in recent 
years. Across regions, there are two types of institutional orientation: the bank- 
dominated systems such as those implemented in Japan and Germany, and the 
market-based orientations of the US and the UK (Atkin & Glen, 1992). 
Comparative studies on international capital structure show that firms in the 
developing countries rely more on debt financing than their counterparts in the 
developed countries (Atkin & Glen, 1992; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996). 
The Japanese keiretsu system is an example of a financial system that is always 
associated with higher level of debt (Gul, 1999). Atkin and Glen (1992) further 
indicate that among the developing countries, only Korea, India, and Thailand are 
highly leveraged. Moreover, they observe a convergence between the US market- 
based and Japan bank-dominated financing mode. They report that Japanese 
gearing has been reduced while US gearing has risen to the point that the major 
differences that existed before are no longer present. On another study conducted 
on six OECD countries by Bartholdy et. al (1997), they observe that capital 
structure choices of firms are closer to those in the US than Japanese finns. 
Regardless of the institutional differences, evidence has indicated that most firm- 
specific leverage-related factors identified by studies in the United States also 
apply to other countries as well (see Booth et. al., 2001; Wald, 1999; Bartholdy et. 
al., 1997; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). 
66 
Emerging equity markets apparently have grown in importance in recent years. 
The stock market has undergone remarkable development especially in countries 
where governments have embarked on some financial liberalisation measures, as 
well as countries with rapid economic growth (Glen & Pinto, 1994). Despite the 
improvement efforts in the emerging equity markets, Glen and Pinto indicate that 
these markets are still falling behind in size by those of the developed countries. 
Aggarwal (1990) surveys 474 companies from 20 Asian countries during 1981 to 
1982 using average equity ratio as a leverage measure. He finds that capital 
0 structure among large companies in Asia depends mostly on geographic location 
and less significantly on industry classification. He claims that there are 
significant international and inter-industry differences in capital structures among 
Asian companies. In investigating 30 industrial and developing economies, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) document a significant correlation 
between stock market development and leverage ratios. They find that large firms 
become more leveraged as stock market develops, but small firms do not appear to 
be significantly affected by the market development. 
Other studies on international capital structure attempt to seek consistency of the 
0 
capital structure theory of the static trade-off and the pecking order to firms' 
financing practices. Examples are studies conducted by Krishnan and Moyer 
(1997), and Booth et. al. (2001). These studies however, present mixed results. 
Krishnan and Moyer (1997) offer some support for the static trade-off view in 
their study of four countries 
- 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea. Their 
results lend weak evidence supporting the pecking order theory. Meanwhile, 
Booth et. al. (2001) conduct a cross-country study on capital structure practices in 
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10 developing countries. Their results show an inclination for the financing 
behaviour of firms in developing countries to follow the pecking order theory than 
the static trade-off theory. Evidently, the findings by Booth et. al. (2001) are 
inconsistent with those of Krishnan and Moyer (1997). 
Some studies have also shown interest in seeking managements' opinions on 
firms' financing preferences. A few have used the adaptation of Pinegar and 
Wilbricht's (1989) questionnaire on managers' views of capital structure theory. 
I For example, this questionnaire has been replicated to seek opinions of CEOs 
from a sample of South Korean firms by Ang and Jung (1993), Finnish firms by 
Kj ellman and Hansen (1996), and Hong Kong firms by Fan and So (2000). 
The South Korean financing preferences do not fit with the usual interpretation of 
the pecking order model (Ang & Jung, 1993). Ang and Jung find that firms with 
high asymmetric infon-nation prefer a financing order of outside debt, outside 
equity and finally the inside funds. The heavy debt preferences in Korean firms 
explain the impact of Chaebols structure, similar to Keiretsu in Japan (Krishnan 
and Moyer, 1997). Kjellman and Hansen (1996) in their study also conclude that 
9 Finnish managers' perceptions contradict the general pecking order view. 
However, their results do not contradict the relation between asymmetric 
information and the pecking order behaviour. As for their part, Fan and So (2000) 
find that Hong Kong firms' financing behaviour is more consistent with the 
pecking order principle rather than the trade-off theory of capital structure. 
Among the five specified capital-raising instruments, internal equity came first, 
followed by bank debt and new common equity. Non-bank straight debt and non- 
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bank convertible debt appeared to be the least preferred choice. Although this 
ranking does not portray the actual pecking order hierarchy, Fan and So find that 
the high degree of asymmetric information and firm size have some impact on the 
firms' financing preferences. 
3.7 MALAYSIAN CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
In a cross-country study by Booth et. al. (2001), they have indicated that the 
Malaysian market has a significant proportion of total equity capitalisation and 
6 belongs to a low-debt country category. Malaysia accumulates relatively less 
4 
foreign borrowings than other Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, the country's 
economy falls under a low inflation group amongst the developing countries and 
enjoys a high real-growth rate, but has a high business risk. The Malaysian data 
for their study comprised of abbreviated financial statements for only the largest 
companies in the country from 1980 to 1990 collected by International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). However, the events that surfaced during the 90s might have 
changed the current market scenario. For example, the rapid development of the 
PDS market and the emergence of the Islamic securities in the 90s have 
contributed to the various financing alternatives circulating in the market. 
Nevertheless, Booth's proposition along with the claim by Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996), on how the development of equity market has made less use 
of leverage financing, have offered preliminary insights on Malaysian corporate 
financing decisions. 
Thus far, there is not a great deal of empirical work done on the capital structure 
issues of the Malaysian firms. Annuar & Shanisher (1993), Kester and Mansor 
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(1994), Mohamad (1995), Fauzias and Shamshubaridah (1997), and Muhammad 
(1998) are among the exceptions. In Annuar and Shamsher (1993), they document 
various aspects of firms' capital structure during the period of 1975 to 1989 by 
sampling 60 firms in five sectors. Their results indicate that leverage in Malaysia 
is industry- specific. Nevertheless, they claim that the leverage ratios differ within 
and between industrial sectors. In addition, they fail to find any significant 
relationship between capital structure and risk, contradicting most empirical 
findings on the negative relations between leverage and proxy for risk (see Marsh, 
0 1982; Friends & Hasbrouk, 1988; Fischer et. al, 1989). Annuar and Sharnsher 
indicate that their findings are due to the conservative attitude of financial 
4 
a 
institutions in making loans, and well available equity financing in the capital 
market. However, the situation was only true in the 80s, and no longer a general 
reflection of the Malaysian financial market in the 90s. 
A study by Mohamad (1995) examines the determinants of Malaysian firms' 
capital structures for the period from 1986 to 1990. He finds that firm's size and 
industry class has significant effects on its financing decisions. Mohamad also 
concludes that highly leveraged firms tend to earn higher profits when his results 
show a positive relation between leverage and future profitability. This finding is 
consistent with Ross' (1977) signalling theory and Jensen's (1986) control 
hypothesis. Meanwhile, a related work by Muhammad (1998) examines 109 listed 
firms from 1986-1995 based on the industry classification set by the PACAP 
databases. His findings reinforce the significant effect of industry classification 
and earnings volatility, but conclude mixed results on the size effect. His finds 
only five out of the ten industries in his study follow the pecking order financing. 
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For their part, Fauzias and Sharnshubaridah (1997) seek to investigate whether the 
changes in firms' capital structure affect Malaysian stock prices and earnings per 
share performance. They sample 82 firms that have continuous listing from 1988 
to 1992 and pay dividends every year. In their conclusion, they assume the 
existence of industrial and pecking order effects in Malaysian capital structure. 
However, we feel that this inference is weak as they based this claim after finding 
a significant positive relation in some industries while a negative relation in some 
other. A robust analysis is in order before submitting to this claim. 
4 
In a more recent study, Pandey (2001) investigates the effects of several firm- 
specific factors on different types of debt ratios in Malaysian firms from 1984 to 
1999. To capture the impact of different economic conditions, he divides the data 
into several sub-periods. His overall results show a significant positive relation of 
all type of leverage to growth and size, and a negative relation between 
profitability and debt ratios. With greater funds needed to finance future 
investment, high growth firms have the inclination to retain more earnings. His 
results also indicate that risk relates negatively to long-term debt, but positively to 
short-term debt ratios. If additional funds need to be acquired through debt, these 
4 high-growth and high-risk finns are inclined to use short-term debt rather than 
long-tenn debt. Asset tangibility however indicates the opposite. The results show 
a negative relation between asset tangibility and short-term debt ratios, as short- 
term debts generally need not to be collateralised. Despite the changes in the 
economic conditions, his results for each sub-period also reveal that profitability, 
size, risk and asset tangibility have consistent influence over short-term and total 
debt ratio, but inconclusive results with regard to the long-term debt ratios. 
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One survey that attempts to investigate directly the justification of the traditional 
capital structure theories in explaining Malaysian firms' financing behaviour is the 
study by Kester and Mansor (1994). Kester and Mansor, who replicate the same 
one-page questionnaire of Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989), seek the chief executive 
officers' views on their preferred financing means. From the 104 responses 
received and analysed, almost 80 percent of the respondents indicate preferences 
for a financing hierarchy while the remaining prefer a target capital structure. The 
former respondents rank internal funds as the first choice before seeking external 
4 financing. However, Kester and Mansor have earlier amended the types of 
financing by incorporating another category of common equity issuance through 
rights issues, rather than the conventional category as in Pinegar and Wilbricht 
(1989). While still maintaining the internal-external hierarchy, they observe that 
firms prefer rights offerings before seeking additional debt. They indicate that 
firms may find rights offerings cheaper and easier than debt. In line with other 
studies, they presume that preserving financing flexibility is one of the most 
important considerations affecting firms' financing decision (see Myers & Majluf, 
1984; Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989; Graham & Harvey, 2001). They conclude that 
capital structure issues in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong financial markets 
0 
are fundamentally consistent with the developed United States market. This claim, 
which is also shared by others (Booth et. al., 2001; Bartholdy et. al., 1997; Rajan 
& Zingales, 1995), will be the base for this research. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
The theoretical and empirical literatures have identified a wide range of capital 
structure issues. Within some modest range, firms should exhibit a preference 
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towards internal funds over funds generated externally, and whenever external 
funds are required, firms would seek for the cheaper source first, let it be debt or 
equity depending on the- lower costs between the two sources. This preference for 
internally generated funds should evidently create a negative relationship between 
finns' cash flow (and profitability) and debt usage. In relation, the costs associated 
with external funds may be lower for firms with lower asymmetric information 
between the respective stakeholders (i. e. equity holders, debt holders, managers 
and investors). 
I 
Nevertheless, if firms seek external funds, their leverage level might also be 
determined by the trade-off between relative cost of debt and relative cost of 
equity. An optimal debt ratio would minimise the cost of market imperfections 
and firm would revert its debt ratio to this targeted level if there is deviation away 
from it. The static trade-off theory predicts a cross-sectional relation between 
leverage ratios and the four firm-specific capital structure determinants, i. e. 
operating risk, asset composition, profitability, and tax. In essence, leverage 
should have a negative relation with risk inherent by the firms in terms of the 
expected financial distress cost and the volatility of earnings. It also implies a 
I positive relation between leverage and firms' collateralised value measured by the 
tangibility of assets in hand. 
The remaining two factors however, show some conflicting theoretical evidence. 
Leverage may relate either positively or negatively to profitability depending upon 
the timing of the profits generated. To describe the pecking order behaviour, 
leverage is supposed to correlate negatively to past profitability. However, 
0 
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Jensen's (1986) suggests otherwise. His control hypothesis claims a positive 
relation between leverage and past profitability. The contradicted relations 
between leverage and profitability arise from firms' different financing motives. 
As for the relation between leverage and tax, the literature has produced mixed 
and inconclusive evidence. Nonetheless, leverage should submit to minimise 
firms' effective tax rate. 
In sum, the review on capital structure literature has offered several general 
0 principles, which provide some empirical support that may be reflected in the 
Malaysian scenario. These general themes along with the corporate financial 
structure theories of the static trade-off and the pecking order have provided 
directions towards the development of the empirical model for Malaysian capital 
structure. Earlier work on the relevance of different capital structure models in 
explaining firms' financing behaviour has also fed some thoughts on the 
methodology for this thesis. This thesis lies on the fundamental claim that most 
capital structure issues are similar across regions, regardless of the institutional 
differences. Therefore, we anticipate some consistency between the aforesaid 
capital structure evidence cited in the literature and Malaysian firms' financing 
I. behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter describes the data collection procedures and the process of 
transforming the data source into a workable data set. All data are secondary in 
nature. The main discussion in this chapter includes definitions of the attributes 
and variables extracted from the financial data of firms listed in the Kuala Lumpur 
I 
Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
In addition, this chapter explains the process of creating a simplified fund flow 
statement from the data collected. The construction of this fund flow statement 
serves as a preliminary step in the descriptive exploration of firms' financing 
behaviour. Several distinct patterns emerge from our interpretation of the firms' 
financing behaviour during the period of this study. The classification of these 
financing patterns ranges from leverage-decreasing financing to leverage- 
increasing financing. The chapter ends with a brief explanation on the planned 
I empirical analyses for this thesis. The issues addressed in Chapter 1 are reiterated 
in the form of testable hypothesis statements. In general, this chapter specifies the 
source of the data, the transformation process that the data has undertaken, and the 
types of analysis that this thesis proposes to implement. 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
As at the end of 2000, the total population in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) was 795 firrns. However, we have imposed specific requirements in the 
75 
sample selection criteria. Firstly, the data set must cover all non-financial firms 
listed in the KLSE since 1990 or before. Consistent with most capital structure 
studies, the sample excludes firms in the finance-related sectors, as they depend 
largely on borrowed funds and have low net asset bases. In practice, these firms 
operate as net lenders on borrowed funds. For that reason, the method of 
classifying their accounting variables differs from the rest of the firms in other 
industry sectors. Secondly, the selected firms must also not be involved in a major 
merger during the sample period. Merger moves could generate a misleading 
change in firms' sustainable capital structure, therefore the firms should not have 
engaged in this activity during the period. The exclusion of firms involved in 
merger does not have much impact on the results as not many merger activities 
were observed during the period of the study. Taking into account both 
restrictions, the number of firms included in the sample at this point is 245. We 
reach this initial number after attaching the date listed in the exchange to the list 
of population. 
Another decisive factor put forward in the data selection criteria is that all firms 
must have a complete and continuous accounting record for the 1 0-year period 
from 1991 to 2000. Nonetheless, the 1990 data is also needed to construct the 
fund flow statement and for the inclusion of lagged variables in 1991. 
4.2.1 BACKGROUND OF THE DATA 
To date, KLSE classifies all firms into 13 industry sectors. After removing 
finance-related sectors (i. e. Finance, Trusts and Close-end sectors), there are 10 
non-finance-related sectors remaining. Due to the disparity in the number of firms 
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between sectors, we merge some of the industries into one combined sector. For 
example, we combine technology sector with the consumer product sector since 
there are only two firms in the technology sector. The distribution of firms in the 
revised sectors is as follows: 
TABLE 4.1 FIRMS LISTED SINCE 1990 BY SECTORS 
COMBINED SECTORS NO. OF FIRMS 
Technology/Consumer Products 41 
Industrial Products 61 
Construction/Properties 56 
Trading Services / Hotels 51 
Others 36 
(Plantation/Mining/IPC*) 
TOTAL FIRMS 245 
* IPC = Infrastructure Project Companies 
Subsequently, we remove several firms from the sample to comply with the 
continuous data flow requirements. Two hundred and twenty five (225) firms 
from five combined industry groupings with continuous listing of at least ten 
years are finally included in the research. Thus, Table 4.2 below surnmarises the 
final number of firms according to the five combined sectors. 
TABLE 4.2 DISTRIBUTION OF THE FINAL SAMPLE IN COMBINED SECTORS 
COMBINED SECTORS NO. OF FIRMS 
Technology/Consumer Products 35 
Industrial Products 60 
Construction/Properties 52 
Trading/Services and Hotels 42 
Others 36 
TOTAL FIRMS 225 
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4.3 THE DATA SOURCE 
As mentioned, the data are from secondary sources. Except for the market value 
of equity data, which is downloaded from DATASTREAM, we extract other 
financial information from the firms' annual reports and publications of KLSE. A 
five year-summary of the- Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss statements items are 
also available in the KLSE Annual Companies Handbook. The KLSE has recently 
made efforts to compile a database of its member firms' financial information in a 
CD-ROM. The content, however, is not complete. Therefore, it is more practical 
I to start with a manual data collection from firms' annual reports. Nonetheless, 
some annual reports turn out to be difficult to obtain, creating gaps in the data 
flow. We fill the gaps, where possible, from information in the KLSE Annual 
Companies Handbook that provides summaries of the firms' financial 
information. If still there were gaps, then we remove the firm from the sample as 
non-compliant to the continuous data flow requirement. 
Furthermore, we are aware of the changes in the accounting years for some of the 
firms during the sample period. For example, a financial report that ends in July 
1992 will have to be pro-rated between the year 1991 and 1992 to standardise the 
accounting years across firms. In the middle of collecting the data, we also 
encounter with some firms changing names and migrating across industries. 
Having anticipated these changes, we retain the most recent name and industry 
membership. 
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4.3.1 DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
The data sources are the Balance Sheet, the Profit and Loss Statement, and the 
Cash Flow Statement of the firms. The Balance Sheet items covers the main 
component items in total assets such as current assets, fixed assets and intangible 
assets, while the liabilities and equity components includes current liabilities, 
long-term liabilities, share capital and total reserves. As for the Profit and Loss 
Statement, the main items are such as tumover/sales, depreciation and 
amortisation, interest expense, after-tax profits and dividends. We extract the 
actual dividend paid amount from the Cash Flow Statement of the firms. Whilst 
most of the data are accounting figures, at times we need to calculate and derive 
some of the relevant data from the accounting variables and notes to the financial 
statements. 
Table 4.3 summarises the variables and the respective definitions, and 
subsequently follows by the detailed explanation on the derivation of the 
variables. 
TABLE 4.3 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Description and Definition 
d Leverage ratio: 
" Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
" Ratio of total long-term liabilities to total assets 
ASSET Ratio of fixed assets to book value of total assets 
RISK Standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to book value of 
total assets 
PRFT Ratio of operating income to book value of total assets 
TAX Ratio of tax expense to operating income 
A The change in variable from t- I to t 
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Cx I The change in total long term asset from t-I to t 
DIV I Cash dividend payments 
NWC I Current assets minus current liabilities 
LD I Total liabilities minus current liabilities 
CP I Common Stock (exclusive of retained earnings) 
FCF Free cash flow amount after deducting tax, changes in NWC and CX ý 
from operating profits after depreciation add backs. 
EGF I The sum of the issuance of additional loans and equity 
Leverage ratio (d) Leverage can be defined in several ways, depending 
on the objective of the analysis (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Some measures of 
leverage include the ratios of total liabilities to total assets, debt to equity, and 
total long-term liabilities to total assets. These debt measures can further be 
divided into short-term and long-term debt, as well as in terms of book and market 
values. This thesis uses the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and the ratio of 
total long-tenn liabilities to book value of total assets to represent leverage ratio as 
the dependent variable. 
I Asset Composition (ASSEI) Asset composition represents firm's asset 
structure, which comprises tangible and intangible components. In this research, 
asset composition corresponds to the tangibility of a firm's assets. The proxy for 
the tangible component of assets is the ratio of fixed assets to the book value of 
total assets (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Friend & Hasbrouk, 1988). 
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Operating Risk (RISK) Risk represents the volatility of a finn's operating 
activities, measured by the variability in the reported annual earnings. The proxy 
for this risk attribute is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income 
(profit before interest and tax) to the book value of total assets (Booth et. al., 2001; 
Titman & Wessel, 1988; Marsh, 1982). 
Proritability (PRFI) Ratio of operating income to the book value of total 
assets is a proxy for a firm's profitability (Booth et. al., 2001; Friend & Hasbrouk, 
1988). 
Tax Status (TAX) Ratio of tax expense over operating income is used to 
represent a firm's tax status (Booth et. al., 2001). 
Cash Dividend Payment (DIP) The amount of cash dividend payment is 
taken directly from the Cash Flow Statement if readily available. If unable to trace 
the amount, then the next move is to look at the difference between the beginning 
and ending dividend payable item in the Balance Sheet, after adding the dividend 
expense amount from the Profit and Loss Statement. The following expression 
calculates the amount described. 
Div Pa able(t-, ) 
- 
Div Payable(, ) + Div Expense(t) = Cash Dividend(t) (4.1) y 
The cash dividend figures from the former and the latter sources should be 
reconcilable. If there were discrepancies, then the tiebreak would come from the 
dividend amount in the Cash Flow Statement. In the case where cash dividend is 
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unavailable from the Cash Flow Statement, and also there exists some 
x 
r 
aggregations in the current liability (i. e. dividend payable item is unavailable 
independently to calculate the figure), then we assume that the firm pays dividend 
the following year after the reported Profit and Loss Statement. 7 
Change in Net Working Capital (ANWC) Net working capital is the 
amount after subtracting current liabilities from the current assets. Therefore, 
change in net working capital is the difference in the net working capital from the 
Balance Sheet for two consecutive years. An increase in net working capital is a 
use of cash flow and a decrease denotes a reduced use of cash flow. 
Change in Long-term Debt (ALD) Long-term debt 8 comprises the total 
items in the liabilities section excluding current liabilities (i. e. long-term debt plus 
other long-term liabilities). An increase denotes a cash inflow and a decrease 
indicates otherwise. We take the value as the difference in the Balance Sheet item 
for two consecutive years. 
Change in Common Stock (ACP) The value comes directly from the 
difference in the Balance Sheet item for two respective years. The net change 
indicates either equity issues (a positive ACP) or share buyback (a negative ACP). 
7 We based this assumption on several observations on the trend of cash dividend paid by 
comparing the firms' reported dividend in the Profit and Loss Statement and the subsequent year's 
Cash Flow Statement for a number of years. The Cash Flow Statement items gathered by us were 
not complete, as more emphasis was given to the collection of the Balance Sheet and Profit and 
Loss items. 
8 The items are actually all long-term liabilities items such as hire purchases, financial leases, 
deferred taxation, retirement benefits, and all other long-term obligations outstanding at the 
reported Balance Sheet date. We used this standard definition for long-term debt. 
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Capital Expenditures (CX) The capital expenditures amount9 is taken 
4 
directly from the difference in total fixed assets, net of capital sales between two 
consecutive years. This is a gross amount before depreciation. 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) We describe a fim-i's free cash flow as the intemal 
cash surplus (denoted by the positive sign) or the internal cash deficit (denoted by 
the negative sign). Based on the accounting information, we express a firm's free 
cash flow (FCFt) at time t as follows: 
(PBITt + DEPRt)- TAXt 
- 
AIVWCt 
- 
CXt = FCFt (4.2) 
0 
Equation (4.2) states that free cash flow for the year (FCFt) will be supplied by 
deducting tax (TAXt), changes in net working capital (AIVWCt) and capital 
expenditures (CXI) from profit before interest and tax (PBITt), and after 
depreciation add back (DEPRt). 
Externally Generated Fund (EGF) Externally generated fund is a 
derived amount comprising the sum of the issuance of additional loans and 
external equity. The issuance (repayment) of loans or issuance (repurchase) of 
external equity is usually made whenever there is a deficit (surplus) in the FCFt. 
Firms, however, pay interest (INTt) and dividend (DIVt) obligations first before 
any issue/repay attempts. Therefore, despite generating cash surpluses, sometimes 
firms still issue shares or debt to meet these interest and dividend obligations. A 
9 The amount can also be verified by inserting these identities into the following accounting, 
expression: (** C, is firm's after-tax cash flow at time t) 
CX, =- (C, 
- 
DIVt) 
- 
ANWCt + ALDt + ACP, 
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negative amount indicates a requirement for some external financing. Equation 
(4.3) illustrates the calculation. 
-EGFt = FCFt - (INTt + DlVt) (4.3) 
4.4 CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS'FINANCING PATTERNS 
The initial phase in exploring the financing behaviour of firms is to transform the 
accounting data into a simplified fund flow statement. A natural question would 
be why the need to construct a separate fund flow statement when a published 
cash flow statement is readily available. In defending this, it could be argued that 
there is some inconsistency in the firms' reported cash flow, especially in the 
early years of the sample period. For example, a number of firms have been 
reporting their cash flow in the Statement of Changes in Financial Position in 
early 90s. In providing some degree of reconciliation and standardisation in the 
cash flow reporting across all firms throughout the entire period, we develop our 
version of a simple fund flow statement instead of relying on the figures reported 
in the respective statement. 
We construct a simplified annual fund flow statement for each firm from 1991 to 
2000. As a framework, we classify the firms' pattern of financing by examining 
the characteristic of financing behaviour of three states throughout the whole 10- 
year time spanlo; (1) State of Net Fund Flow", (2) State of Issue/Repurchase of 
10 Once the accounting data are transformed into a fund flow statement, the period has now 
become 10 years rather than 11 years since the fund flow statement is developed from the 
differences in two respective years' statements. 
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Share Capital and (3) State of Issue/Repayment of Loans. The structure of a fund 
flow statement appears as follows: 
FIGURE 4.1 FRAMEWORK OF A FUND FLOW STATEMENT 
Internal Financing: 
Operating Profit before Interest and Tax 
Add: Depreciation 
Less: Tax 
Less: Change in NWC 
Less: Capital Expenditure 
Free Cash Flow'2 
Less: Dividends 
Less: Interest 
Net Fund Flow 
External Financing: 
Add: Issuance of Share Capital 
(Less: Repurchase of Share Capital) 
Add: Issuance of Loans 
(Less: Repayment of Loans) 
Externally Generated Fund" 
Based on the developed framework, when there is deficit in the net fund flow, 
firms will raise capital externally either by issuing debt-only, equity-only, or a 
simultaneous debt and equity. Meanwhile, firms will normally repay debt when 
there is excess, although we also have observed firms repurchase equity in a few 
rare cases. From the financing behaviour identified in each firm during the period, 
we sort similar patterns together. Six unambiguous financing patterns have 
emerged from this effort. The financing patterns range from 'no-leverage' (all- 
11 Net fund flow is the free cash flow net of interest and dividend payment. 
12 A negative amount of FCF, indicates a deficit that requires some external ftinds to meet the INT, 
and DIV, obligation. 
13 The amount matches the net fund flow amount but with opposite sign. For example, a negative 
net fund flow indicates a deficit that will be met by issuing externally generated fund. As this 
issuance is now a cash inflow, it holds a positive sign. 
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equity) financing to 'all-leverage' (no equity) financing. The suggested 
classifications of the financing patterns are as follows: 
1 All equity-only issues (no debt issues) 
týc 
z H. Simultaneous debt and equity issues andlor Z 
equity-only issues (no year with debt-only issues) 
Iff. Sometimes equity-only issues and sometimes debt- 
only issues (no year with simultaneous debt and 14 
equity issues) 
TV All types offinancing (debt-only, equity-only, and 
debt 1equity simultaneous issues) at different 
times 
v Simultaneous debt and equity issues andlor debt- 
only issues (no year with equity-only issues) 
IF VI. All debt-only issues (no equity issues) 
We realise that this classification is not the only possible one, as the interpretation 
of financing behaviour is subjective. However, the groupings above should serve 
as an unambiguous preliminary classification in exploring the firms' financing 
pattern. (Appendix I illustrates an example of how the pattems for this 
classification are established. ) 
4.5 PROPOSED ANALYSES AND HYPOTHESES 
Overall, we have divided this research into two parts: (1) descriptive investigation, 
and (2) empirical analyses. 
14 We later realise that Type III financing could also be grouped together with Type IV, as the 
financing behaviour of both types is almost similar. In addition, Type III and Type IV fit neither the 
leverage-increasing nor the leverage-decreasing arrows. Nonetheless, both financing types 
position themselves moderately between the two extreme financing of equity-only (Type I) and 
debt-only (Type VI). 
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The descriptive investigation deals with the initial exploration into the Malaysian 
firms' financing background, and attempts to relate the financing behaviour to the 
economic cycle. Based on this investigation, we intend to build preliminary 
inferences on the relation between the financing behaviour detected and the 
descriptions of the capital structure theories of static trade-off and pecking order. 
Meanwhile the empirical analyses seek evidence of capital structure decisions in 
the Malaysian context. We perform three main empirical analyses. The first 
analysis attempts to seek consistency of prior Malaysian-based claims on the 
alleged firm-specific effects (i. e. size, risk, profitability and industry class) on 
firms' financing decisions. We subsequently extend the investigation to restate the 
relation between leverage and firm-specific theory-related factors of asset 
tangibility, profitability (past, current and future profits 15) 
, 
business risk, and tax 
effects. Equation (4.4) below specifies the link between leverage ratios (dit) and 
the aforementioned variables. 
dit = ai + xit P+ cit (4.4) 
where xit = [ASSETit, PRFTit-i, PRFTit, PRFTit+l, RISKit, TAXit], while m and cit 
are constant and error terms respectively. In re-establishing the relations between 
leverage and the explanatory variables listed above, Table 4.4 below summarises 
the testable hypothesis of each independent variable. 
15 Future profitability also reflects the growth opportunities of firms as it signifies an increase in 
the firms' value. 
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TABLE 4.4 PREDICTED DIRECTION OF CAPITAL STRUCTURIE 
DETERMINANTS 
Dependent Variables: Le erage Ratios 
independent Variables Direction of HO: Null HA: Alternative 
Coefficient Hypothesis Hypothesis 
Asset Tangibility (ASSETid + 
'81 =0 81 >0 
Past Profitability (PRFTit-ý =0 A<0 
Current Profitability (PRFTid 0 A<0 
Future Profitability (PRFTit+, d + 0 >0 
Business Risk (PJSKid 0 <0 
Tax (TAXid + A0 >0 
I If the coefficients (, 6's) are in the directions Predicted and are statistically 
significant, then there is strong evidence that our results are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions. When these coefficients produce the sign as predicted, 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no-significant effect (H,,: 8 =0) would amount 
to a direct probability that the firm-specific determinants cited in the literature 
also work in Malaysia. 
I 
The second analysis performs empirical investigation on whether the static trade- 
off and the pecking order models are able to describe the firms' financing 
behaviour. The static trade-off or target adjustment model adopted from Shyam- 
Sunder and Myers (1999) is as in Equation (4.5) below. 
ALDit =a+ fiTA (LD *it 
- 
LDit- 1) + Eit (4.5) 
where BTA denotes the target-adjustment coefficient, and LD*it denotes the target 
or optimal long-term debt level for firm i in the current period. The above 
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equation states that the current change in debt level (ALDit) is an attempt to adjust 
I 
the previous year's debt level (LDit- 1) to the targeted level (LD *it). 
However, we have revised the pecking order model of Shyarn-Sunder and Myers. 
Myer (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) predict a negative relation between 
leverage and profitability, while Jensen (1986) and Ross (1977) predict a positive 
relation. In view of these conflicting theoretical predictions on the relation 
between leverage and profitability, we include a lagged profitability variable to 
check the prediction of profitability in our model. We also change the model's 
underlying assumption as a response to Chirinko and Singha's (2000) comment on 
the original model's strict assumption. In our pecking order model, we allow 
possible issuance of equity in the financing hierarchy if additional debt is 
insufficient to cover the current deficit level. Chirinko and Singha describe this 
type of financing behaviour as the semi-strong fonn of pecking order model. The 
following Equations (4.6) and (4.7) illustrate the revised pecking order model. 
ALDit = al +, Bpo (DEFit)+ PpRFT (PRFTit-, d + Ent (4.6) 
k ACPit = a2 + As (DEFit - ALDd + c2tt (4.7) 
where flpo denotes the pecking order coefficient in response to the deficit level 
(DEFit), and flpRFT is the coefficient for the lagged value of profitability 
fDD ýPaFTit, ). Meanwhile, 6ss is the coefficient for the semi-strong assumption. This 
fiss value should be greater than zero to qualify for this assumption. Equation 
(4.7) suggests the issuance of equity (ACPit) in the event when debt issues cannot 
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fully cover the deficit level (DEFit 
- 
ALDit). The e's are the error tenns in the 
specifications. 
Based on our adaptations of Shyam-Sunder and Myers' (1999) target adjustment 
model (Equation (4.5)) and pecking order model (Equation (4-6) and (4.7)), we 
have developed the following hypotheses. 
HI: PTA ýý' 
There is some adjustment of debt ratio ftom the current level to the target level if 
the static trade-off model were able to explain thefinancing behaviour. 
H2: j8po >0 
Firms that utilise debt in response to current deficit level explain the pecking 
order behaviour, i. e. there is a positive relation between the change in debt level 
and the level of deficit. 
H3: APRFT'ýý 0 
Firms that generate substantial past profits tend to exhaust internal funds for 
investment and use less debt, i. e. there is a negative relation between past 
profitability and debt. 
H4: flss> 0 
Firms seek to raise external equity if the additional debt could not fully support 
the current deficit level, L e. this type of financing portrays the semi-strong 
assumption ofpecking order. 
The 8 coefficients in the models should produce the predicted signs for both or 
either models (the static trade-off (via target-adjustment model) and/or the 
pecking order models) to be able to explain the capital structure behaviour. The 
purpose of the enquiries is neither to derive a conclusion on the theory domination 
nor to examine the dependability of the specifications of the models by comparing 
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the adjusted-R 2 value. To reiterate, the analysis based on our versions of Shyarn- 
Sunder and Myer's model is entirely an attempt to investigate whether the 
traditional capital structure theories are able to provide plausible explanation of 
Malaysian firms' financing behaviour using these developed models. 
The final analysis attempts to seek consistency with the claim of Shyarn-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) on the greater confidence of the pecking order model than in 
the target adjustment model. In essence, this part of the thesis assesses the 
0 statistical explanatory power of both the target-adjustment and the pecking order 
models developed for this research. In performing the statistical power tests for 
this analysis, we initially need to generate two types of hypothetical financing 
series; one type to reflect the hypothetical target-adjustment series, and the other 
to represent the pecking order financing time-series. In each financing series, 
firms' financing is supposed to behave as if the firms are following the assumed 
financing rules. We conduct the tests by fitting the target-adjustment and the 
pecking order models specifications independently and later jointly to each 
simulated financing series. We anticipate the results from these fitted tests to 
indicate the empirically better model between the two specifications when judged 
I 
on explanatory power. The hypothesis developed for this analysis is as follows. 
H5: The pecking order model has no significant explanatory power for the 
simulated data based on the target adjustment specifications. 
The results from this simulated experiment should imply that an acceptance of the 
above hypothesis indicates that the pecking order model should generate 
statistically significant results for the pecking order hypothetical financing series 
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and correctly reject the significant results for the target-adjustment time series. 
Whereas, presumably being a weaker counterpart, the target adjustment model is 
anticipated to falsely produce significant explanatory power for the alternative 
pecking order financing series just as well as fitting its own hypothetical series. A 
model lacks statistical explanatory power if it fails to accept the true and reject the 
false. 
4.6 SUMMARY 
4 To recapitulate, the chapter may be surnmarised as follows: First, the sample 
comprises 225 non-financial firms from five combined industry sectors listed in 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange since 1990. We have imposed several 
restrictions before reaching the final sample size. In addition to having a 
continuous accounting record for the prescribed period, the firm must also not be 
involved in a major merger during this period as this activity may severely alter 
the firm's sustainable capital structure. All data are secondary in nature and 
collected from the firms' published accounting reports from 1990 to 2000. From 
the financial data, we define several attributes and variables for the analyses 
proposed. 
0 
Second, in exploring the financing behaviour of the firms, we have classified the 
finns into six distinct financing patterns. We base the classification on the 
financing decisions following the state of firms' net fund flow during the period of 
the study. If the net fund flow shows a deficit, then firms raise financing through 
issuing additional equity-only, debt-only or simultaneous debt and equity. 
However, when there is a surplus in the net fund flow, firms normally repay debt, 
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and/or repurchase shares. Subsequently, we group firms with similar financing 
I 
pattern together as they are assumed to have comparable financing behaviour. 
Third, the final part of this chapter outlines the planned investigations along with 
the associated testable hypotheses. In addition to the descriptive exploration, the 
first empirical analysis seeks to investigate the significant effects of firm-specific 
factors to capital structure decisions. The second analysis explores the extent to 
which the static trade-off theory and the pecking order model work in the 
Malaysian context. The specifications also highlight the predicted directions of the 
coefficients in both model specifications. The final analysis attempts to build a 
better empirically based theory of corporate leverage that can very much explain 
firms' financing behaviour by testing the statistical explanatory power of both 
models on simulated financing time-series. 
In general, this chapter revolves around discussing the description of the relevant 
data and the exploration of the firms' preliminary financing patterns. The chapter 
ends with a brief overview of the proposed analyses and a list of testable 
hypotheses on the submitted issues. The chapters hereafter discuss the detailed 
analyses and the achieved results. 
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PART 3 
DESCRIPTIVE 
EXPLORATION 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the descriptive exploration on firms' financing background 
from 1991 to 2000. The discussion begins with the observation on firms' 
financing trend during the last decade. For this part, we have classified the firms 
based on the financing patterns identified in Chapter 4. For each pattern, we 
I 
present detailed description of its financing flow throughout the ten-year period. 
Subsequently, the discussion centres on the exploration to seek whether each 
pattern's financing behaviour fits the description of the static trade-off theory, the 
pecking order model, or both. 
The second part of this chapter presents the firms' financial performance in the 
period identified. It focuses on the description and movement of selected annual 
key financial ratios during the time. These annual ratios are compared to capture 
the trend and the financial impact when economic condition changes. We 
L conclude the discussion in this part by presenting the descriptive statistics of the 
key attributes proposed for the empirical analyses of this thesis. 
The final part of this chapter presents preliminary results from a regression 
analysis on firms' book-debt ratio against the manifested Malaysian evidence, as 
cited earlier in Chapter 3. The preliminary analysis attempts to seek consistency 
on the relation between leverage and the proposed factors using our data. In 
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general, this chapter provides initial ideas on Malaysian firms' financing profiles 
during the period of this study. 
5.2 PRELIMINARY FINANCING PATTERNS 
Prior to ascribing the firms to a specific financing pattern as described in the 
preceding chapter, we initially do a count on firms' financing behaviour for each 
year and observe the frequency of specific financing manner across industries. To 
accomplish this task, we divide firms' financing into three broad categories. These 
financing categories are: (1) equity financing, (2) debt financing, and (3) mixed 
financing. 
Figure 5.1 below illustrates the frequency of financing in the above categories 
across industries during the period of 1991 to 2000. 
FIGURE 5.1 FREQUENCY OF FIRMS' SPECIFIC FINANCING ACROSS 
INDUSTRIES FROM 1991 TO 2000 
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FIGURE 5.1 (continued): 
ll., NlIXED FINAV 1\(, 
I 
25 
20 
15 
0 10 
z 
5 
0 
111. DEBT FINANCING 
I 
30 
25 
0 
Z-- Z" 
20 
- 
15 
- 
10 j, 
0 
A 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
YEARS 
= TechICons 
trja sr -W Industrial 
ConstlProp 
X TralServlHolel 
0 
TechlCons 
-Industrial 
ConstlProp 
TralServlHotel 
0 Others 
The first graph shows the frequency of equity financing, while the second and 
third graphs illustrate the frequency of mixed financing and debt financing 
respectively. From the three time-temporal graphs above, we assess the frequency 
of each financing category utilised by firms in the sample throughout the period. 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
YEARS 
As shown, 'technology/consumer products' and 'others' sectors seem to have the 
least number of firms utilising equity and mixed financing compared to other 
industry sectors. From 1991 to 1997, we observe sectors such as 'industrial 
products', 'construction/properties', and 'trading/services' have alternately 
dominated the use of both equity and mixed financing. We also notice that firms 
in 'industrial products' sector utilise more debt financing compared to other 
means of financing. By the end of 1997 until 1998, all three financing categories 
had slowed due to the crisis that hit the region during the time. However, we 
observe that the frequency of debt financing by firms in 'construction/properties' 
and 'trading/services' sectors began to increase slightly during this crisis period. 
After the economic crisis of 1997-98, equity financing in firms from all industries 
started to pick up, while the graph shows a varying direction of mixed-financing 
utilisation across industries. For example, the number of firms that utilise mixed- 
financing in 'industrial product' and 'construction/properties' sector increases, 
while other sectors show a decline. The graph also indicates a decreasing number 
of firms utilising debt financing in most industries immediately after the crisis. 
However, from 1999 onwards, the frequency of debt financing in 
'technology/consurner products' sector started to pick up again after experiencing 
a decline during the period of the crisis. 
With regard to the average frequency of financing within each industry, Table 5.1 
provides a snapshot on the average percentage of firms engaging in the three 
aforementioned financing categories. In the table, frequency averages from each 
financing category are calculated according to industry class (i. e. 
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'technology/consumer products', 'industrial products', 'construction/properties', 
'trading/services' and 'others'). Please note that the frequency averages do not 
add to 100 percent as not all firms raise finance in a given year. 
TABLE 5.1 AVERAGE FREQUENCY OF FINANCING WITHIN INDUSTRY 
1. TECHNOLOGY/CONSUMER PRODUCTS 2. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
(100%=35 firms) (100% 60 firms) 
Equity (%) Mixed (%) Debt (%) Equity (%) Mixed (%) Debt(%) 
1991 11.43 11.43 42.86 1991 10.00 11.67 35.00 
1992 14.29 14.29 25.71 1992 18.33 6.67 46.67 
1993 11.43 14.29 34.29 1993 10.00 30.00 26.67 
1994 5.71 22.86 28.57 1994 13.33 25.00 26.67 
1995 11.43 22.86 11.43 1995 16.67 33.33 21.67 
1996 11.43 37.14 25.71 1996 21.67 28.33 36.67 
1997 11.43 25.71 42.86 1997 21.67 18.33 38.33 
1998 11.43 2.86 31.43 1998 6.67 10.00 30.00 
1999 14.29 17.14 20.00 1999 13.33 8.33 23.33 
2000 22.86 5.71 31.43 2000 16.67 16.67 18.33 
Average 12.57 17.43 29.43 Average 14.83 18.83 30.33 
3. CONSTRUCTION/PROPERTIES 4. TRADING/SERVICES/HOTELS 
(100% 52 firms) (100% = 42 flrms) 
Equity (%) Mixed (%) Debt (%) Equity (%) Mixed (%) Debt (0/6) 
1991 25.00 25.00 30.77 1991 11.90 38.10 26.19 
1992 11.54 13.46 40.38 1992 23.81 30.95 30.95 
1993 17.31 44.23 11.54 1993 35.71 30.95 14.29 
1994 21.15 36.54 23.08 1994 28.57 45.24 16.67 
1995 23.08 34.62 15.38 1995 21.43 40.48 26.19 
1996 28.85 30.77 28.85 1996 14.29 52.38 28.57 
1997 25.00 30.77 25.00 1997 19.05 50.00 23.81 
1998 11.54 11.54 32.69 1998 16.67 16.67 33.33 
1999 17.31 13.46 25.00 1999 16.67 21.43 30.95 
2000 23.08 19.23 17.31 2000 28.57 19.05 23.81 
Average 20.38 25.96 
__L5.0)0 
Average 21.67 34.52 2L. 48 
5. OTHERS (100% 36 flrms) 
Equity (%) Mixed (%) Debt (%) 
1991 8.33 2.78 30.56 
1992 8.33 16.67 22.22 
1993 13.89 8.33 27.78 
1994 8.33 5.56 30.56 
1995 5.56 11.11 33.33 
1996 2.78 19.44 33.33 
1997 5.56 16.67 44.44 
1998 11.11 8.33 38.89 
1999 16.67 11.11 27.78 
2000 25.00 
- 
30.56 
Average 10.56 10.00 
__Ll. 
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From these averages, we observe that firms in all five industries utilise debt 
financing more frequently than equity financing. The difference in average 
percentage of utilisation between equity and debt financing is quite high in some 
of the industries (for example; the difference of 21.38% for 'others' sector and 
16.86% for 'technology/consumer products' sector). Apparently, the frequency of 
mixed financing has positioned itself moderately between the frequency of equity 
and debt financing in three industries. The average mixed-financing utilisation is 
slightly higher for 'construction/properties' sector, and even very much utilised by 
I 'trading/services/hotel' sector (34.52%). 
In general, the above descriptions suggest that firms in 'technology/consumer 
products', 'industrial product' and 'other' sectors raise finance more frequently 
through debt than through equity. The aversion towards risk (i. e. avoiding debt 
financing) of technology-products firms may not be observable in this thesis since 
there are only two technology-products firms included in the 
'technology/consumer' sector (refer to Section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4). Firms in 
'trading/services/hotel' sector, however, utilise mixed financing more frequently 
than other types of financing, while a moderate use of all three types of financing 
by firms in 'construction/properties' sector. 
5.2.1 DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FINANCING PATTERNS 
This section provides detailed explanations on the financing flow captured by 
each type of financing pattern described in Chapter 4. In the course of assigning 
the finns to their respective pattern, we have discarded two firms since they did 
not raise any additional debt or equity throughout the 10-year period (i. e. the rows 
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for 'issue/repurchase of share capital' and 'issue/repayment of loans' in Figure 
4.1 of Chapter 4 are filled with zeros). These two firms seemed to be able to 
generate the amount of operating cash surplus just enough to service their interest 
and dividend payment. Therefore, the external financing for the two firms 
appeared to be nil. The allocation for the remaining 223 firms is as follows 
(Appendix 11 has examples of firms from each type of financing pattern): 
TYPE I FIRMS 
All equity-only issues 
Only one (1) firm belongs to this group. The firm, which is in the 
'technology/consumer products' sector, raised additional equity for only one year 
when it experienced a deficit in the net fund flow, whereas for other years, the 
required annual payment of interest and dividend matched exactly to the amount 
of operating cash surplus generated. We could assume that the year when the firm 
employed equity financing was the year when all other means of financing were 
not available. 
TYPE II FIRMS 
Simultaneous debt and equity issues andlor equity-only issues 
0 Sixteen (16) firms match this category. These firms issued either equity only or 
mixture of debt and equity simultaneously to finance deficits. There were no debt- 
only issues observed during this 10-year period. Firms in this category repaid debt 
when there was excess in the net fund flow. We could justify that this type of 
financing behaviour reflects some adjustments to targets. Nonetheless, the pattern 
could also indicate a smoothing financing hierarchy from a mixed financing to 
equity-only issues. These firms are from the following industries: 
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Industry No. Of firms 
Technology/Consumer Products 3 
Industrial Products 1 
Construction/Properties 4 
Trading/Services and Hotels 7 
Others 1 
TYPE III FIRMS 
Sometimes equity-only issues and sometimes debt-only issues 
The eighteen (18) firms that fit into this category issued either equity-only or 
debt-only whenever there were deficits in net fund flow. There was no single year 
with simultaneous issues of debt and equity. These firms normally repaid debt 
when there was a surplus as we only observe two cases of equity repurchases. We 
presume that these firms were adjusting towards some targeted amount. The 
distribution of firms in this category is as follows: 
Industry No. Of firms 
Technology/Consumer Products 1 
Industrial Products 8 
Construction/Properties 2 
Trading/Services and Hotels 2 
Others 5 
TYPEIVFIRMS 
All types of financing (debt-only, equity-only and simultaneous debt 1equity 
issues) 
One hundred and twenty (120) firms adopt all three types of financing 
behaviour to finance deficit in net fund flows. The firms repaid debt or/and 
repurchased equity if there was a surplus. With the alternate financing, these firins 
behaved as if they were adjusting the debt ratios towards some targeted levels. 
Nevertheless, if the sequence could be determined, it may also be that these firms 
behaved as if they were following some sort of hierarchy in financing. All firms 
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that fall in this type of financing pattern belong to the following industry 
distribution: 
Industry No. Of firms 
Technology/Consumer Products 14 
Industrial Products 36 
Construction/Properties 35 
Trading/S erv ices and Hotels 25 
Others 10 
I 
TYPE V FIRMS 
Simultaneous debt and equity issues andlor debt-only issues 
Forty (40) firins correspond to this type of financing pattern. These finns acted as 
if they were avoiding equity-only issues during this period. In addition to repaying 
debt when there was a surplus, these firms sometimes repurchased shares. The 
mixed financing of debt and equity would suggest a transition to involve equity 
financing when raising debt alone could not afford to support the year's financing 
needs. Nonetheless, the pattern could also reflect some adjustment behaviour, as 
the simultaneous issuances may be an act to rebalance the debt ratios to targets. 
The distribution of these firms based on industrial sectors is as below: 
Industry No. Of firms 
Technology/Consumer Products 6 
Industrial Products 8 
Construction/Properties 8 
Trading/Services and Hotels 9 
Others 9 
TYPE VI FIRMS 
All debt-only issues 
Twenty-eight (28) firms fit the description of this pattern. It seems that all firms 
in this category only issued additional debt to meet deficits in net fund flow. 
Otherwise, these firms repaid part of the outstanding debt whenever there was 
excess in the fund flow. This all-debt utilisation appears to reflect a strict 
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financing hierarchy since there were no equity issues observed. The following is 
the distribution of firms according to industry sectors: 
Industry No. Of firms 
Technology/Consumer Products 10 
Industrial Products 7 
Construction/Properties 3 
Trading/Services and Hotels 1 
Others 7 
5.2.2 FIRMS'FINANCING PATTERNS AND RELEVANT THEORY 
From the number of firms shown in each financing pattern, it seems that majority 
of the finns, which account for 87 percent of the total firms, have the tendency to 
combine both debt and equity financing rather than to concentrate on only one 
type of financing source. To illustrate, Appendix III plots a stem-and-leaf chart 
of the financing patterns and firms according to industry. However, when 
comparing between debt and equity financing, most firms seem to incline towards 
leverage-increasing financing. Table 5.2 below matches the financing types with 
the relevant theoretical description. 
TABLE 5.2 FINANCING PATTERNS AND THEORETICAL DESCRILPTION 
FINANCING 
PATTERNS 
(FIRM TYPES) 
ADJUSTING 
TOWARDS TARGET 
FINANCING 
HIERARCHY 
BEHAVIOUR 
NO. OF 
FIRMS 
TYPE I FIRMS x I 
TYPE II FIRMS V, 16 
TYPE III FIRMS V, x 18 
TYPE IV FIRMS 120 
TYPE V FIRMS V, 40 
TYPE VI FIRMS x 28 
TOTAL FIRMS 223 
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We reinforce this assertion further by presenting a histogram of the firms' 
distribution according to financing types, as in Figure 5.2. With the two extreme 
financing of equity-only (Type 1) on the far left and debt-only (Type VI) on the far 
right, the distribution of firms clearly stacks in the centre around Type TV and Type 
V, and particularly clusters at Type IV pattern. 
FIGURE 5.2 FINANCING PATTERNS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF FIRMS 
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The assertion about how these patterns fit the description of both theories may 
0 possibly be the explanation why some of earlier studies offer mixed evidence on 
the consistency of capital structure theory in Malaysia (see Krishnan and Moyer, 
1977; Muhammad, 1999; Booth et. al., 2001). The above descriptions however, 
are only little more than cursory impressions at this exploration phase. From the 
observations at this stage, we can generally infer that both the target adjustment 
and the financing hierarchy views may have some relevance in explaining the 
broad financing behaviour of Malaysian finns. 
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Type I Type H Type III Type IV Type V Type VI 
FINANCING PATIERNS 
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE DATA 
Prior to engaging into the main empirical analyses, we examine the background of 
the main variables collected. This section discusses the descriptive statistics of 
these variables and the trend of the key indicators during the observed period. In 
essence, we estimate book and market debt ratios, market value of equity and 
return on assets in each year to identify movements in leverage and profitability. 
We derive most ratios directly from the accounting information in the firms' 
financial report. However, in calculating market-debt ratio 16 
, 
we obtain the firms' 
market value database from DATASTREAM. 
Table 5.3 surnmarises the descriptive statistics of the key indicators during the 
period of the study. Glimpsing through the maximum value of both book and 
market debt ratios, we have anticipated having values of debt ratios greater than 
1.0 as some of the firms in the sample have negative capital reserves. The overall 
trend indicated a rise in the mean of book-debt ratio 17 from 42.4 percent in 1991 
to 74.8 percent in 2000, a 76.4 percent increase. Having an increase of about 60 
percent, the market-debt ratio too escalated from 27.3 percent in 1991 to 43.6 
percent in 2000. However, profitability as represented by the return-on-assets ratio 
seemed to topple from the mean of 4.8 percent in 1991 to a negative value (-5.6 
percent) in 2000. The triggering event for this negative mean of retum-on-assets 
ratio was the Asian economic crisis in 1997, and this negative rate continued until 
2000. 
16 We calculate market-debt ratio as the ratio of total liabilities to the sum of book value of total 
liabilities and the market value of equity. 
17 For standardised comparison, we calculate book-debt ratio based on the ratio of total liabilities 
to book value of total assets. 
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TABLE 5.3 DESCRIEPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE DATA 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
BOOK DEBT RATIO 
Mean 0.424 0.405 0.395 0.400 0.407 0.417 0.499 0.603 0.622 0.748 
Minimum 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.033 0.001 0.009 0.011 
Maximum 2.824 2.326 2.322 1.425 1.749 1.702 3.751 7.070 9.785 18.674 
SD 0.331 0.269 0.254 0.224 0.229 0.232 0.395 0.782 0.908 1.663 
MARKET DEBT RATIO 
Mean 0.273 0.322 0.235 0.207 0.235 0.259 0.314 0.631 0.424 0.436 
Minimum 0.007 0.016 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.016 0.043 0.016 0.012 
Maximum 0.887 0.911 0.946 0.797 0.854 0.901 1.439 12.432 2.477 3.709 
SD 0.179 0.198 0.156 0.148 0.172 0.189 0.215 0.879 0.284 0.340 
MV OF EQUITY (RM' million) 
Mean 630.151 618.417 939.561 1369.027 1503.973 1597.948 1490.832 611.056 1167.488 1138.988 
Minimum 15.540 15.020 24.120 47.170 69.330 85.460 91.060 11.810 32.860 32.860 
Maximum 22463.7 27029.6 31177.1 38992.2 35461.1 40725.0 30885.6 18141.5 35688.1 36711.5 
SD 1746.9 2065.9 2516.0 3267.4 3109.6 3268.4 2567.1 1558.4 2934.8 2962.6 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
Mean 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.025 0.035 
-0.017 -0.087 -0.013 -0.056 
Minimum 
-0.304 -0.228 -0.476 -0.267 -6.502 -5.678 -4.573 -3.448 -3.146 -3.095 
Maximum 0.509 0.293 0.586 0.412 0.913 1.248 1.718 0.709 0.874 0.494 
SD 0.074 0.065 0.077 0.063 0.448 0.399 0.390 0.406 0.281 0.335 
Figure 5.3 further illustrates the trend of debt and profitability ratios graphically 
during this period. Book-debt ratio demonstrated a slight decrease in the earlier 
years before starting to increase in 1996 and onwards, while the market-debt ratio 
experienced a mixed movement. Return on assets (ROA), however, suffered the 
most in 1998 following the already downward trend of profitability during this 
period. 
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FIGURE 5.3 DEBT RATIOS AND ROA OVER THE PERIOD OF 1991 TO 2000 
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The market-debt ratio links inversely to the market value of equity. This ratio 
seemed to have a less volatile movement in the first half of the period before 
experiencing a sharp increase in 1997, reaching its peak in 1998, and decreasing 
in the year that follows before regaining its steady movement. This sharp increase 
in 1997 to 1998 reflected the decline in the market value of equity (see Figure 
5.4) in response to the economic crisis that hit the country at that time. 
FIGURE 5.4 
1800.00 
1600.00 
1400.00 
1200.00 
1000.00 
800.00 
600.00 
400.00 
200.00 
0.00 
MV OF EQUITY OVER THE PERIOD OF 1991 TO 20000 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
YEARS 
1999 2000 
108 
Next, we compare the changes in these leverage ratios by charting the movement 
of book-debt ratio and market-debt ratio separately, as in Figure 5.5. 
FIGURE, 5.5 LEVERAGE RATIOS (BASED ON INDUSTRY SECTORS) 
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During the period, 'others' sector has demonstrated as having the lowest mean of 
book-leverage among all sectors, while the mean of book ratios for the remaining 
sectors did not show too much variation between one other. However, the book 
ratio mean for 'consumer/technology products' showed an increase in 1999 and 
after. Meanwhile, the market-debt ratios for all five sectors have illustrated 
comparable movement during the period. 'Others' sector still maintained as 
having the lowest market- leverage. However, during the crisis of 1997-98, the 
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increase in the market-debt ratio for 'consumer/technology products' sector had 
overshadowed the rest. We could translate this elevated market-debt ratio as 
having a soaring market value of equity. From the rise in this ratio, we presume 
that the 'consumer/technology products' sector had been the most affected sector 
during this economic turmoil. 
In comparing between book-debt ratio and market-debt ratio measurements, the 
latter appears to be more sensitive to the variation in the economy, thus, reflecting 
the 'true' situation. We observe the book-debt ratio measure is less volatile, i. e. 
less sensitive, to changes in the market despite the various economic events that 
took place during the last decade, as discussed in Chapter 2. This evidence 
provides some support to the theoretical foundation on market-value based capital 
structure which claim that the results based on market value measures outdo those 
on book value (see Bennett & Donnelly, 1993) 
To supplement the descriptive analysis discussed in this section, we also report the 
summary statistics of other key attributes that will be included in the main 
analyses of this thesis, as presented in the following Table 5.4. 
TABLE 5.4 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ASSETit, PRFTit-1, PRFTi,, PRFTi, +I, TA)G 
and RISKit 
ASSETit PRFTjj-j PRFTit PRFTit+l TAXit RISKit 
Mean 0.373 0.052 0.061 0.066 0.171 0.091 
Median 0.351 0.069 0.072 0.074 0.230 0.052 
Maximum 1.212 0.616 0.616 0.616 16.314 2.479 
Minimu m 0.000 
-6.482 -6.482 -6.482 -79.933 0.014 I Std. De 1 0.260 1 0.252 1 
11 
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Asset composition (ASSEY) shows a mean of 37.3 percent (sd = 24.4%), lagged 
and lead profitability indicate a mean of 5.2 percent (sd = 26 %) and 6.61 percent 
(sd = 24.9%) respectively, while 6.1 percent (sd = 25.2%) for current profits. 
Meanwhile, tax status (TAX) produces a mean of 17.1 percent (sd = 202.5%); and 
a mean of 9.1 percent (sd = 19.9%) for operating risk (RISK). Please note that a 
zero minimum value for ASSET is probably due to the missing value in 1990, as 
the continuous accounting data requirement in firms' selection criteria is set only 
from 1991-2000. In addition, a loss reported by a firm in its profit and loss 
statement would cause a negative TAX (see the minimum value for TAX). 
5.4 RELATION BETWEEN LEVERAGE AND PROPOSED 
MALAYSIAN FACTORS 
This section takes the groundwork a step further by initially testing the 
relationship between capital structure and the firm-specific Malaysian evidence 
using our data. To reiterate, the Malaysian-based studies have established 
significant effects of leverage to industry (Annuar & Sharnsher, 1993; Mohamad, 
1995; Muhammad, 1998) and profitability (Moharnad, 1995). Nonetheless, 
leverage has posed mixed results on the effects of earning volatility (see Annuar 
and Shamsher, 1993; Muhammad, 1998) and size (see Moharnad, 1995; 
Muhammad, 1998). Therefore, with industry, size, earning volatility, and 
profitability as the manifested factors in Malaysia, we set the following cross- 
sectional expression, based on period averages, to recapture their relationship with 
leverage. 
N4 
j (IND)j +p d= a+Aize(SIZE)+)6evol(E VOL) + )6prft(PRFT) +X (5.1) 
III 
where the dependent variable d, the leverage ratio, is regressed against the list of 
explanatory variables of SIZE using natural log of sales as proxy; EVOL using 
the standard deviation of the ratio of net operating income to sales, a proxy for 
earning volatility; PRFT, the average return on total assets, a proxy for 
profitability, and industry sectors (IND) as dummy variables. 
A regression analysis performed between book-debt ratio and the above variables 
produce the following results: 
EXHIBIT 5.1 RESULTS FROM A PRELIMINARY REGRESSION BETWEEN DEBT 
RATIO AND THE PROPOSED MALAYSIAN FACTORS 
Dependent Variable: d 
Variable Coefficient STD Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 0.20 0.077 2.551 0.011 
SIZE 0.05 0.015 3.710 0.000 
PRFT 
-1.98 0.166 -11.934 0.000 
EVOL 
-0.00 0.001 -0.885 0.377 
IND 1 0.10 0.073 1.391 0.166 
IND2 0.13 0.062 2.097 0.037 
IND3 0.08 0.064 1.229 0.221 
IND4 0.11 0.071 1.474 0.142 
R2 0.422 
Adjusted-R2 0.404 
F-statistic 22.67 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Significant at]% level 
Significant at 5% level 
IND] = TechnologylConsumer Products IND2= Industrial Products 
IND3= ConstructionlProperties IND4= TradinglServiceslHotels 
Exhibit 5.1 indicates that the overall model is statistically significant (F-statistic = 
22.67, Prob (F-statistic) = 0.000). Both size (SIZE) and profitability (PRFI) 
variables produce a statistically significant coefficient at I 
-percent level, hence 
rejecting the zero null. Size produces a positively significant coefficient (, 8, i,, >O), 
indicating a positive relation to debt ratio (t-statistic = 3.710, prob = 0.000). This 
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positive relation between size and leverage is consistent with earlier studies 
(Mohamad, 1995; Chiarella et. al., 1992; Fischer et. al., 1989; Myers, 1982). 
Meanwhile, the negatively significant coefficient of profitability (, 8p, <0) 
. 
ft 
demonstrates its inverse relation to debt ratio (t-statistic = 
-11.934, prob = 0.000). 
This negative relation between profitability and leverage is consistent with the 
pecking order description of Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Although producing a negative coefficient, earning volatility (EVOL) fails to 
reject the null of no-significant effect to debt ratio (, 8,,, =O). 
The results shows that only IND2 produces a significant coefficient at 5-percent 
level (t-statistics=2.097, prob=0.037), while the remaining industry sectors fail to 
show significant relation to debt ratio (d) at any level. We then test the restrictions 
of the dichotomous industry variables using a Wald test. This test determines 
whether the industry coefficients Vs produced by the regression result are 
consistently different from zero. The Wald test reports the following findings: 
EXHIBIT 5.2 WALD TEST RESULT ON THE INDUSTRY COEFFICIENTS 
Wald test@ 
Null Hypothesis: ý-] ýý-2 ý1 ý-4ý 0 'ý3 ýI 
F-statistic 1.129 Probability 0.344 
Chi-square 4.518 Probability 0.340 
The high probability of the F-statistics and chi-square values has failed to reject 
the zero-null hypothesis (Xj=O). Our effort to combine the many industry sectors 
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into only five combined sectors may possibly be the contributory factor to the 
insignificant effect of industry to leverage. 
In this preliminary analysis, the overall regression results show a significant effect 
of leverage to size and profitability. However, risk (via eaming volatility) and 
industry produce inconclusive outcome. 
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we have divided the discussion of the preliminary data analysis 
into three parts. The first part attempts to descriptively identify whether there 
exists some specific financing across industries. An initial impression has 
suggested some inclination of certain industries to follow specific financing 
patterns. Further, the preliminary inference on the financing patterns has provided 
some relevance to the description of both the static trade-off and the pecking order 
theories in justifying firms' financing behaviour. However, we have yet to 
empirically disprove the ability of these two capital structure theories in 
explaining firms' financing behaviour in the forthcoming analyses. 
The second part assesses the trend of the key financial indicators of book-debt 
ratio, market-debt ratio, profitability, and market value of equity during the period 
of 1991 to 2000. Book-debt ratio trend has shown a relatively stable movement to 
economic cycle. Meanwhile, market-debt ratio has demonstrated a mixed 
movement in response to the shaky economic situation during the period. 
However, profitability has indicated a constant downward movement throughout 
the sample period and this trend was more visible during the 1997-98 crisis. 
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The third part of the discussion attempts to preliminarily regress firms' leverage 
against firm-specific factors of size, profitability, earning volatility, and industry. 
We select these four factors following the literature on Malaysian capital structure 
(see Annuar & Shamser, 1993; Mohamad, 1995; Muhammad, 1998; Pandey, 
2001). The result from this test serves as an opening verification of whether our 
data are able to refute the relationship established by the aforementioned 
Malaysian evidence. Nonetheless, our results show some consistency on the 
relationship of leverage to only two out of the four alleged variables. 
In general, the inferences dictated in this chapter are only passing intuitions 
espoused at this preliminary stage. In the following chapters, we will embark on a 
deeper empirical investigation of the issues raised. 
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PART 4 
EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS (1) 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DETERMINANTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter continues the discussion of this thesis by empirically investigating 
whether the factors alleged to be the determinants in Malaysian firms' capital 
structure decision are consistent with those factors specified in the literature. The 
empirical literature on capital structure determinants has suggested a number of 
factors that influence firms' financing decisions. Some of these factors vary either 
across firms or across time, yet there are also firm-and-time-varying factors as 
well. Examples of variables that vary across both firms and time would be firms' 
reported earnings, size, tax status, and asset tangibility, while industry sectors vary 
across firms. The basic approach for this type of empirical work is to identify 
certain proxies for the unobservable theoretical factors. Earlier work on capital 
structure determinants were conducted by financial economists such as Titman 
and Wessels (1988), Fischer et. al. (1989), Friends and Hasbrouk (1988), and 
Marsh (1982). Extensions of this empirical evidence include those in G-7 
countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995), Asian countries (Aggarwal, 1990), and 
developing countries (Atkin & Glen, 1992; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996; 
Booth et. al., 2001). 
Following these prior studies, we seek to examine the relevance of firm-and-time- 
varying factors on capital structure choices in Malaysia. The first part of this 
chapter restates the relation between firms' financing patterns and the firin-and- 
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time-varying factors of size, profitability, and earnings volatility. Although only 
vary across firms, we also incorporate industry in this analysis to see whether the 
results produced are consistent with the preliminary suggestion on the inclination 
of individual industry to adopt specific financing strategy. In support, Scott Jr and 
Martin (1975) have concluded that "... it is unwise to disregard industry class as a 
determinant offinancial structure because financial structures are not, in fact, 
identical across wide array of industries". Meanwhile, the second part of the 
chapter concentrates on finding the relation between firms' financing behaviour 
and the theory-supported factors of asset tangibility, profitability, tax status, and 
operating risk. 
In general, both analyses in this chapter seek to examine whether the commonly 
cited capital structure determinants in the literature can be disproved when tested 
using Malaysian data. 
6.2 FIRM FACTORS AND FINANCING PATTERNS 
The first analysis employs a contingency table framework in testing H, of no- 
association between each of the four alleged Malaysian factors (i. e. industry, size, 
earnings volatility and profitability) and firms' financing types. The process 
begins by grouping the data into specific functional categories. For the industry 
groupings, the five combined categories as previously sorted are: 
technology/consumer products, (2) industrial products, (3) construction/properties, 
(4) trading/services/hotels, and (5) others. Moreover, each financing type has 
already identified the industry sectors in which the component firms are operating. 
For the remaining factors, we split firms' size into small, medium, and large, 
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while earnings volatility and profitability are classified into low, medium, and 
high according to some percentile range. 
In assessing the accuracy of the parameter estimates, we embark on the bootstrap 
re-sampling procedure introduced by Efron and Tibshirani (1986; 1993). This 
technique enables the calculation of the actual distribution of the sample 
parameters without having to resort to strong parametric assumptions. This 
procedure focuses on robust estimation of sampling means by randomly drawing 
with replacement new samples of the same size from the original sample. 
Subsequently, we calculate the empirical distribution of the estimated means from 
the re-sampled series. 
Figure 6.1 below exhibits the bootstrap sampling distributions for size, 
profitability, and earnings volatility across two resample sizes of 250 (Panel A) 
and 1000 (Panel B). The distribution of the estimated means for size (SIZE) 
approximates quite closely to the normal distribution assumed in parametric 
analyses, with a skewness of 
-0.203 for Panel A and 0.001 for Panel B. The other 
two estimates, however, differ markedly. The distribution of profitability (PRF7) 
skews negatively for both resample sizes (with a slightly less negative skewed in 
Panel B), whereas earnings volatility (EVOL) shows an opposite orientation. The 
distribution of estimated means for EVOL appears to skew positively, in which 
the larger the resample size, the more positive skewed the distribution is. 
119 
FIGURE 6.1 BOOTSTRAP SAMPLING DISTRIBUTIONS 
PANEL A: Number of bootstrap resamples =250 
FPXOE F-VCY 
SIZE PRFT EýAf- atz 
Mean 5.401 Mean 
Standard deviation 0.107 Standard deviation 
Kuriosis 2.698 Kurtosis 
Skewness 
-0,203 Skewness 
PANEL B: Number of bootstrap resamples =1000 
FPXQL'E, VCY FREQLEVCI FREQUENCY 
EaAf- 
EVOL 
I Mean 
Standard deviation 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
-5.407 Mean 
-0.101 Standard deviation 
-2.772 Kurtosis 
-0,001 Skewness 
0.048 Mean 2.107 
0.008 Standard deviation 1.250 
4.064 Kuriosis 1.102 
-0.566 Skewness 0.981 
0.048 Mean 
0.008 Standard deviation 
3.047 Kurlosis 
-0.397 Skewness 
= 
1.987 
= 
1.202 
= 
4.243 
= 
1.021 
In comparing the shapes of the histogram in both panels, it appears that the shape 
of the larger resample size (Panel B) forms better, especially the distribution of 
size, which approximates the normal distribution. The distribution of profitability 
may require a larger resample size for the approximation of a normal distribution. 
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Eýt Af- 
PRFT SIZE E. Af- 
We also observe the distribution of both size and profitability in Panel B to have a 
kurtosis value close to 3.0. However, not much we can assess about the 
distribution of earnings volatility. It seems that when we increase the resample 
size for EVOL, the kurtosis value increases to a value exceeding 3.0. 
The underpinning issue is to determine how large should the sample size be. We 
settle with the bootstrap resample size of 1000 as the basis for estimating the array 
of small (low), medium and large (high) for the variables. Based on these 
0 estimates, the descriptive distribution of size (SIZE), earnings volatility (EVOL), 
and profitability (PRF7) are as follows: 
TABLE 6.1 DESCRIPTIVE PARAMETERS OF THE BOOTSTRAP 
DISTRIBUTIONS OF SIZE, EVOL, AND PRFT 
SIZE EVOL PRFT 
First Quartile (25h percentile) 5.333 0.870 0.043 
Second Quartile (50'h percentile) 5.410 1.929 0.049 
Third Quartile (75th percentile) 5.474 2.946 0.053 
Small (Sm) or Low (Lo) < 5.333 < 0.870 < 0.043 
Medium (Med) 5.333 
- 
5.474 0.870 
- 
Z946 0.043 
- 
0.053 
Large (Lg) or High (Hi) > 5.474 > Z946 > 0.053 
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6.2.1 DISCUSSION OF THE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To form the basis of association between financing patterns (FVý_ TYPE) and the 
series of variable (IND, SIZE, EVOL and PRF7), we obtain a standardised chi- 
square measure in comparing the actual cell frequencies with the expected cell 
frequencies. The distance of the difference between the actual and expected cell 
count under the 'no-association' hypothesis will be the basis for the test statistics. 
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In Table 6.2, each contingency table contains the number of firms for the 
following combinations: (1) IND-FIN TYPE, (11) SIZE-FIN TYPE, (III) EVOL- 
FIN TYPE, and (IV) PRFT-FIN TYPE. 
t 
TABLE 6.2 CONTINGENCY TABLES BETWEEN FIN TYPE AND THE FACTORS OF 
IND, SIZE, EVOL AND PRFT 
1. CROSS-TABULATED DATA DETAILING 
IND BY FIN TYPE 
IND 
, 
Mý, TYPE Tcch/ Cons 
IndustrW Cons/ 
Prop. 
rmd/Sm. Others TOTAL 
I 1 0 0 0 0 1 
H 3 1 4 7 1 16 
III 1 8 2 2 5 18 
ly 14 36 35 23 12 120 
v 8 9 9 40 
vi 10 7 1 7 28 
TOTAL 35 60 4 2 34 223 
Measures of Association YAW& 
Phi Coefficient 0.44 
Cramer's V 0.22 
Test Statistics df Value 
Pearson X2 20 43.44 
Likelihood Ratio G2 20 41.99 
Prob 
0.002 
0.003 
M. CROSS-TABULATED DATA DETAILING 
EVOL BY FIN TYPE 
I EVOL I 
FIN TYPE Lo med Hj TOTAL 
I 1 0 0 1 
Il 13 2 1 16 
111 14 2 2 18 
IV 102 12 6 120 
v 33 5 2 40 
VI 21 3 4 28 
TOTAL 184 24 is 223 
Measures of Association Value 
Phii Coefficient 0.14 
Cramer's V 0.10 
Itst Statistic df Value 
Pearson X2 10 4.38 
Likelihood Ratio G2 10 3.95 
Prob 
0.929 
0.950 
11. CROSS-TABULATED DATA DETAILING 
SIZE BY FIN TYPE 
I SIZE I 
FEV TYPE Sm Mod. L9 TOTAL 
I 1 0 0 1 
11 5 1 10 16 
111 7 1 10 is 
IV 56 5 59 120 
v 18 0 22 40 
pi 17 0 11 29 
TOTAL 104 7 112 223 
Measures of Association Value 
Phi Coefficient 0.19 
Cramer's V 0.14 
Test Statistics df Yl)l! C 
Pearson X2 10 8.22 
Likelihood Ratio G2 10 10.56 
P-rgh 
0,607 
0.393 
IV. CROSS-TABULATED DATA DETAILING 
PRFT BY FIN TYPE 
PRFT 
FLV TYPE La Med. EE TOTAL 
1 0 0 1 1 
m 5 1 10 16 
111 5 0 13 is 
rv 37 13 70 120 
13 4 23 40 
10 0 18 28 
70 18 135 223 
Measures of Association 
Phi Coefficient 
Cramer's V 
Test Statistics 
Pearson X2 
Likelihood Ratio G2 
value 
0.17 
0.12 
df value 
10 6.66 
10 10.58 
Prob 
0.757 
0392 
v 
P7 
TOTAL 
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Table 6.2(1) shows the number of firms that varies across industry sectors (IAD) 
and financing types (FIN TYPE). In determining whether there exists an 
association between the two variables, the cross-tabulated data indicates that for 
20 degrees of freedom, the test statistics of Pearson X2 and likelihood-ratio 
produce a value of 43.44 and 41.99 respectively. Both probability values of 0.002 
2 for Pearson 
, 
and 0.003 for likelihood 7 
-ratio are less than the I 
-percent level. 
Therefore, we reject the no-association hypothesis. A large value of chi-square 
relative to the degree of freedom signifies that the actual and expected matrices 
differ significantly. The values of Phi-coefficient of 0.44 and Cramer's V of 0.22 
infer a modest relationship between financing types and industry sectors. 
However, the test statistics have not been able to find any significant association 
between financing patterns (FIN TYPE) and the remaining variables. For 10 
degrees of freedom, the cross-tabulated data between SIZE and FIN TYPE 
produces a value of 8.22 for Pearson X2 and 10.56 for likelihood-ratio (see Table 
6.2(11)). The cross-tabulated data in Table 6.2(111)) and Table 6.2 (IV) indicates 
similar results as well. For 10 degrees of freedom, the table between EVOL and 
FIN TYPE (Table 6.2 (111)) indicates a Pearson X2 value of 4.3 8, and a 
likelihood-ratio of 3.95. Meanwhile, the cross-tabulated data of PRFT and 
FIN TYPE (Table 6.2 (IV)) yields a Pearson X, 2 value of 6.66 and a likelihood- 
ratio value of 10.58. All three contingency tables produce probability values 
greater than I percent. 
The deductions from the contingency tables above are only able to show a 
significant association between industry sectors and firms' financing types. 
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Meanwhile, size, earning volatility, and profitability fail to reject H, of no 
association with our predetermined financing types. 
6.3 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS ON LEVERAGE FACTORS 
The second part of the analysis examines the relative merits of firm-specific 
theory-related attributes for the 10-year period from 1991 to 2000 in determining 
firms' leverage. The static trade-off theory predicts cross-sectional relation 
between debt ratios and asset risk, asset type, profitability and tax, while the 
pecking order model implies a negative relation between debt ratios and past 
profitability. In view of the above claims, we obtain measures for the four 
attributes from firms' financial accounts and test them jointly against leverage 
ratios. However, instead of analysing for the cross-sectional differences, the 
analysis uses a panel data framework to capture both cross-sectional and time 
effects in exploring aggregate capital structure (Francis & Leachman, 1994). Panel 
data set could improve the efficiency of the estimates as it increases the degree of 
freedom and reduces the collinearity among explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2003) 
To re-establish the expected signs for these mentioned variables, we reiterate the 
literature on the relation between risk, asset composition, profitability and tax, and 
leverage as follows: 
Risk (RISK) Most studies have shown a negative relationship between 
leverage and risk (Fischer et. al., 1989; Friends & Hasbrouk, 1988; Marsh, 1982). 
We calculate risk as the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to the 
value of total assets based on the eleven-year time span from 1990 to 2000. With 
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this single standard deviation value for each firm, the firm's operating risk is 
assumed constant throughout the period (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Chiarella et. 
al., 1992). 
Asset Composition (ASSET) A positive relation for the collateral value 
attributes is detected by Marsh (1982), Friends and Hasbrouk (1988), and 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), but not by Chiarella et. al. (1992). 
Profitability (PRFI) Cross-sectional evidence indicates that leverage 
relates negatively to firms' past profitability (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Chiarella 
et. al., 1992), and positively to future profitability (Chiarella et. al., 1992; 
Mohamad, 1995). We measure profitability predictors in terms of past (PRFTit-1), 
current (PRFTit), and future profits (PRFTit+, ) in seeking some consistency with 
the theoretical predictions. 
Tax status (TAX) Tax-related factors have offered inconclusive 
evidence (e. g. Stulz, 1990; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Myers, 1984), however, 
there is evidence indicating that tax benefits are one of the factors affecting a 
firm's financing choice (Graham, 1996, Wiwattanakantang, 1999). 
Further, we reconcile the issues regarding the measurement of leverage ratios (d) 
by using both book and market-debt measures 18 
. 
Myers (1977) defines market 
value consisting of present value of assets in place and present value of future 
growth opportunities. His main concern is that, since market values would 
18 It is quite difficult to get a published market data for debt instruments traded in the Malaysian 
PDS market. Therefore, the study assumes for convenience that debt is riskless, and hence adopts 
the book value amount for debt. Only equity reflects the market value amount. 
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incorporate the present value of future growth opportunities, issuing debt against 
these values can distort future real investment decisions. He suggests using book 
value measure as a reference to assets already in place. However, the theoretical 
foundations of capital structure are more concerned with the changes in firm's 
market value as compared to the book value. In relation, Bennett and Donnelly 
(1993) observe that when debt uses both book and market value measurements, 
the results based on the latter measure surpass the former. Moreover, they stress 
on the notion that managerial decision-making process tends to employ market- 
based measures in understanding capital structure. These managers assume the 
capital structure choices as having substances if these choices have an impact on 
firms' market value. 
For this analysis, the adoption of both measurements of debt ratio lies on the 
following two rationales: 
(1) Thus far, capital structure theories have not explicitly specified on which 
debt ratio to use. 
(2) Most empirical studies have used both measures of leverage ratios in 
seeking evidence on capital structure decisions. 
6.3.1 DISCUSSION OF THE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The equation below specifies the features of the observed explanatory variables 
and the nature of the unobserved effects. The specifications embedded in this 
analysis are as follows: 
yit = ai + xit ß+ Ei, (6.1) 
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or 
N 
yit aDj j+ xit + cit 
J=l 
where 
Dij I if i=j 
0 Otherwise 
(6.2) 
In the model, yit = dit (book-debt or market-debt ratio), and xit = [ASSETit, PRFTit, 
PRFTit-1, PRFTit+l, TAXit, RISKit], where i=1,2,225, t=1,2 
........ 
10. 
We could treat aý either as a random effect or as a fixed effect. As a random 
effect, there is no correlation between aý and the observed variables. However, if 
we treat ai as a fixed effect, then the parameter is estimated to be constant for each 
cross section observation i with a correlation between the observed explanatory 
variables and the unobserved effect. Moreover, when M is a fixed effect, the 
model assumes that: (1) the strictly exogeneity of xit is conditional on the 
unobserved effects. (2) If xit contains a time-invariant element, then the 
corresponding element is identical to zero for all t and any draw from the cross 
section. (3) The error terms, cit, have a constant variance across t and are serially 
uncorrelated. Under the above assumptions, the fixed effects estimator is 
consistent and asymptotically normal. 
(1) Book-debt ratio as the dependent variable 
This section discusses the result from the test using book-debt ratio as the 
dependent variable. Exhibit 6.1 summarises the regression results between book- 
debt ratio as the dependent variable and the discussed predictors. The test covers 
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2023 observations using three estimations: (1) pooled OLS estimation, (2) fixed- 
effects (FE) estimation, and (3) random-effects (RE) estimations. 
EXHIBIT 6.1 PANEL DATA REGRESSION BETWEEN BOOK-DEBT RATIO AND 
THE OBSERVED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
1. Asset Tangibility 
-0.07 0.03 0.013 
(0.039) (0.013) (0.049) 
2. Profitability at t-I 
-0.53 * -0.42 * -0.53 * 
(0.041) (0.029) (0.035) 
3. Current Profitability at t 
-0.41 * -. 0.46 * -0.39 * 
(0.050) (0.025) (0.035) 
4. Profitability at t+1 
-0.12 * -0.04 -0.09 * 
(0.038) (0.020 (0.032) 
5. Tax Status 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
6. Operating Risk 
-0.010 ------------- 0.020 
(0.052) (0.080) 
7. Constant 0.55 * 
------------- 
0.51 * 
(0.019) (0.027) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 0.96 0.45 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.547 1.045 0.77 
Observations 2023 2023 2023 
Standard error in parentheses 
Significant at I% level 
Significant at 5% level 
At the outset, Hausman specification test is used to test the hypothesis of no 
misspecification in the random effects estimator based on its differences with the 
fixed effects estimator. The estimators are consistent under H,, and may be 
inconsistent under the alternative. This specification test produces a test statistic of 
5.61 with a p-value of 0.346. The statistic is asymptotically J- distributed with 6 
degrees of freedom. The result fails to reject HO at any conventional critical value. 
This finding suggests that both the fixed effects and the random effects estimators 
do not differ substantially. For comparison purposes, we also report the results 
based on the basic pooled OLS. 
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Referring to Exhibit 6.1, the first column of basic pooled OLS shows that all 
profitability variables have significant inverse relation to book-debt ratio. 
Although indicating negative signs, the remaining predictors of asset tangibility, 
tax status, and operating risk have failed to reject H, of no-significant effect on 
leverage. The second column highlights the results from the fixed effects. The 
estimation produces no estimates for any time-invariant elements in the model, as 
previously stated in the assumption. Therefore, the coefficients for constant and 
operating risk are zero since we assume these variables are constant for each cross 
section during the I 0-year period. However, the fixed effects result shows a 
significant positive relation between asset tangibility and book-debt ratio. 
Meanwhile, profitability factors show a significant negative effect on book 
leverage (i. e. past and current profitability are significant at I-percent, while 
future profitability is significant at 5-percent level). Tax status too shows a 
significant negative relation to leverage at the 5-percent level. In the third column, 
the random effects results further testify the significant negative relations between 
all profitability factors and book-debt ratio at I 
-percent level. The remaining 
predictors of asset tangibility, operating risk, and tax status have not been able to 
demonstrate their significant effects in predicting firms' leverage in this random 
effects model. 
Further, the Durbin-Watson statistics indicates possible existence of serial 
correlation in the models. In violation of the third assumption of constant variance 
and serially uncorrelated of the error terms, the fixed effects expression gives an 
improper variance matrix estimator, thus the reported standard errors can be 
misleading (Wooldridge, 2002: 274). This calls for a robust variance estimator that 
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is valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity or serial correlation in (gj,: 
t-- II ý0, provided that T is small relative to N (Wooldridge, 2002: 276). To 
resolve this concern, we obtain robust estimates by adjusting the standard errors 
using VA-iite's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
The revised version after applying the variance matrix estimators is in Exhibit 
6.2. After correcting the standard errors, the results suggest that all factors are 
statistically significant in predicting the book debt ratio at I 
-percent level as 
predicted. Asset tangibility shows a positive relation, whereas the remaining 
factors of profitability and tax status indicate a negative relation to book leverage. 
EXHIBIT 6.2 RESULTS FROM FIXED-EFFECTS (FE) SPECIFICATION AFTER 
CORRECTING THE STANDARD ERRORS USING WHITE 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY-CONSISTENT STANDARD ERRORS (Book- 
debt ratio determinants) 
Variable Fixed Effects Coefficient 
1. Asset Tangibility 0.03 
(0.003) 
2. Profitability at t-I 
-0.42 * 
. 
034) 
3. Current Profitability at t 
-. 
0.46 * 
(0.023) 
4. Profitability at t+I 
-0.04 * 
(0.010) 
5. Tax Status 
-0.003 
(0.000)) 
6. Operating Risk 
------------- 
7. Constant 
------------- 
Standard error in parentheses 
* Significant at. 1% level 
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(2) Market- debt ratio as the dependent variable 
Next, when market-debt ratio replaces book-debt ratio as the dependent variable, 
the number of total observations reduces to 1818 observations, as some firms' 
market value data are unavailable. In dealing with missing values, the panel 
regression drops cross sections without valid observations. Exhibit 6.3 
summarises the results from the three estimations. 
EXlHBIT 6.3 PANEL DATA REGRESSION BETWEEN NIARKET-DEBT RATIO AND 
THE OBSERVED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
1. Asset Tangibility 
- 
0.08 ** 0.02 0.015 
(0.035) (0.013) (0.044) 
2. Profitability at t-I 
-0.15 * -0.10 * -0.11 * 
(0.043) (0.01 (0.040) 
3. Current Profitability at t 
-0.11 ** -. 0.17 * -0.09 ** 
(0.046) (0.019) (0.041) 
4. Profitability at t+I 
-0.11 * -0.04 ** -0.06 
(0.041) (0.018) (0.038) 
5. Tax Status 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
6. Operating Risk 
-0.26 * ------------- 0.20 * 
(0.0-54) (0.075) 
7. Constant 0.40 * 
------------- 
0.36 * 
(0.018) (0.023) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.68 0.23 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.27 1.37 1.60 
Observations 1818 1818 1818 
Standard error in parentheses 
Significant at]% level 
Significant at 5% level 
Hausman specification test on the random effects estimation reveals that with 5 
degrees of freedom, the test statistic produces a value of 32.83. With the 
associated p-value of 0.000, this test rejects H. of consistent estimators. The result 
indicates a strong evidence of inconsistency in the estimators, thus implying that 
the fixed effects and the random effects estimators do differ substantially. 
Therefore, the test on the market-debt ratio determinants will follow closely the 
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results of the fixed effects estimator. Here, we present the results from pooled 
OLS and random effects estimators for comparison purposes only. 
Referring to Exhibit 6.3, the pooled OLS in the first column indicates significant 
negative relation between market debt ratio and all predictors except for tax status. 
The random effects estimator in the third column indicates similar negative effect 
of profitability predictors (past and current profitability) to market-debt ratio. 
Operating risk however, indicates a positively significant relation to market 
I leverage. Albeit failing to reject H,, of no-significant effect, future profitability and 
tax status indicate a negative relation to market-debt ratio, while asset tangibility 
predicts otherwise. When tested using fixed effects estimators (in the second 
column), the results suggest a negatively significant relation between market-debt 
ratio and the factors of profitability and tax status. All these factors are significant 
at I 
-percent level except for future profitability, which is significant at 5-percent 
level. Asset tangibility however, has not been able demonstrate its significance to 
leverage. As stated earlier, the fixed effects estimation omits reporting the effect 
of risk and constant value for their time-invariant element. 
To obtain robust estimates, we revise the standard errors using White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Exhibit 6.4 that follows presents the 
results from the fixed-effects estimation after correcting the standard errors. In the 
exhibit, all predictors indicate significant relation to market-debt ratio at the I- 
percent level. All profitability variables and tax status show negatively significant 
relations to market-debt ratio, whereas asset tangibility indicates a positively 
significant relation to market leverage. Nonetheless, we take all results presented 
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with caution in view of the existence of both autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the presented estimations. 
EXHIBIT 6.4 RESULTS FROM FIXED-EFFECTS (FE) SPECIFICATION AFTER 
CORRECTING THE STANDARD ERRORS USING WHITE 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY-CONSISTENT STANDARD ERRORS 
(Market-debt ratio determinants) 
Variable Fixed Effects Coefficient 
1. Asset Tangibility 0.02 * 
(0.004) 
2. Profitability at t-I 
-0.10 * 
(0.018) 
3. Current Profitability at t 
-. 
0.17 * 
(0.019) 
4. Profitability at t+1 
-0.04 * 
(0.012) 
5. Tax Status 
-0.006 
(0.000) 
6. Operating Risk 
------------- 
7. Constant 
------------- 
Standard error in parentheses 
* Significant at I% level 
4 
6.4 SUMNIARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter re-examines the relevance of different firm-specific determinants in 
explaining Malaysian firms' leverage decisions. Based on the cross sectional and 
panel data regressions during the period of 1991 to 2000, we conclude that the 
overall findings on firm-specific predictors and industry class are consistent with 
the empirical capital structure literature. 
Specifically, the main empirical findings in this chapter are as follows: (1) Our 
result suggest a strong association between industry and firms' financing patterns. 
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We deduce this claim after finding a significant chi-square value on a contingency 
table between industry class and firms' financing patterns. (2) However, the 
results from this contingency table framework have not been able to produce any 
significant association between firms' financing patterns and the factors of size, 
earnings volatility and profitability. (3) For the theory-related factors of 
profitability, asset tangibility, and tax status, these variables have been able to 
demonstrate their significant predictions to firms' leverage. (4) Finally, our tests 
produce comparable results when using book-debt ratio and market-debt ratio as 
the dependent variable to measure firms' leverage. Despite earlier claims that the 
market measure surpasses the book measure, our results are inconsistent with this 
claim. 
For the industry effect, we conclude that a firm's industry class plays a significant 
role in determining the firm's capital structure decisions, even if there are 
possibilities that some results may not show significant relation between industry 
and leverage. One example of this claim is the inconsistent industry effect 
between our results in the regression analysis (see Exhibit 5.2 & 5.3 in Chapter 5) 
and the contingency table framework (see Table 6.2). This conflicting results 
between industry and firms' financing corroborate with the claim that empirical 
findings maybe susceptible to how the concepts of industry groupings and 
leverage are characterised (see Bowen et. al., 1982). Furthermore, although our 
findings do not produce different empirical results when using book and market 
leverage to measure firms' capital structure, our preliminary assessment of the 
data, in Chapter 5 has indicated the opposite. In comparing the behaviour of the 
two ratios, we have described that the former measure is less sensitive to the 
134 
movement in the market, if compared to the latter measure. The arguments that 
the use of market over book leverage to measure firm's capital structure can lead 
to differing empirical results (see Myers, 1977; Bennett & Donnelly, 1993; 
Strong, 1998) is plausible. The leverage measure may need to be rigid to show the 
disparity of the empirical outcome as claimed. 
Finally, the general conclusion reiterates the findings from earlier empirical 
capital structure work. Regardless of different economic, political and social 
background, we find that the determinants of Malaysian firms' capital structure 
are similar with those cited in the literature. These overall findings support the 
earlier claims that most leverage-related factors identified in the developed 
economy also apply to other countries as well, despite the differing economic 
orientations (Booth et. al., 2001; Wald, 1999; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). 
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CHAPTER7 
ANALYSIS (2) 
TESTING THE STATIC TRADE-OFF AND 
THE PECKING ORDER MODELS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the relevance of the static trade-off and the pecking order 
models in providing plausible explanation of firms' financing behaviour. Earlier 
empirical literature on the coexistence of both theories in firms' capital structure 
decisions (see Claggett Jr., 1991; Vogt, 1994; Ghosh & Cai, 1999; Shyam-Sunder 
& Myers, 1999) further encourages this investigation. Although implicitly firms' 
financing seems to suggest convergence to some targets, we could not rule out the 
evidence of financing hierarchy. In fact, the pecking order evidence seems to 
surpass the static trade-off view in some of the studies (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999; Ghosh & Cai, 1999, Claggett Jr., 1991). We however, reserve discussing 
this issue until the next chapter. This chapter focuses on seeking whether the 
description of both capital structure theories exist in Malaysian corporate 
financing decisions. 
As highlighted in the Malaysian literature survey (refer to Section 3.7 of Chapter 
3), a study that investigates the relevance of the capital structure theory in 
Malaysian firms' financing decisions is the study of Kester and Mansor (1994). 
Kester and Mansor survey chief executive officers' views on their preferred 
means of financing, and draw conclusions from the responses received. However, 
unlike Kester and Mansor, investigating the financing preferences in our study 
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would not be survey-based, but through assessment of firms' reported financial 
data. In implementing the task, we adapt the models of Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) since we feel that the specifications introduced in their models manage to 
reasonably justify the descriptions of the two competing capital structure 
hypotheses. 
The discussion of this chapter begins with a review of the Shyarn-Sunder and 
Myers' (1999) model specifications, and any revisions or adjustments made on the 
models to fit our investigation. The analysis gets underway by testing the target- 
adjustment and the pecking order specifications independently. To capture the 
appropriate prediction of profitability on the pecking order model, the developed 
model includes lagged-profitability variable (i. e. past profitability) in the equation. 
In response to Chirinko and Singha's (2000) comment on the strict assumption of 
the pecking order model of Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999), we have revised the 
underlying assumption behind our developed pecking order model. In the final 
test, we combine both target-adjustment and pecking order mechanisms in the 
same equation as a way to check the consistency of the model specifications. In 
essence, all tests perfonned in this chapter seek to investigate whether the static 
trade-off (via target-adjustment model) or the pecking order, or both theories, are 
able to generally explain the corporate financing behaviour of Malaysian firms. 
7.2 MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This section describes the development of the models for the analysis. As stated 
earlier, we refer to the model specifications of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
in developing our models. To adapt to the Malaysian market environment, we 
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amend the original models wherever necessary. As mentioned, the pecking order 
specification in this analysis takes into account the criticism of Chirinko and 
Singha (2000). We change the underlying strong form assumption of the original 
pecking order model of Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) to a semi-strong 
assumption, in which firms will eventually issue equity when they have exhausted 
their debt capacity. 
7.2.1 THE TARGET-ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
The basic idea behind the static trade-off or target adjustment model is that firms 
following this financing rule attempt to preserve their capital structures if they are 
optimal or to correct them if there is a deviation. The target-adjustment model 
from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is as follows: 
ALDit =a+ PTA (LD *it 
- 
LDit- 1) + cit (7.1) 
where &A denotes the target-adjustment coefficient, LD*it denotes the target or 
optimal long-term debt level for firm, and -it is an error ten-n. In the economic 
interpretation, firms adjust their debt level in an inverse proportion to adjustment 
cost, and PTA constitutes firms' debt adjustment. If there is no adjustment cost, 
then PTA equals one, implying that firms would immediately adjust their current 
debt ratio to the target level. However, firms would not adjust their debt level 
(, BTA = 0) if the adjustment cost were high. The intermediate situation, 0 <, 8TA <1 
would indicate some partial adjustment. The related hypothesis for the target- 
adjustment model in Equation (7.1) is: 
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H,: PTA >0 
There is some adjustment of debt ratio ftom the current level to the target level if 
the static trade-off theory were able to explain thefinancing behaviour. 
However, the key issue is to fairly estimate the accurate target debt level (LD *) 
since the true level is unobservable. There are a few specifications suggested by 
the literature in determining this target level. One suggestion is to take the rolling 
or moving average target using historical information of each firm such as in 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) who report the use of three-year moving average as 
the target level. Whereas, others have submitted to using the industry mean as a 
benchmark for target ratio (see Claggett Jr., 1991; Ariff & Lau, 1996). 
Meanwhile, Shyam-Sunder and Myers use several ways of measuring target ratio. 
One way is to take the historical mean of debt ratio for each firm, multiplied by 
the total capital to obtain the estimated level. Another possible way is to take a 
firm's optimal debt ratio as a function of firm characteristics. Both measures 
allow the targets to vary year by year. For this analysis, we follow the same path 
as Shyam-Sunder and Myers in detennining the target. 
1. Target based on sample mean debt ratios for each firm 
n 
d, 
LD *it x TAj, (7.2) 
n 
where d, is the debt ratio and TAit is the total asset of firm i at time t. We reach the 
estimated target debt level of firm i for the current year by taking the historical 
mean of the debt ratio in the sample period multiplied by the total assets of the 
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firm in the current year. Each year's target debt level fluctuates in response to the 
year's reported total assets 
11. Target based on firm characteristics 
Risk, asset type, tax status, and profitability predict a firm's optimal debt ratio in 
the static trade-off model. The following expression defines the prediction. 
d*tt =a+A ASSETt +, 82 PRFTt + 83TAXt + #4 RISKt (7.3) 
Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999) use the base year's debt ratio as the seed value 
to generate coefficients for the target. To replicate their study, this analysis uses 
the coefficients for predicting book debt ratio for 1990 (i. e. our base year) to 
generate the targeted debt ratio series for subsequent years. In addition, to 
incorporate the idea of prescribing industry average as a benchmark for target 
level, we segregate the coefficient for book-debt ratio predictors according to 
industry membership. As a result, each industry will have its own unique 
coefficients for predicting optimal debt ratio. The following equation calculates 
the changes in each firm's annual targets throughout the time series. 
A. 
= fi ISKd d,,, 
.1 
A(ASSETt) + fl2 A(PRFTt) + fl3A(TAXt) + fl4A(R (7.4) 
Having reached the year's target debt ratio (d*i, ), the same method applies in 
determining LD *it that is by multiplying d*j, to the year's total asset (TAit). 
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Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999), while using this specification, have stated that 
the mechanism they developed to generate coefficients for debt ratio predictors 
I does not correspond to any empirical study thus far. On our part, we adopt their 
specifications along with the attempt to adjust for industry benchmark as part of 
the efforts to explore plausible ways of establishing the target level, which are 
nonetheless ubjective. 
7.2.2 THE PECKING ORDER MODEL 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) define the fund flow deficit (DEF) as the extent 
of inadequate internal cash inflows after taking into account real investment and 
dividend commitment. Their version of the pecking order hypothesis is 
ALDit =a+ bpo (DEFit )+ eit (7.5) 
If DEFit is positive, then firm issues additional debt (ALD). However, firm repays 
debt if DEFit is negative. 
This analysis redefines deficit (DEFt) as the net of fund flow deficit after 
deducting the interest (INTt) and dividend (DIVt) payments. The equation below 
reiterates Equation (4.3) in Chapter 4, but with deficit (DEF) replacing the 
externally generated fund (EGF)19. 
DEFt = INTt + DIVt 
- 
FCFt (7.6) 
19 DEF and EGF carry the same weight as we generate EGF from the amount of DEF calculated. 
A positive DEF means a requirement for some externally generated fund (EGF), which in this 
case will be accommodated through issuing debt. 
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As noted earlier, Chirinko and Singha. (2000) have criticised Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers' test on the pecking order hypothesis. They conunent that: (1) the model 
assumes a specific financing hierarchy consistent with pecking order, but equity 
issues constitute a more substantial percentage of external financing. (2) There are 
situations of convoluted finance hierarchy (e. g. if equity issues occur in the 
middle of financing). (3) There are situations where firms always issue debt and 
equity in a fixed proportion. As this strong-fonn pecking order view is too 
restricted in terms of practicality, our analysis amends Shyam-Sunder and Myers' 
pecking order versiom Our revised model will take on the assumption of the semi- 
strong form of pecking order as defined by Chirinko and Singha, which allows for 
the possible issuance of equity in firms' financing hierarchy. 
In addition, the two competing schools of thought on capital structure under 
asymmetric information pose some conflicting theoretical predictions on leverage 
and profitability. Shenoy and Koch (1996) have raised the issue of contradicting 
theoretical implications between firms' leverage and cash flow. They indicate that 
the signalling theory of Ross (1977) implies a positive relation between leverage 
and cash flow, while the pecking order behaviour suggests the opposite. Shenoy 
and Koch reconcile these contrasting predictions by stating that the pecking order 
view describes the simultaneous relationship between leverage and cash flow, 
while the signalling implication captures the dynamic aspect between current 
leverage and future cash flow. In line with this view, this analysis attempts to 
resolve the related issue regarding leverage and profitability. 
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This analysis rests on the notion that firms' profitability ratio is one measure of 
the firms' cash flow capacity. The pecking order view predicts negative 
relationship between leverage and past profitability (see Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Chiarella et. al., 1992; Titman & Wessels, 1988). The theory implies that a firm 
with high past profits reported would exhaust its internally generated fund before 
resorting to external funding through debt. Alternatively, Jensen's (1986) free 
cash flow theory has different prediction. Jensen argues that if having a high 
amount of free cash flow means giving managers the tendency to misuse the 
I wealth, then finns should be encouraged to use debt. Therefore, a strong cash flow 
firm should utilise relatively higher debt, hence implying a positive relationship 
between leverage and past profitability. These two opposing predictions raise 
question on which motive dominates firms' debt financing decisions. To capture 
the appropriate prediction for profitability, the developed pecking order model 
incorporates a lagged value of profitability (i. e. an average value) in some early 
years (PRFTit-,, ) as the proxy for past profitability. The calculation of this lagged 
value is as follows: 
PBITýITA 
PRFTit-n = n=l (7.7) 
The following expression reflects the inclusion of the lagged-profitability variable 
in the pecking order model. 
ALDit = ai + Ppo (DEFit)+ PPRFT PRFTil-n + Elit (7.8) 
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Equation (7.8) explains that if deficits call for debt issuance, then 8po is positive, 
and additional debt issues should relate negatively to past profitability (PpRFT <1). 
However, the equation above appears to imply strict pecking order behaviour. A 
test on equity issues as in Equation (7.9) is essential to check on the assumption 
behind the pecking order model. 
ACPit = a2 +, 6ss (DEFit) + -02it (7.9) 
The strong form of pecking order implies Bpo equals to one (flpo =1) since the 
debt issues (repayments) would cover the total amount of financing deficit 
(surplus). However, the semi-strong assumption implies 8po to be greater than 
zero but less than one (0 < Bpo <1) as debt issues only cover part of the deficit. 
This assumption stipulates firms' incentive to move down the pecking order and 
issue additional equity to cover the remaining deficits. Ideally, the semi-strong 
coefficient (fiss) should hold a positive sign withgss equals to I 
-, 
6po (flSS =I- 
j8po). The relationship works in reverse as well, as firms would pay off debt when 
there is a surplus. If this surplus continues after debt repayment, then firms might 
also be able to repurchase shares. However, if j6ss equals zero, then the 
assumption reverts to the strict pecking order view, in which equity is never 
utilised. To reiterate, the testable hypotheses are as follows: 
H2: No >0 
Firms that utilise debt in response to current deficit level explain the pecking 
order behaviour, i. e. there is a positive relation between the change in debt level 
and the level of deficit. 
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H3: PPRFT'ýý 0 
Firms that generate substantial past profits tend to exhaust internal funds for 
investment and use less debt, i. e. there is a negative relation between past 
profitability and debt. 
H4: fiss >0 
Firms seek to raise external equity if the additional debt could not fully support 
the current deficit level, i. e. this type of financing portrays the semi-strong 
assumption ofpecking order. 
7.3 DISCUSSION OF THE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We present the results from the regression analysis on both models using several 
estimations. These estimations are (1) the pooled ordinary least squares (Pooled 
OLS) test, (2) the fixed-effects (FE) estimation, and (3) the random-effects (RE) 
estimation. This section describes the process and the outcomes from all three 
estimations. 
(1) The target-adjustment model: Estimated target debt level 
Determining the target level based on historical mean of debt ratio is 
straightforward. The discussion in this section only describes the steps in 
estimating the target debt level using firm characteristics and industry benchmark. 
The first step is to generate the based-year coefficients (i. e. the coefficient for 
1990 debt ratio predictors) by sorting the firms according to industry sectors. For 
each industry, we regress the 1990 book-debt ratio against asset tangibility 
(ASSE7), profitability (PRF7), tax status (TAX), and operating risk (RISK) 
predictors. The following Table 7.1 lists the coefficient value of each 1990 book- 
debt ratio predictor by industry. 
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TABLE 7.1 FIRM'S COEFFICIENTS SEED VALUE BASED ON 1990 BOOK DEBT 
RATIO AND INDUSTRY BENCUMARK 
INDUSTRY 
Tech/Consumer Industrial Construction/ Trading/ Others 
Coefficients Products Products Properties Services/ 
Hotels 
j6l 0.170 0.206 0.10 0.042 0.022 
0.004 
-0.196 0.206 -0.003 0.143 
-0.002 -0.003 0.018 -0.226 -0.031 
0.003 
-0.058 -0.106 -0.229 0.016 
Based on Equation (7.4) and the estimated coefficients in Table 7.1, we generate 
the subsequent values of debt ratio series as follows: 
TechlConsumer Adi, = 0.17A(ASSETt) + 0.004A(PRFTI) -0.002A(TAX) + 0.003 A(RISKd 
Industrial : Adi, = 0.206A(ASSETt) 
- 
0.196A(PRFTt) 4.003A(TAXt) 
- 
0.058 A(RISKd 
ConstlProperties : Adit = O. IOA(ASSETt) + 0.206A(PRFTt) + 0.018A(TAXt) - 0.106 A(RISKd 
TradinglServices : Adil = 0.042A(ASSETt) - 0.003A(PRFTt) -0.226A(TAXI) - 0.229 A(RISKd 
lHotel 
Others : Adi, = 0.022A(ASSET, ) + 0.143, d(PRFTt) - 0.031A(TAX) + 0.016A(RISKd 
We then calculate each year's target debt ratio (d*i, ) as d*jt-I + Adit. The target debt 
ratio is identical among firms within the same industry but different between firms 
across industries. 
Exhibit 7.1 summarises the results from the tests on the target-adjustment model. 
Results from the pooled OLS are in column 1, while results from the FE and RE 
are in column 2 and 3 respectively. Panel A produces results when historical 
debt 
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ratio mean over 1990-2000 is used to calculate the target debt level, while Panel B 
presents the target level as the function of firm characteristics and industry 
benchmark. 
EXHIBIT 7.1 RESULTS OF THE TARGET-ADJUSTMENT MODEL USING POOLED 
OLS, FE, AND RE ESTIMATIONS 
ALDj, =a+ 8TA (LD*j, 
- 
LDi, 1) + -i,: The target-adjustment predicts gradual adjustment to target level (LD*i, ), where each firm's target is measured by its historical debt ratio mean over 1990-2000 (PANEL A) 
and firm characteristics and industry benchmark (PANEL B). The sign * denotes that the coefficients are 
significant at 1% level and standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(1) 
POOLED LEAST 
SQUARES 
(2) 
FIXED EFFECTS 
MODEL 
(3) 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
MODEL 
PANEL A: 
Constant (a) 45.04 
-------- 
44.99 
(11.09) (10.03) 
Target-adjustment 0.67 * 0.59 0.67 * 
Coefficient (, 8TA) (0.030) (0.017) (0.030) 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.38 0.17 
PANEL B: 
Constant (a) 50.39 
------- 
50.46 
(12.353) (12.671) 
Target-adjustment 0.03 * 0.05 0.04 * 
Coefficient (flTA) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.04 0.010 
The fmdings indicate that all constants are significant at 1 -percent level. In the 
pooled OLS (column 1), we find significant adjustment coefficients of 8TA = 0.67 
(Panel A) and &A = 0.03 (Panel B). The fixed-effects results (column 2) show 
significant positive adjustment coefficients of, 6TA = 0.59 (Panel A) and, 8TA = 0.05 
(Panel B). Meanwhile, the random-effects test (column 3) produces positive 
adjustment coefficients of 8TA = 0.67 (Panel A) and 8TA = 0.04 (Panel B). When 
we use historical mean of debt ratio to represent the target in Panel A, the 
adjusted-R 2 values are 0.19 (column 1), 0.38 (column 2) and 0.17 (column 3). 
However, when the target is based on firm characteristics and industry benchmark 
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(Panel B), the adjustment coefficient values (, 8TA) drop drastically. yet able to 
maintain their positive significance at the I-percent level. The adjusted-R 2 for all 
estimations yields similar decline. The findings imply that the measurement of 
target based on firm characteristics and industry benchmark have only slight 
nil 
ability to predict the change in firms' debt level compared to using historical 
mean of debt ratio as a measure of target. 
To check, we recast the target level based on firm characteristics (without the 
inclusion of industry benchmark) as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers. When debt ratio 
is regressed against the four predictors using the 1990 data, we generate the 
coefficients as follows: 
Adit = 0.06A(ASSET, ) 
- 
0.024A(PRFTt) 
- 
0.005A(TAX) 
- 
0.03 A(RISKd (7.10) 
The following Exhibit 7.2 surnmarises the results when the target level adopts 
this function as proxy. 
EXHIBIT 7.2 RESULTS OF TARGET-ADJUSTMENT MODEL USING FIRM 
CHARACTERISTICS AS A FUNCTION FOR THE TARGET LEVEL 
ALD, 
=a+ &A (LD *,, 
- 
LDj, 
- 
1) + Ej, : The sign * denotes that the coefficients are significant at I% level 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(1) 
POOLED LEAST 
SQUARES 
(2) 
FIXED EFFECTS 
MODEL 
(3) 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
MODEL 
Constant (a) 50.84 
-------- 
49.83 
(12.527) (12.104) 
Target-adjustment 0.018 0.20 0.008 
Coefficient (8TA) (0.020) (0.013) (0.19) 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.08 0.000 
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The results above show that two out of the three estimations (see column I and 3) 
fail to indicate positive significant adjustment coefficients (flTA), and produce zero 
adjusted-R 2. Only fixed-effects estimation (column 2) indicates a positive 
significant adjustment coefficient of 8TA = 0.20, yet the adjusted-R 2 of 0.08 is still 
too small to justify the explanatory power of the specifications. Despite Shyarn- 
Sunder and Myers' (1999) submission to using firm characteristic as one measure 
of target, our Malaysian data is unable to support the idea brought forward. This 
finding implies that firm characteristics may not be a good measure of target debt 
ratio for firms in Malaysia. Nevertheless, we report the test results from all target 
functions to explore the dependability of the mentioned measures. 
(2) The pecking order model: Unanticipated and anticipated financing 
deficit 
In refining the pecking order model, we develop several definitions of financing 
deficit as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In the actual context, Equation 
(7.6) corresponds to Shyam-Sunder and Myers' definition of contemporaneous 
deficit, as deficit at the end of year t is estimated when there are some unexpected 
elements in the cash inflows and outflows that add up to the deficit amount. These 
cash flows could be incurring in the middle or end of the year. Deficit of this type 
is 'unanticipated' deficit as the financing arrangement 'has more to do with short- 
term adjustment than plannedfinancing' (Shyam-Sunder &Myers, 1999). 
However, as highlighted by Shyam-Sunder and Myers, we can also divide the 
deficit element into two components consisting of (1) expected deficit at t-1, and 
(2) unexpected funds at t. By doing so, we assume a 'more' anticipated deficit. As 
a rule, firms normally plan the interest and dividend amount well in advance, prior 
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to executing any cash disbursements on them. In defining the first component, the 
expected deficit at t-I represents these lagged values of interest and dividend. We 
confine the second component to the amount of free cash flow that requires some 
short-term financial adjustments. The expression of this anticipated deficit is as 
follows: 
Anticipated DEF, = INTt-I + DIVt-, 
- 
FCFt (7.11) 
Exhibit 7.3 below surnmarises the results from our revised pecking order model. 
Panel A presents the results based on unanticipated deficit and Panel B on the 
anticipated deficit. 
EXHIBIT 7.3 RESULTS OF THE PECKING ORDER MODEL USING POOLED OLS, 
FE AND RE ESTIMATIONS 
ALDj, ýa+ APO (DEFU )+ 8PRFT PPFTj,, 
-i + Ej,: The pecking order predicts firm issues debt to accommodate the deficit level (DEF,, ) 
, 
where each firm's deficit is based on unanticipated deficit (PANEL A) and 
anticipated deficit (PANEL B). The sign * denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level and 
standard errors are reported parentheses. 
POOLED LEAST 
SQUARES 
FIXED EFFECTS 
MODEL 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
MODEL 
PANEL A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant (a) 1.59 4.02 
---- ----- -6.85 4.29 (6.342) (5.90) (1.630) (6.156) 
Pecking-order 0.73 * 0.60 * 0.84 0.68 0.86 * 0.60 * 
Coefficient (flpo) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
Lagged profitability -14.67 -13.64 -16.85 
Coefficient (flpRFJ (46.58) (4.192) (47.981) 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.63 0.90 0.85 0.67 0.64 
PANEL B: 
Constant (a) 4.26 14.0 
---- ---- -4.21 -5.62 (8.062) (6.799) (1.847) (0.881) 
Pecking-order 0.70 * 0.39 * 0.74 0.44 0.88 * 0.88 * 
Coefficient (, 8po) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
Lagged profitability -21.42 -34.92 18.79 
Coefficient (, 8pRFL) (57.593) (7.607) (21.377) 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.41 0.82 0.61 0.65 0.65 
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In the above exhibit, the odd-numbered columns highlight the results of the strict 
pecking order model, while the even-numbered columns include lagged- 
profitability term in the equation. As shown in the results, most of the constant 
tenns fail to produce their significant results, thus inferring zero coefficients. 
Perusing into the odd-numbered columns, the results reveal that the positively 
significant pecking order coefficient remains relatively high for both deficit 
measures. The pooled OLS Produces pecking order coefficients of 8po = 0.73 
(Panel A) and 8po = 0.70 (Panel B). The fixed-effects estimation indicates 
pecking order coefficients of 8po = 0.84 (Panel A) and 8po = 0.74 (Panel B). 
Meanwhile, the corresponding pecking order coefficients for the random-effects 
estimation are Ppo = 0.86 (Panel A) and Opo = 0.88 (Panel B). The adjusted-R 
value for all estimations ranges from 0.65 to 0.90. This range between 0.65 and 
0.90 implies strong explanatory power of this model. It appears that the high 
coefficient value of the pecking order specifications is in the right scale to explain 
the variations in finns' debt level. This positive pecking order coefficient of less 
than one (0<j8po<1-0) however, weakens the assumption of the strong-form 
pecking order model. 
Further, the results show that the positive value of pecking order coefficient (, 8po) 
decreases with an added lagged-profitability variable in the equation (see the 
even-numbered column), but are still able to sustain its significance to qualify the 
prediction. The lagged-profitability coefficient (, 8pRFT) shows a negatively 
significant value in the fixed-effects test with )6PRFT =- 13.64 in Panel A, and 8PRFT 
= 
-34.92 in Panel B. Although not significant, the results 
from the pooled OLS 
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(both Panel A and B) and the random-effects (Panel A) also indicate a negative 
relation between lagged-profitability and changes in the debt level. This negative 
relation concurs with the pecking order prediction. It indicates that firms with 
substantially high past profits tend exhaust internal funds, thus limiting the use of 
debt financing. 
To test the semi-strong assumption of the pecking order model, embracing the 
comment made by Chirinko and Singha's (2000), we add another expression to 
the pecking order model by running a regression between equity issues and finns' 
financing deficit as in Equation (7.9). Exhibit 7.4 below surnmarises the results 
from this test. 
EXHIBIT 7.4 RESULTS OF THE SEMI-STRONG ASSUMPTION OF THE 
PECKING ORDER MODEL (AS SUGGESTED BY CHH; UNKO & 
SINGRA (2000)) USING POOLED OLS, FE, AND RE ESTIMATIONS 
ACP,, =a+ 8SS (DEFd + ej,: The semi-strong assumption of pecking order predicts firm issues equity in the 
event when the debt issues cannot fully accommodate the deficit level. PANEL A measures deficit in terms of 
the unanticipated deficit, while PANEL B measures deficit in term of the anticipated deficit. The sign 
denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level and standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(1) 
POOLED LEAST 
SQUARES 
(2) 
FIXED EFFECTS 
MODEL 
(3) 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
MODEL 
PANEL A: 
Constant (a) 
-0.45 -------- 6.94 (5.712) (1.629) 
Semi-strong assumption 0.27 * 0.17 0.15 * 
Coefficient (, 8ss) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.24 0.11 
PANEL B: 
Constant (a) 
-2.89 ------- 7.063 (7.924) (1.847) 
Semi-strong assumption 0.31 * 0.19 0.15 * 
Coefficient (, 8ss) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.27 0.10 
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Based on the results, we observe that all the semi-strong coefficients (, 8ss) produce 
positively significant signs to changes in equity (ACPjj), thus, consistent with the 
results of the predicted assumption. The test indicates that in addition to issuing 
debt, firms may also find issuing external equity necessary to cover part of the 
deficit. Chirinko and Singha's (2000) suggested semi-strong form of pecking 
order is shown to be workable in describing Malaysian firms' financing 
behaviour. 
In view of these findings, one might suggest that the positive coefficient for both 
debt and equity issues are possibly the results of either (1) firras seeking equity 
issues in events when debt cannot fully cover the total financing deficit, inferring 
the semi-strong pecking order behaviour (as in our findings in Exhibit 7.4), or (2) 
firms issuing debt and equity proportionately in complying with the target- 
adjustment financing view (as assumed by our target-adjustment results in 
Exhibit 7.1). The issue lies on how to discriminate between the two underlying 
motives when both debt and equity issues surface in firms' financing stream. In 
our opinion, if the motive for issuing both debt and equity is to follow the target 
adjustment view, then the values for the semi-strong coefficient (, 8ss) and pecking 
order coefficient (, 8po) should be comparable. However, in the semi-strong form 
of pecking order, the value of 8po should always be greater than 8SS, as firms 
always seek for additional debt issues first. In the pecking order model, utilising 
equity financing is secondary, and only to be raised when debt could not fully 
cover the deficits. 
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Our findings show that the positive coefficient of 8po is always greater than 8ss 
for all results, indicating that debt financing dominates equity financing. For 
example, our pecking order results produce a 8po value of 0.73 (see first column 
in Panel A of Exhibit 7.3) and the corresponding 8ss of 0.27 (see first column in 
Panel A Exhibit 7.4). Submitting to this idea, the inference is inclined towards the 
semi-strong pecking order behaviour. Nonetheless, we still could not rule out the 
target adjustment motive completely. 
(3) The target-adjustment and the pecking order in the same equation 
The final test combines both the target-adjustment and the pecking order 
specifications in the same equation. Exhibit 7.5 below presents summary of the 
results. 
EXHIBIT 7.5 REGRESSION RESULTS WHEN BOTH THE TARGET- 
ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING ORDER MODELS ARE 
INCLUDED IN THE SAME EQUATION 
ALDj, 
=a+ &A (LD *j, 
- 
LDj, 1) + 8po (DEF, )+ -i,: Regression based on Pooled Least Squares. The sign denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level and standard errors are reported in parentheses. (1) LD*i, is based on historical sample mean and DEFj, is based on the unanticipated deficit (2) LD*i, is based on historical sample mean and DEF, is based on the anticipated deficit (3) LD *j, is based on firm characteristics and industry benchmark and DEF,, is based on the unanticipated 
deficit 
(4) LD *j, is based on firm characteristics and industry benchmark and DEF, is based on the anticipated 
deficit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant (a) 3.19 4.08 2.09 4.74 
(6.167) (7.802) (6.348) (8.063) 
Target-adjustment 0.20 * 0.24 * 0.011 0.014 
Coefficient (flTA) (0.018) (0.023) (0.007) (0.008) 
Pecking-order 0.69 * 0.65 * 0.73 * 0.70 * 
Coefficient (, 8po) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.69 
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When the target level is based on historical mean of debt ratio (column I and 2), 
the adjustment coefficients (flTA= 0.20 and 0.24 respectively) drop almost two- 
thirds from the value when tested independently in the equation (refer to column I 
in Panel A of Exhibit 7.1). This outcome is similar to the finding of Shyam- 
Sunder and Myers (1999). The results however, do not invalidate the target 
adjustment hypothesis, as its positive coefficients are still significant at I 
-percent 
level. As anticipated, the target based on firm characteristics and industry 
benchmark produces positively low and insignificant target adjustment 
I coefficients (see column 3 and 4). Meanwhile, the range of positive pecking order 
coefficients remain significantly high for all provisions (, 8po = 0.69 (column 1), 
ppo 
= 
0.65 (column 2), 8po = 0.73 (column 3), 8po = 0.70 (column 4)). The 
adjusted-R 2 remains high as well. This implies that the joint target-adjustment and 
pecking order specifications introduced in the model do have the ability to predict 
changes in the debt level. 
4 
In obtaining robust estimates, we revise the standard errors for all results from the 
pooled OLS estimation using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors as in Exhibit 7.6 below. In the exhibit, column I presents the results from 
the target-adjustment test, column 2 and 3 summarise the results for the pecking 
order test (column 3 includes the lagged-profitability term in the specification), 
and column 4 shows the results of both target-adjustment and pecking order 
specifications when integrated in the same equation. 
155 
EXHIBIT 7.6 REGRESSION RESULTS AFTER CORRECTING THE STANDARD 
ERRORS USING WHITE HETEROSKEDASTICITY-CONSISTENT 
STANDARD ERRORS 
0 
Regression based on Pooled Least Squares. The sign * denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level 
and ** at the 5% level. The corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. (1) The target adjustment model (target, LD* 
, 
is based on the historical mean of debt ratios) (2) The pecking order model (DEF is the unanticipated financing deficit) (3) The pecking order model with inclusion of lagged profitability (DEF is the unanticipated financing deficit) 
(4) When both models are included in the same equation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant (a) 45.04 1.59 4.02 3.19 
(9.904) (11.548) (10.491) (11.639) 
Target-adjustinent 0.67 ** 0.20 ** 
Coefficient (, 8TA) (0.310) (0.105) 
Pecking-order 0.73 0.60* 0.69 ** 
Coefficient (, 6po) (0.183) (0.207) (0.192) 
Lagged profitability 
Coefficient (, 8pRFT) 
-14.67 (19.155) 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.74 0.63 0.75 
We observe that after correcting the standard errors, both positive target- 
adjustment and pecking order coefficients are statistically significant in predicting 
the variation in the debt level. Lagged-profitability variable indicates a negative 
relation, but the coefficient fails to show its significance to the produced relation. 
The low adjusted-R 2 of the target-adjustment model compared to the pecking 
I order model is due to the unresolved issue of what constitutes a good 
representation for target debt level. However, our findings do not nullify the 
target-adjustment hypothesis. Meanwhile, the positive pecking order coefficient 
remains significantly high whether we test the specifications independently or 
jointly, with the target-adjustment specifications in the same equation. 
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7.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter concentrates on seeking the relevance of the capital structure theories 
of static trade-off and pecking order in describing the variations in the debt level 
of Malaysian firms. The tests on the static trade-off theory deal with the target- 
adjustment model that predicts firms will gradually adjust their debt to achieve the 
target. The alternative pecking order model however, implies that firms follow 
some sort of funding hierarchy, and debt is the first source of external funding. 
Before performing the analysis, we resolve several issues such as determining the 
appropriate target measures and the elements of financing deficits. Both capital 
structure theories are capable to explain the financing behaviour of Malaysian 
firm if the associated coefficients yield the predicted signs. 
The empirical findings can be concluded as follows: (1) The static trade-off theory 
(via target-adjustment model) has the ability to predict changes in firms' debt 
level, especially when the target debt level is set at a value equal to the historical 
mean of debt ratio. (2) The pecking order model too is found significant to 
provide plausible explanation on the variations in firms' debt level, regardless 
whether the deficit amount is anticipated or unanticipated. (3) Although 
inconclusive, past profitability indicates a negative relation to changes in debt 
level in most of the tests performed, thus confirming with the pecking order 
prediction (4) Firms also raise additional equity in response to deficits, however, 
the associated positive coefficient value is low. This low equity financing, 
compared to debt financing, is in accordance with the descriptions of the 
suggested semi-strong pecking order model of Chirinko and Singha (2000). 
(5) When both model specifications are combined and tested jointly. the positive 
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target-adjustment coefficient deteriorates, whereas the pecking order coefficient 
barely alters. Nonetheless, both models are still significant in predicting changes 
in firms' debt level. 
In sum, the empirical evidence offered in this chapter embraces both the static 
trade-off theory and the pecking order model in providing plausible explanation of 
firms' financing behaviour. The specifications tested are in the right magnitude to 
explain the variations in firms' debt level. In fact, we find that both theories 
coexist in Malaysian corporate leverage practice, hence supporting the claim on 
the coexistence of both capital structure theories in finns' financing decisions 
(Claggett Jr., 1991; Vogt, 1994; Ghosh & Cai, 1999; Shyarn-Sunder & Myers, 
1999). Moreover, the empirical findings are also consistent with the preliminary 
impression inferred in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Earlier, we have descriptively 
asserted that the financing patterns identified among Malaysian firms mostly fit 
the description of both the static trade-off and the pecking order theories. To 
complement this assertion, our findings about the coexistence of both theories 
suggest that the theoretical descriptions of static trade-off and pecking order are 
relevant in explaining Malaysian firms' financing behaviour. Overall, we 
conclude that the capital structure practice in Malaysia appears to be 
fundamentally consistent with the long-established traditional capital structure 
theories. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ANALYSIS (3) 
WHICH IS THE BETTER MODEL? 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The descriptive and empirical evidence presented in the earlier chapters of this 
thesis have demonstrated that the static trade-off and the pecking order theories 
are able to provide plausible explanation of Malaysian finns' financing behaviour. 
Despite corroborating with the evidence, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) have 
some additional views about the models. They argue that the pecking order model 
offers a better first-order descriptor of corporate financing behaviour when 
compared to the competing target-adjustment model. In essence, they draw this 
conclusion when they find that the pecking order model has correctly described its 
own pecking order financing series and rejected the alternative target-adjustment 
financing series. Whereas, the target-adjustment model have falsely accepted the 
alternative pecking order series just as well as fitting its own series. A model lacks 
statistical power if it fails to accept the true and/or reject the false. Based on this 
notion, this chapter will take another look at the claim that the pecking order 
specification tests tend to outperform the target-adjustment model when judged on 
explanatory power. 
To seek assurance, the analysis performed in this chapter follows similar 
procedure of Shyarn-Sunder and Myers' (1999) statistical power tests on 
hypothetical data. However, our simulation experiments differ slightly from those 
of Shyam-Sunder and Myers. In our power tests, we revise the treatment of the 
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hypothetical financing series and the underlying assumption of the pecking order 
model. Instead of placing a numerical figure to the coefficients in the equations, 
the simulation experiment generates the hypothetical financing series as though 
they are following the financing rules based on some subjective financing 
decision framework. In addition, we simulate the hypothetical pecking order 
financing series based on the semi-strong assumption of the pecking order model, 
as previously addressed by Chirinko and Singha (2000), in contrast to the strict 
pecking order model of Shyarn-Sunder and Myers. 
The discussion in this chapter centres on the procedures for generating the 
simulated series, the fitted tests on the model specifications, and the outcomes 
from the simulation experiments. The first two tests fit each model specifications 
independently to the financing series, while the final test combines both models 
and fits them jointly to each financing series. In general, this chapter seeks to 
examine the reliability of the developed models' statistical explanatory power. 
Having a strong and reliable explanatory power means that the model must be 
able to correctly describe the financing behaviour of its own series (rejecting H, 
when it is false (I 
-P)), and rejecting the alternative series (accepting H, when it is 
true (1 
-a)). 
8.2 GENERATING HYPOTHETICAL TIME-SERIES FINANCING 
In these statistical power tests, we initially generate the simulated financing series 
of debt issues or repayments based on actual operating cash flows. The simulated 
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series also maintain the actual annual dividend and interest amouneo. For each 
model, we generate the hypothetical series for all 225 firms in the sample, each 
spanning 10 years from 1991 to 2000. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) have 
pointed out that there are no requirements to assign any numerical values for the 
coefficients in the specification, although their version generates the series in this 
particular manner. Therefore, the hypothetical financing series generated for this 
experiment differ from those of Shyam-Sunder and Myers in the absence of any 
specified coefficients in the models' specifications. The following subsections 
discuss the procedure in generating our version of the simulated financing series 
of target-adjustment and pecking order. 
8.2.1 TARGET-ADJUSTMENT SIMULATED TIME SERIES 
The target-adjustment financing rule assumes that firms exhibit a tendency to 
converge towards their target. The hypothetical series start with the information 
on the debt ratio in 1990, as this ratio will be the starting point in generating the 
debt ratio flow. We determine the corresponding target ratio for this series by (1) 
the actual historical mean of book debt ratio as in Equation (7.2), and (2) the 
firms' cross-sectional characteristics and industry benchmark in Equation (7.4). 
We estimate the annual debt ratio from 1991 to 2000 based on the idea that firms 
consistently adjust their debt ratio towards the target level when there is a 
deviation away from it, as interpreted by the target-adjustment model in Equation 
(7-1). In this hypothetical series, we have arbitrarily set the range of five percent 21 
20 We are aware that the assumption of maintaining the actual dividend and interest seems 
unrealistic in the real world. Ideally, a hypothetical additional financing should require 
recalculation of dividend and interest. 
21 Since this is a subjective financing framework, firms could set any range from target for their 
financing adjustment. In our case, we arbitrarily pick five percent as the range. 
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from the target for any change in financing decision rule. To begin with, the 
following Table 8.1 summarises the financing decision framework of our 
simulated target-adjustment financing series. 
TABLE 8.1 THE TARGET-ADJUSTMENT FINANCING DECISION FRAMEWORK 
If d< (d* 
- 
0.05) Issue additional debt 
(Repurchases equity) 
If d> (d* + 0.05) Issue additional equity 
(Repay debt) 
If (d*- 0.05) !ýd: 5 (d* + 0.05) Issue proportionate debt and equity (Proportionate repayment of debt and equity) 
* Treatment ofsurpluses in parentheses 
The beginning book-debt ratio 22 triggers the decision rule for this target- 
adjustment series. The stipulated rules assume that firms would issue additional 
debt if the beginning debt ratio (d) is below five percent from the target ratio (d*), 
and issue additional equity if the ratio (d) is well above five percent from the 
target (d*). If the beginning debt ratio (d) is within five percent from the target 
ratio (d*), then firms would issue a mix of debt and equity in equal proportion. In 
the event of surpluses (or negative deficits), the sarne rules apply. Finns 
4 repurchase equity if d is below five percent from d*, pay off debt if 
d above five 
percent from d*, and proportionately pay off debt and repurchase equity if d is 
within five percent from d*. Table 8.2a and the discussion that follows illustrate 
an example on the procedure to generate the simulated target-adjustment series. 
22 We assume the beginning book-debt ratio for the current year as the prior year's debt-to-total 
asset ratio. 
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TABLE 8.2a GENERATING THE HYPOTHETICAL TARGET-ADJUSTMENT 
SERIES: AN EXAMPLE 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Deficit (surplus) 62.25 41.89 (5.04) 1.67 33.64 4.71 3,318 (2,393) 4,324 1,159 
Target ratio (d*) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Long term debt (W) 1.09 63.34 84.28 81.76 83.43 117.07 121.78 3,440.40 1,046.90 3,209.15 3,209.15 
Total Assets (TA) 369.03 697.41 965.75 2,930. 4,589 5,816 8,763 12,874 14,327 15,264 18,603 
Debt ratio (d) 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.03 0,02 0.02 0.01 0.27 0.07 0.21 0.17 
Fxternal Finance: 
Issue (Repurchase) 
Share Capital 0 20.94 (2.52) 0 0 0 0 0 2,162 1,159 
Issue (Repay) loans 62.25 20.94 (2.52) 1.67 33.64 4.71 3,318 (2,393) 2,162 0 
f 
In this example, we initially assume that the firm estimates the target debt ratio 
(d*) based on the historical mean of debt ratio. This explains the constant value of 
d* at 9-percent throughout the period. To generate the series, we assume that this 
firm gradually making efforts to converge its debt ratio to this 9-percent target 
ratio following the financing decision framework outlined in Table 8.1. We refer 
to the zero-percent debt ratio in 1990 as the starting point for this simulation 
example. The series begins by deciding on the financing sources between debt and 
equity to fund the deficit amount of RM62.25 million in 1991. However, since the 
zero-percent debt ratio (d) is below the 5-percent range from the target (d* is set 
at 9 percent), the firm issues only debt to cover this needed amount. This 
additional debt issue changes the debt ratio in 1991. The year-end long-term debt 
level (LD) in 1991 also increases by the amount of this additional debt. In the 
following year, the firm has another deficit of RM41.89 million. Since the 
generated d has now increased to 9-percent, which is within 5-percent range from 
d*, the firm issues equity and debt proportionately (RM41.89mil /2 = RM20.94 
million) in 1992. In 1993, when there is a surplus of RM5.04 million, the firm 
repays both debt and equity in equal proportion as the beginning debt ratio (d) is 
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within 5-percent from dlý Based on the target-adjustment financing framework, 
we generate the target-adjustment series by continuously adjusting the subsequent 
years' annual debt ratio (d) and long-term debt level (LD). 
To test the power of the models, we then fit the target-adjustment and the pecking 
order specifications independently to the generated target-adjustment series. If 
these models are true, the fitted target-adjustment specification should have the 
power to reject the null of non-significant statistical result to this series (I-P), 
t while the fitted pecking order model should fail to reject the null of this statistical 
inference (I 
-a). 
8.2.2 PECKING ORDER SIMULATED TIME SERIES 
In the pecking order financing, we assume that firms issue debt if the deficit 
amount is positive and repay debt if negative. However, since the financing 
behaviour must reflect the semi-strong form of the pecking order model, we add 
another provision in the financing decision. We allow firms to issue additional 
equity if the beginning debt ratio (d) exceeds a certain arbitrarily determined cut- 
off point. 
Our descriptive statistics in Chapter 5 of this thesis have shown that the annual 
mean of debt ratios (both book and market ratios) during the sample period has 
ranged from 20 percent to 70 percent (refer to Table 5.3). In view of this range, 
we attempt to simulate the pecking order financing series by setting several debt 
ratio benchmarks for issuing equity. Based on this range, we arbitrarily set the 
cut-off point at 30 percent, 40 percent and 50 percent as the benchmark before 
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issuing equity, although the pecking order model has no well-defined maximum 
debt level. In essence, we are actually generating three sets of hypothetical 
pecking order financing series with different assumed cut-off points. Similar to 
generating the former series, the initial point of reference for this series is the 
beginning debt ratio in 1991, which is the 1990 year-end book-debt ratio. We 
estimate the following years' annual debt ratios based on the actual fund flow, 
dividends, interest, and total assets for the year. In our pecking order financing 
I 
series, we assume that firm issues only debt in the current year if the beginning 
debt ratio is below the assumed cut-off point. In other words, only when the 
beginning debt ratio exceeds this point, firm starts to issue equity to fund deficit. 
Firms would again issue debt if the beginning debt ratio slips below the assumed 
level. The process continues to generate the hypothetical annual book-debt ratios 
and external financing for each firm from 1991 to 2000. The following Table 
8.2b illustrates the procedure for generating this hypothetical pecking order series 
by continuing with the example presented in Table 8.2a earlier. Similarly, the 
explanation on the example follows after. 
i 
I 
TABLE 8.2b GENERATING THE ffYPOTHETICAL PECKING ORDER SERIES: THE 
EXAMPLE CONTINUES 
1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20001 
! it (surplus) 62.25 41.89 (5.04) 1.67 33.64 4.71 3,318.62 (2,393.50) 4,324.51 I'l 
fng Order at 30% 
ffpoint 
term debt (LD) 1.09 63.34 105.23 100.19 101.86 135.49 140.20 3,458.83 1,065.32 5,389.83 5,3 
Assets (TA) 369.03 697.41 965.75 2,930 4,589 5,816 8,763 12,874 14,327 15,264 1 
ratio (d) 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.27 0,07 0.35 
(Repurchase) 
Capital 0000000001,159.62 
(Repay)loans 62.25 41.89 (5.04) 1.67 33.64 4.71 3,318.62 (2,393,50) 4324.51 0 
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In Table 8.2b, we illustrate an example of the semi-strong pecking order 
hypothetical series with the assumption that the firm only begins issuing equity 
when the beginning debt ratio (d) exceeds the cut-off point of 30-percent (one of 
arbitrarily assumed debt ratio benchmark for issuing equity). Therefore, in order 
to finance the RM62.25 million deficits in 1991, the firm issues additional debt as 
the beginning debt ratio (d) is O-percent. Throughout the period until 1999, the 
firm only issues (repays) debt to cover the deficit (surplus) as the generated d is 
less than the assumed 30-percent cut-off point. However, we observe d reaching 
I 35-percent in 1999, a level exceeding 30-percent. Reacting to this increase, the 
firm resorts to issuing equity in 2000 as a way to halt d from exceeding the 
maximum debt level assumed. 
To perform the power tests, we fit both the target-adjustment and the pecking 
order models independently to this simulated pecking order series. Again, if these 
models are true, we anticipate the pecking order specification to be able to 
demonstrate the power of this statistical inference test (1-P), while the target- 
adjustment model should fail to reject the null of no significance to this pecking 
order series (I 
-cc). 
I 
8.3 DISCUSSION OF THE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Ideally, the target-adjustment model should correctly reject the cases in which the 
financing follows the pecking order rule, and only generate significant statistical 
results to its own financing rule. The sarne justification applies to the pecking 
order specification; only significant to its own simulated financing but not 
significant to the alternative series. If we find a model unable to reject the null for 
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its own series (0) or incorrectly showing significance to the alternative series (a), 
q 
then we can infer that this model is suffering from the lack of statistical 
explanatory power. For this experiment, we perform all tests using pooled OLS 
regressions. In the tests, we adjust to account for first-order serial correlation by 
adding the first-order autoregressive (AR (1)) expression in the equations. 
Moreover, in obtaining robust estimates, we have adjusted the standard errors 
using VA-iite's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
8.3.1 TESTING THE TARGET-ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING 
ORDER MODELS INDEPENDENTLY 
This subsection describes the results from the independent tests. The test starts by 
fitting the models to the target-adjustment series, and subsequently to the pecking 
order series. We discuss the inferences from both independent tests at the end of 
the section. 
(1) Target-adjustment Hypothetical Financing Time Series 
Exhibit 8.1 summarises the outcomes from the simulated target-adjustment series. 
t Panel A presents the results from fitting the series to the target-adjustment model, 
and Panel B shows the results from the fitted pecking order model. Column I 
highlights the series when we calculate the target based on historical mean of debt 
ratio, while the function of firm characteristics and industry benchmark is the 
target specification in column 2. 
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EXHIBIT 8.1 REGRESSION RESULTS FROM FITTING THE TARGET- 
ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING ORDER MODELS 
INDEPENDENTLY TO THE SIMULATED TARGET-ADJUSTMENT 
FINANCING SERIES 
Regression based on Pooled Least Squares. The sign * denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(1) Target-adjustment financing series when target is based on historical mean of debt ratio. 
(2) Target-adjustment financing series when target is based on firm characteristics and industry benchmark 
Target-adjustment 
Series I 
Target-adjustment 
Series 2 
(2) 
PANEL A: 
TARGET-ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
Constant (a) 22.35 23.32 
(4.457) (4.359) 
Target-adjustment 0.76 * 0.07 
Coefficient (, 8TA) (0.163) (0.061) 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.12 
PANEL B: 
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
Constant (a) 0.39 
-6.48 (1.653) (1.605) 
Pecking-order 0.53 * 0.49 * 
Coefficient (, 8po) (0.022) (0.011) 
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.92 
The results indicate that the coefficient in column 1 of Panel A is statistically 
significant with an adjustment coefficient of j6TA = 0.76 and adjusted-R 2 value of 
0.42. However, column 2 (Panel A) reports both very low and insignificant 
coefficient of 8TA = 0.07 and adjusted-R 2 value of 0.12. This low adjusted-R 
2 
value reinforces the earlier finding in Chapter 7, which suggests that firm 
characteristics and industry benchmark may not be a good predictor of target debt 
ratio for Malaysian firms. Meanwhile, when we fit the pecking order 
specifications to the swne series (Panel B), the pecking order coefficients (flpo) 
also present significant results. The coefficients reported are statistically 
i 
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significant with flpo = 0.53 (column 1) and flpo = 0.49 (column 2). Both adjusted- 
R2 values are high at 0.92. 
Based on these results, we can infer that the target-adjustment model has correctly 
produced a significant statistical result to its own financing series. The setback is 
the finding in Panel B. The pecking order also seems to describe the change in 
debt levels even when the simulated series follows the target-adjustment financing 
rule. At this point, we opt to defer any inferences from these results until after 
testing both specifications in the alternative series. 
(2) Pecking order Hypothetical Financing Time Series 
In the second experiment, we fit both the target-adjustment and the pecking order 
models to the simulated pecking order financing series. To reflect the semi-strong 
assumption of the pecking order model, we have generated three simulated 
pecking order financing series with different benchmarks of debt ratio (i. e. 30 
percent, 40 percent and 50 percent), as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Exhibit 8.2 presents the results from fitting both model specifications to each of 
these financing series. Column 1 summarises the results when fitting the model to 
the pecking order series at the debt-ratio cut-off point of 30-percent, while column 
2 and 3 highlight the results when the cut-off point is 40-percent and 50-percent 
respectively. 
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EXHIBIT 8.2 REGRESSION RESULTS FROM FITTING THE TARGET- 
ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING ORDER MODELS 
INDEPENDENTLY TO THE SIMULATED PECKING ORDER 
FINANCING SERIES 
Regression based on Pooled Least Squares. The sign * denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses. (1) Pecking order financing series reflects a semi-strong assumption with a cut-off debt ratio of 30%. (2) Pecking order financing series reflects a semi-strong assumption with a cut-off debt ratio of 40%. (3) Pecking order financing series reflects a semi-strong assumption with a cut-off debt ratio of 50%. 
Simulated 
Pecking Order 
Series I 
(1) 
Simulated 
Pecking Order 
Series 2 
(2) 
Simulated 
Pecking Order 
Series 3 
(3) 
PANEL A: 
TARGET-ADJUSTMENT 
MODEL 
Constant (a) 49.67 138.22 196.27 
(16.090) (74.34) (121.248) 
Target-adjustment 0.51 1.14 * 1.16 * 
Coefficient (fiTA) (0.300) (0.412) (0.399) 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.26 0.24 
PANEL B: 
PECKING ORDER 
MODEL 
Constant (a) 
- 
14.99 
-7.63 -3.41 (3.341) (1.899) (1.001) 
Pecking-order 0.90 * 0.97 * 0.99 * 
Coefficient (flpo) (0.061) (0.020) (0.005) 
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.97 0.99 
In column 1, the results show that the adjustment coefficient (flTA) in Panel A is 
not statistically significant at PTA = 0.51 to explain the pecking order series. This 
test has correctly failed to reject the null of no significance to this pecking order 
series. As anticipated, the pecking order specification in Panel B has the power to 
reject the null of no significance to this series. The fitted pecking order 
specifications have produced both the coefficient (flpo) and the adjusted-R 2 values 
equal to 0.90. 
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The next two columns illustrate the results when we increase the cut-off point 
from 30-percent to 40-percent (column 2) and 50-percent (column 3), the results 
of the target-adjustment specifications have differed markedly. The target- 
adjustment coefficient (flTA) in both columns produces a very high and significant 
coefficient value of 1.14 (column 2 in Panel A) and 1.16 (column 3 in Panel A) 
respectively, in contrast to the lower value and non-significant coefficient 
produced earlier when the cut-off point is 30-percent. Likewise, the pecking order 
specifications in column 2 and 3 of Panel B also show a highly significant pecking 
I order coefficient (flpo) equal to 0.97 (column 2) and 0.99 (column 3). It appears 
that when we increase this cut-off point, the values of the adjustment and pecking 
order coefficients have risen to values close to or greater than one. These 
coefficient values however, are not empirically plausible. Therefore, we only take 
into account the empirical results produced by the fitted specifications in column 
1, which is when the debt ratio benchmark for issuing equity is 30-percent. 
At this 30-percent benchmark, both models seem to have comparable statistical 
explanatory power when fitted to this hypothetical pecking order series. The 
target-adjustment model has correctly failed to re ect the null of non-significant j 
statistical result to this pecking order financing series (I -(x). Meanwhile, the 
alternative pecking order model has demonstrated its power of this statistical 
inference test by correctly rejecting the null of no significance (1-P), thus fitting 
its own series well. 
Thus far, the findings from the fitted tests above can be surnmarised as follows: 
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TABLE 8.3 SUMMARIES OF THE FINDINGS FROM FITTING THE TARGET- 
ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING ORDER MODELS TO 
DIFFERENT HYPOTHETICAL FINANCING SERIES 
Target-adjustment Pecking order series 
series 
Target-adjustment Model (1-a) 
Pecking Order Model Type I error 
(a) 
The results indicate that the target-adjustment model is able to demonstrate its 
statistical explanatory power by accepting its own financing series (I-P) and 
t 
rejecting the alternative pecking order series (I 
-a). On the other hand, the pecking 
order specifications have indicated its significance to both financing rules. The 
model has accepted its own pecking order series (I-P), however, failed to reject 
the alternative target- adjustment series. It seems that the pecking order model in 
our fitted test lacks statistical power, as the model has incorrectly rejected the null 
when the null is true, hence statistically committing a Type I error (a). Our 
findings from the power tests above fail to support the work of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999), which claims a stronger performance of the pecking order model 
than the target-adj ustment model, when judged on explanatory power. 
In seeking for some explanation, we attempt to duplicate Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers' version of the simulated series by assigning numerical value to the 
coefficients in both specifications. We generate these new hypothetical financing 
series based on the following assumptions: 
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(1) The newly generated target-adjustment series use an adjustment coefficient 
of 8TA= 0.6 (a figure arbitrarily taken based on the empirical results of the 
adjustment coefficient in Exhibit-7-. 1, which range from 0.59 to 0.67). 
(2) This hypothetical pecking order financing series assign a pecking order 
coefficient of Opo =0.8 (a mid-point value based on Exhibit 7.3 that present 
the empirical results of pecking order coefficient ranging from 0.73 to 0.86). 
z The following Exhibit 8.3 shows the results from the fitted tests 23 
I 
EXHIBIT 8.3 REGRESSION RESULTS FROM FITTING THE TARGET- 
ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING ORDER MODELS TO THE 
SIMULATED SERIES WHEN NUMERICAL VALUES ARE ASSIGNED 
TO GENERATE THE SERIES 
Regression based on Pooled Least Squares. The sign * denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(1) Pecking order financing series using an pecking order coefficient of 6PO = 0.8 
(2) Target-adjustment financing series using an adjustment coefficient of flTA = 0.6 
(1) 
Pecking order 
simulated series 
(2) 
Target-adjustment 
simulated series 
PANEL A: 
TARGET-ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
Constant (a) 6.92 
(4.444) 
Target-adjustment 0.96 * 
Coefficient (, 8TA) (0.160) 
Adjusted R2 0.24 
PANEL B: 
PECKING ORDER MODEL 
Constant (a) 19.3 5 
(4.607) 
Pecking-order 0.02 
Coefficient (, 8po) (0.012) 
Adjusted R2 0.55 
23 We leave column 2 in Panel A and column I in Panel B empty as the specifications in these 
columns are essentially fitting into the data generated by the same equation. 
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In the above exhibit, Panel A summarises the results when the target-adjustment 
model is fitted to the newly generated hypothetical pecking order financing series 
(column 1), while Panel B indicates the results from fitting the pecking order 
model to the newly generated target-adjustment financing series (column 2). The 
results produce a statistically significant -target-adjustment coefficient of 8TA = 
0.96 (Panel A) and adjusted-R 2 value of 0.24. Meanwhile, Panel B reports a non- 
significant pecking order coefficient of j8po = 0.02 and an adjusted-R 2 of 0.55. 
Our findings for this part suggest that the pecking order model has demonstrated 
its statistical power by correctly failing to show any significant statistical result 
when financing follows target-adjustment series (see column 2 in Panel B). 
Whereas, the result of the target-adjustment model has incorrectly produced a 
significant coefficient when fitted to the pecking order series (see column I in 
Panel A). It seems that the explanatory power of the pecking order model only 
becomes evident when the generated series use specific numerical coefficients. 
Our fitted test on this newly generated financing series fails to show the 
explanatory power of the target-adjustment model. 
I 
In view of this finding, we may possibly conclude that the greater support for the 
pecking order model than in the target-adjustment model, as claimed by Shyam- 
Sunder and Myer, could only be observed when the models' coefficient is 
specified. Since there is no indication to believe that firms will always set specific 
coefficient values in their financing formula, the experiment on this statistical 
power continues using the financing decision framework set earlier. 
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8.3.2 TESTING THE TARGET-ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING 
ORDER MODELS JOINTLY 
In this final test, we fit both specifications jointly to each simulated series. 
Exhibit 8.4 summarises the results from this joint specification test. Column I 
shows the results from fitting this joint specification to the simulated pecking 
order series, while column 2 highlights the results from the target-adjustment 
series. 
EXHIBIT 8.4 REGRESSION RESULTS FROM FITTING BOTH THE TARGET- 
ADJUSTMENT AND THE PECKING ORDER MODELS JOINTLY TO 
THE SIMULATED SERIES 
Regression based on Pooled Least Squares. The sign * denotes that the coefficients are significant at 1% level 
and standard errors are reported in parentheses. (1) The semi-strong form of pecking order series at cut-off debt ratio of 30% (2) Target-adjustment financing series when target is based on historical mean of debt ratio. 
(1) 
Pecking order 
simulated series 
(2) 
Target-adjustment 
simulated series 
COMBINED MODEL: 
Constant (a) 
-14.45 0.56 (3.938) (1.673) 
Pecking-order 
Coefficient (flpo) 0.90 0.49 
(0.063) (0.018) 
Target-adjustment 0.02 0.16 * 
Coefficient (flTA) (0.053) (0.047) 
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.93 
Although indicating a lower pecking order coefficient value of j8po = 0.49 in the 
target-adjustment series (column 2) compared to the coefficient value of 8po = 
0.90 in its own pecking order series (column 1), the results still show that the 
pecking order specifications fit significantly well to both series. On the contrary, 
the target-adjustment specification has fitted its own simulated series (flTA = 0.16 
in column 2), and has failed to reject the null of non-significant statistical result 
for the simulated data based on the pecking-order specification (column 1). 
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In the joint test above, the interpreted results also fail to produce the alleged 
greater confidence of the pecking order model as suggested by Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers. The findings indicate that the pecking order specifications fit the simulated 
target-adjustment series just as well as its own series. This finding apparently 
generates a false fit. However, the target-adjustment model has demonstrated the 
power of the statistical inference test by rejecting the null of no significance to its 
own series (I-P), and correctly failed to reject the null hypothesis when fitted to 
the alternative pecking order series (I 
-a). Our overall findings reveal no support 
to suggest a stronger explanatory power of the pecking order model than in the 
target-adjustment model. On the other hand, it seems that the target-adjustment 
model developed for this fitted test appears to have power. 
Why do our statistical power tests suggest contradictory outcomes to those 
claimed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers? We suppose the possible explanations are 
as follows: 
a. Different procedure in generating the hypothetical series 
In our simulation experiment, we have altered the procedure for generating the 
hypothetical financing series of target-adjustment and pecking order. Instead of 
assigning some numerical values to the coefficients following the procedure of 
Shyarn-Sunder and Myers, we generate the series based on the financing decision 
framework outlined and discussed earlier in the chapter. The subjective financing 
decision framework that we employed in generating the simulated financing series 
has shown to change the results of the statistical power tests. 
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b. Different underlying assumption of the pecking order 
The predetermined financing decision framework, together with the semi-strong 
assumption of the pecking order further intensifies this contradictory outcome. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers' claim on the strong performance of the pecking order 
model is based on a strict pecking order assumption, in which firms never issue 
equity. However, our developed model assumes the semi-strong form of pecking 
order model by Chirinko & Singha (2000), which suggests issuing additional 
equity when firms have exhausted their debt capacity. Likewise, the target- 
I adjustment behaviour also utilises financing through equity in preserving the 
optimal capital structure. By definition, there is a fine line in the underlying 
motives behind the pecking order and the target-adjustment behaviours. However, 
we find it difficult to accurately distinguish between the two financing behaviours 
when equity issues appear in firms' financing stream. 
c. No single unique proxy for each leverage predictor 
There is no single unique representation for the unobservable attributes when 
using proxy (Titman & Wessels, 1988). We could use several proxies to represent 
the leverage predictors. For instance, both net profit margin and return on assets 
I 
can represent firm's profitability measure. In addition, one proxy may also 
represent several attributes. One example is asset tangibility, as it could represent 
firm's collateral value as well as firm's potential growth. Depending on which 
proxy to use and how we interpret it, the results may vary subjectively. Therefore, 
even when the target ratio specifications are similar, the proxies representing the 
predictors may differ, thus, affecting the target-adjustment outcome. 
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d. Different economic setting 
i 
II 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers have sampled mature firms in the stable United States 
economy. However, the sample for this research consists of a mix of mature and 
growing firms from an emerging market economy. In addition, we have found 
earlier that the financing behaviour of Malaysian firms is closely linked to the 
economic events experienced by the country during the period of the study, 
especially when all these firms have been badly affected by the economic turmoil 
in 1997-98. In view of the difference in economic orientation between our sample 
and the sample from Shyam-Sunder and Myers, we need to anticipate the 
contradicting outcomes of the tests. 
8.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reassesses the statistical explanatory power of both the target- 
adjustment and the pecking order models when tested in a different economy. 
Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999) originally introduce this power test using a 
sample of mature firms in a well-developed economy. In their paper, they have 
demonstrated that the pecking order model has greater explanatory power than in 
the target-adjustment model. This analysis adopts similar power tests in an 
attempt to seek some reliability as to whether the pecking order model would also 
perform well if tested on firms from other economic background. If the results are 
consistent to those of Shyarn-Sunder and Myers, then the strong perfonnance of 
the pecking order model with regards to explanatory power can be generalised. As 
highlighted in the discussion of this chapter, the two deviations from Shyam- 
Sunder and Myers' power tests are in the decision rules for generating the 
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simulated financing series, and the underlying assumption of the pecking order 
model. 
The main empirical results can be surnmarised as follows: (1) The strong 
performance of the pecking order model, as suggested by Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, only become evident when we assign specific numerical value to the 
coefficients in the specifications to generate the hypothetical financing series. (2) 
However, when we change the procedure in generating the hypothetical series 
I from assigning numerical value to using subjective decision rules based on a 
predetermined financing framework, our findings indicate otherwise. In addition 
to fitting its own series, the pecking order specifications have incorrectly 
produced significant statistical results when fitted to the alternative target- 
a ustment financing series. (3) Building on similar procedure, we find that the 
target-adjustment model has performed well when tested both independently and 
jointly to each financing series. (4) Finally, our tests have demonstrated the power 
of the target-adjustment model and unable to prove the alleged stronger 
performance of the pecking order model. 
I 
In sum, we find that the results from our simulation experiments are inconsistent 
with the Shyam-Sunder and Myers' (1999) claim on the greater confidence of the 
pecking order model than in the target-adjustment model, when judged on 
explanatory power. In fact, our findings show that the target-adjustment model 
has outperformed the pecking order model when fitted to our version of 
hypothetical financing series. The procedure in generating the series, the 
underlying assumption of the pecking order model, the subjective proxies for 
0 
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leverage predictors, and the difference in our firms' profiles may be amongst the 
plausible factors contributing to the results of these power tests. The findings from 
our simulated experiments in this chapter suggest that the issue of what constitutes 
an accurate model that fit the descriptions of corporate financing behaviour 
remains inconclusive. 
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PART 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 9 
4 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN MALAYSIA: 
THE CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The thesis examines the relevance of different capital structure theories in 
explaining capital structure choice of Malaysian firms. Based on descriptive 
exploration and panel data study, the thesis concludes that both the static trade-off 
and the pecking order theories do provide plausible explanation of Malaysian 
firms' financing behaviour. 
The conclusions for this thesis are split into four parts: Section 9.2 presents 
Malaysian firms' financing background. In essence, this section describes how 
financing patterns relate to economic events and the capital structure theoretical 
predictions. Section 9.3 provides evidence on the consistency between the 
proposed Malaysian factors and the factors cited in the empirical capital structure 
literature. Section 9.4 offers empirical evidence on the relevance of the static 
I trade-off theory (via target-adjustment model) and the semi-strong form of the 
pecking order model in explaining Malaysian firms' financing behaviour. The 
findings indicate that both theories coexist in explaining most corporate financing 
strategy. Section 9.5 however, fails to conclusively determine the better model 
that fit the description of firms' financing behaviour. Finally, Section 9.6 provides 
summaries of the general conclusions, and the subsections discuss the limitations 
of the thesis, the practical implications of the research, and the suggested 
recommendations for future research. 
I 
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9.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCING BACKGROUND 
The first part of the thesis describes Malaysian firms' financing profiles during the 
period from 1991 to 2000. The firms' financing patterns that emerged from our 
exploration range from no-leverage to all-leverage financing. We find that 
Malaysian firms' financing patterns change in response to the economic events 
experienced by the country during the period of the study. For example, during 
the recent Asian crisis,, we observe that firms' financing in all financing categories 
v (i. e. equity, debt and mixed financing) had slowed. Equity financing began to pick 
up as the crisis ended, while debt and mixed financing indicated varying trend 
after the crisis. Further, the inclination for firms in some industries to follow 
specific type of financing infers some industry- specific financing trend. Through 
an inductive examination on the patterns, we find that most of the firms' financing 
behaviour fit the static trade-off and the pecking order descriptions. Despite 
differences in the financial system as compared to the west, the initial inference 
on this part of the thesis has been able to link Malaysian firms' financing patterns 
to the traditional theoretical predictions. Finally, a preliminary look on the 
prediction of several proposed Malaysian firm-sPecific factors suggests some 
consistency with regards to the effect of size and profitability on firms' leverage. 
The conclusion of this part of the thesis on the relevance of economic events, 
industry, and capital structure theory in explaining firms' financing behaviour are 
only preliminary impressions at the initial stage of the investigation. Nevertheless, 
this background analysis of the data facilitates in rationalising the empirical 
findings of the thesis. 
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9.3 CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES AND DETERMINANTS 
This part of the thesis concludes that the proposed firm-specific factors in 
Malaysian capital structure are similar to those cited in the literature. The 
empirical results conclude that a firm's industry membership plays an important 
role in determining the firm's leverage, despite the possibilities of some 
conflicting industry findings due to varying views of how the concept of industry 
groupings and leverage should be characterised (Bowen et. al., 1982). The relation 
of the theory-related capital structure factors of asset tangibility, profitability, and 
0 tax status in Malaysian financing decisions are also consistent with the relation 
documented in most capital structure work (e. g. Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Graham, 
1996; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Pandey, 200 1). Further, the negative relation 
between past profitability and debt embraces the underlying motive of the western 
capital structure arguments (e. g. bankruptcy cost, asset substitution effect, and 
asymmetric information). 
The conclusion of this part of the thesis reiterates the claim of earlier work on 
comparative capital structure evidence such as in Booth et. al. (2001), Wald 
(1999), Bartholdy et. al. (1997), and Rajan and Zingales (1995). Our findings 
about the significant relation of several well-cited factors in determining 
Malaysian firms' capital structure decisions substantiate the claim that the 
leverage-related factors identified in the developed economy can be applied to 
other countries as well, regardless of different economic orientation. 
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9.4 RELEVANCE OF TRE CAPITA-L STRUCTURE MODELS 
This part of the thesis concludes that the static trade-off and the pecking order 
models are able to provide plausible explanation of Malaysian firms' financing 
behaviour. The results from the analysis carried out show that the description of 
both the target-adjustment and the pecking order models are consistent with firms' 
financing decision. Although the performance the target-adjustment model 
degrades when tested jointly, the results are still significant in predicting the 
variations in debt level. Both the static trade-off and the pecking order models 
seem to be able to operate simultaneously to describe firms' financing behaviour. 
Based on our developed models adapted from the models of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) and the criticisms of Chirinko and Singha (2000), the results in this 
part suggest that both the static trade-off and the pecking order theories coexist in 
explaining the financing behaviour of most firms in Malaysia. This finding 
reinforces the initial impression generated in the early part of this thesis on the 
relevance of the theoretical description in explaining Malaysian firms' financing 
patterns. Our overall findings on the coexistence of both capital structure theories 
in firms' financing decisions also support the earlier work by Claggett Jr. (1991), 
Vogt (1994), Ghosh and Cai (1999), and Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999). This 
part of the thesis claims that the western capital structure theories are capable of 
describing Malaysian capital structure. 
9.5 EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
SPECIFICATIONS 
This part of the thesis fails to support the claim by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
i 
(1999) on the stronger performance of the pecking order model than in the target- 
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adjustment model, when judged on explanatory power. The statistical power tests 
on both capital structure model specifications produce inconsistent results when 
the models are fitted, independently and jointly, to several hypothetical financing 
series. The pecking order model has generated a false fit ((x), when it incorrectly 
fits the alternative target-adjustment series just as well as its own series. However, 
the results from the fitted tests lend some evidence on the power of the target- 
adjustment model by accepting its own financing series (I-P) and rejecting the 
alternative pecking order series (I 
-a). The procedure in generating the 
0 hypothetical series, the revised underlying assumption of the model, the subjective 
proxies for leverage predictors, and the different sample background are amongst 
the plausible contributory factors for the improved statistical explanatory power of 
the target-adjustment model and the declined performance of the pecking order 
model. 
This part of the thesis has not been able to replicate the claim of Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) and the earlier writers (Gosh & Cai, 1999; Claggett Jr., 1991; 
Baskin, 1989) on the power of the pecking order model. Based on the findings in 
this part, it seems that the stronger performance of the pecking order model than 
in the target adjustment model is a limited view and cannot be generalised. For 
that reason, this concluding part is unable to justify an answer to the question on 
which model can generally provide better explanation of firms' financing 
behaviour. 
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9.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS 
To recapitulate, the general conclusions of this thesis are as follows: (1) Firms' 
financing trend changes with economic cycle. (2) Malaysian firms' financing 
pattern varies across industries. (3) Most leverage-related factors proposed by 
studies in the developed economies are also applicable in Malaysia, regardless of 
different institutional background. (4) The specifications in the traditional capital 
structure models of static trade-off and pecking order are relevant in explaining 
Malaysian firms' financing behaviour. (5) However, there is no conclusive 
I indication as to which capital structure model can better describe the firms' 
financing behaviour. 
9.6.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
A research of this nature must assume some implicit rules that a firm must follow 
in deciding its financing means. Firms normally plan their financing resources in 
advance, based on some set objectives, such as minimising costs, maintaining 
some target ratios and preserving financial flexibilities. No firms simply choose 
their financing resources arbitrarily without considering the outcome of the choice 
made. However, in this thesis, we assume that the main motivation for firms to opt 
specific financing behaviour is to follow fixed financing rules of either 
maintaining some optimality or following some form of financing hierarchy. 
Furthermore, different firms may have adopted different accounting standards, a 
typical problem when using accounting variables. Examples of such problems are 
the inventory costing of LIFO and FIFO, the depreciation methods, and the cash 
versus accrual basis. Therefore, the approach of using proxies to represent the 
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unobservable theoretical attributes may pose a number of problems (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988). Titman and Wessels specify problems such as: (1) there is no 
single unique representation of the attributes measured. (2) It is difficult to find 
measures of particular attributes than are unrelated to other attributes. (3) Since 
these observed variables are imperfect representation, their use in regression 
analysis introduces an error-in-variable problem. (4) The measurement errors in 
proxy variables may relate to the measurement errors in the dependent variables, 
creating false correlation. Therefore, to deal with these problems, Titman and 
I Wessels employ a factor-analytic technique that mitigates the measurement 
problems encountered when working with proxy variables. We are aware of the 
problem, however we do not venture into the factor-analytic technique for this 
research. Nonetheless, accounting data is the closest element that a researcher can 
embrace to represent the unobservable attributes. 
As highlighted by Pandey (2001), data availability is the major limitation in 
capital structure studies in emerging market economies. Due to inadequate 
compilation of firms' database by the KLSE, the manual data collection procedure 
employed in this research may subject to possible human error. Further, the 
construction of simplified fund flow statement in exploring firms' financing 
pattern may not be the only way to reconcile the inconsistent cash flow reporting 
of the firms. Given the limited database and time constraint, this was the best 
alternative that transpired during the analysis stage. 
Finally, the models developed in this thesis are simple models, adapted from the 
model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and the subsequent comments by 
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Chirinko and Singha (2000) on the pecking order model's assumptions. Even after 
revising the underlying assumptions and including some subjective financing 
decision framework to the models' specifications, the models still need some 
improvements if they were to represent firms' actual financing scenarios. 
Inevitably, in seeking for precise descriptions of the realistic facet of the corporate 
financing decision, richer specifications, possibly with scenario analysis, to 
capture some specific situations are in order. 
9.6.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
Since MM (195 8), much has been learnt about capital structure and its effects on 
finns' value. Each study thereafter brings an increased understanding of the forces 
influencing firms' financing decisions. Nonetheless, we are unlikely to be able to 
provide explanation of the financing behaviour with certainty. Whenever 
consensus seems to emerge, we find that financial changes and innovations in the 
real business world appear. However, this is not to suggest that we cannot offer 
practical advice to policy makers, financial managers and investors. In view of 
different economic and financial orientations, our plausible recommendations to 
these respective parties in Malaysia are as follows: 
A. Policy makers 
In the efforts to further transform Malaysian PDS market into a more active 
secondary market, policy makers should devise ways and means to encourage 
participations in this market. Market participants normally want some assurance 
that their investments in the market will provide maximum return at minimum 
possible risk. The outcome of any policy changes should tailor toward having an 
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increased liquidity in the market, and tax is one mechanism. Our findings about 
the significance of tax in firms' financial decisions (Chapter 6 of this thesis) 
suggest that policy makers should design a taxation regime that would not only 
maximise the tax benefit of debt to debt-seekers but to debt-providers as well. On 
the investors' side, Malaysia's current tax system seeks to fully offset the tax 
incentive of corporate debt by giving investors a tax credit on dividends received 
since Malaysian shareholders do not pay additional taxes on dividend income. In 
order to have an increased participation from these market lenders, policy makers 
could also implement a tax incentive scheme for bondholders as well. Perhaps, an 
incentive in the form of tax exemption on some portion of interest income from 
securities purchased from the PDS market. To boost market confidence, policy 
makers could introduce a more tightened financial reporting system as to reduce 
the adverse selection problem. A further idea is to encourage the use of equivalent 
restrictive covenants on traded bonds to reduce moral hazard. 
B. Financial managers 
As far as financial managers are concerned, they want to ensure that their firms 
are financed at the lowest possible cost. Any financial decisions must be able to 
create value for the firms. As discussed in the literature (Chapter 3 of this thesis), 
there is no clear evidence that managers only pursue an optimal capital structure, 
as pecking order appears to be a common financing practice. In support, our 
findings about the relevance of traditional capital structure theories in explaining 
firms' financing behaviour (Chapter 7 of this thesis) suggest that both capital 
structure theories of static trade-off and pecking order coexist in Malaysia, and 
there is tax benefit to debt. Based on these findings, managers could be missing 
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opportunities to enhance value if they don't utilise debt. Therefore, to gain the 
most from both capital structure practices, financial managers should exhibit a 
preference toward internal funds over funds generated externally. In acquiring 
funds externally, financial managers should tailor decisions towards taking full 
advantage of the tax benefit of debt. However, if bankruptcy costs were very high, 
then setting a low target capital structure would be appropriate. 
Investors 
# As far as investors are concerned, they want to constantly ensure that their 
investments in the financial market can provide maximum return at minimum risk. 
Our overall findings in this thesis about the implications of different corporate 
financing strategies could provide better access for investors to make sensible 
investment decisions. Even when the current tax system impliedly suggests that 
investors would be better off taking advantage of dividend tax incentive by 
investing in equity, investors should aware of the risks associated with stock price 
volatility in the equity market. Therefore, investors should appreciate the 
contribution that corporate bonds can make to their portfolio, potentially 
providing greater security of income than investing in equities, especially to 
Malaysian pension providers. 
9.6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future research could involve looking at similar firms in two divided sub-periods; 
(1) the pre-economic crisis period (1991-1996), and (2) the post-economic crisis 
period (1999-present), and see whether there are changes in the perceived 
financing trend. By separating these periods, we can check whether there are 
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significant differences in firins' financing patterns before and after the crisis of 
1997-98. Since after the crisis, the banking system has been restructured to restore 
the banking sectors. In addition, the latest announcement on the depegging of 
Malaysian ringgit suggests stability of the country's financial system, hoping to 
boost confidence in the market. Inevitably, with the encouraging economic 
situation, improved PDS market, along with the revitalised banking system, it 
would seem reasonable to expect firms to raise more financing through debt in 
this latter period. With this inclination, will firms still insist on keeping optimality 
in their capital structure or choose financing based on ease and flexibility? 
Bringing this issue to light, the period of the crisis would be the transition point in 
examining which capital structure theory dominates in two states of economy: (1) 
pre-crisis and (2) post-crisis. Perhaps, one of the capital structure models would 
outdo the alternative in each period comparatively as the economic circumstances 
change. 
As more data becomes available in the future, one could explore additional 
variables that may have significant influence on Malaysian corporate debt policy. 
Additional research could engage in developing higher-order models that define 
firms' financing behaviour without having to impose strict assumptions on the 
models. A more practical capital structure choice that is able to explain the 'real' 
financing behaviour could emerge from this newly developed model. In relation, 
we would recommend developing a 'hybrid' capital structure model that possesses 
both the static trade-off and the pecking order attributes since both models' 
descriptions are commonly detected in firms' financing. In addition, we cannot 
draw a conclusive description between the static trade-off and the semi-strong 
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pecking order model with certainty when equity issues appear in firms' financing 
stream. Therefore, establishing this 'hybrid' capital structure model may be one 
solution in search for the accurate descriptor of corporate financing strategy in an 
economy. 
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